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Abstract 
National parliaments have always been involved in the affairs of the European Union. 
They have debated and voted on joining the Community and have ratified the 
European treaties negotiated by their governments. On a more regular basis, national 
parliaments have also, to varying degrees, scrutinised European legislation and the 
European-level activities of their executives. Increasingly, it has been recognised that 
national parliaments underpin decisions taken at the European level by legitimising 
the actions of their executives. 
As Europeanisation has progressed and the impact of European legislation has become 
more widely felt at the domestic level, national parliaments have found that their space 
to manoeuvre has shrunk. National parliaments have become part of a multi-level 
system of governance and can no longer, singularly, determine the parameters within 
which they operate. 
The traditional model of undertaking scrutiny, with specialised European committees 
operating in isolation from the rest of parliament, is therefore no longer tenable. EU 
specialists are unable to provide the expertise on all areas covered by European 
integration and increasingly require the expertise found in other committees within 
national parliaments to perform their scrutiny adequately. Inter-parliamentary contacts 
have contributed to a better understanding of common parliamentary problems. 
Parliamentarians have become more aware of the challenges of Europeanisation and 
globalisation, but have also discovered ways to, collectively and individually, face 
these challenges. 
National parliaments are likely to remain firmly anchored in the domestic level, 
maintaining their roles as legitimisers of national executives as well as expressions of 
national sovereignty. They can therefore also be expected to remain independent and 
autonomous institutions, determining their own activities and procedures. As a 
consequence, the impetus behind any move by national parliaments to further develop 
their influence over European (or global) decision-making and activities must come 
from within national parliaments themselves. 
2 
Contents 
Contents .............................................................................................................................................. 3 
Acknowledgements 
.......................................................................................................................... 5 
List of Figures: ................................................................................................................................... 6 
List of Tables: ..................................................................................................................................... 6 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 7 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................. .. 8 
1. The impact of Europeanisation ............................................................................................ 12 2. Legislatures and parliaments ............................................................................................... 15 Vertical division of power .................................................................................................... 18 3. National parliaments and the EU ........................................................................................ 20 4. The case studies of Denmark, Italy and the UK ............................................................... 23 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 26 Chapter 2: Democracy and integration theory .......................................................................... 28 
1. The nation state and its governance ................................................................................... 30 Globalisation ........................................................................................................................... 33 2. Democracy in the EU ............................................................................................................. 36 EU and the democratic process ........................................................................................... 36 The democratic deficit ......................................................................................................... 38 3. European integration: theories and the parliaments ....................................................... 41 Federalism, transactionalism, and functionalism ............................................................ 42 Neofunctionalism ................................................................................................................... 43 Realism/ intergovernmentalism .......................................................................................... 44 Multi-level governance ......................................................................................................... 46 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 48 Chapter 3: The European Union and national parliaments: Together but apart? .............. 51 
1. The EU's founding treaties ................................................................................................... 52 2 The EU institutions ................................................................................................................ 57 The Commission .................................................................................................................... 57 The Council ............................................................................................................................. 59 The European Court of justice ............................................................................................ 60 The European Parliament ..................................................................................................... 61 3. National parliaments and the EU ........................................................................................ 64 Historic developments .......................................................................................................... 66 Information 
...................................................... 67 Levels of power ...................................................................................................................... 70 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 71 Chapter 4: Denmark ....................................................................................................................... 74 
1. Select committees within the Folketing ............................................................................... 77 2 The European Union Committee ........................................................................................ 80 3. The involvement of select committees in European affairs ............................................ 84 4. The Administration ................................................................................................................ 88 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 93 Chapter 5: Italy ................................................................................................................................ 98 
1. The First republic and its transformation .........................................................:.............. 100 2. Parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs .................................................................... 105 The Chamber of Deputies ................................................................................................... 105 The Senate ............................................... .......................................................................... 107 3. The legge comunitaria ............................................................ ........................................... 111 4. Parliamentary relations with government and the administration ..........................:. 114 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 
119 
Chapter 6: United Kingdom ........................................................................................................ 121 
1. How Parliament has developed over time ...................................................................... 124 
The European Scrutiny Committee .................................................................................. 125 
2. Working methods of committees ...................................................................................... 128 
3. European affairs in other select committees .................................................................... 133 
4. The European Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords .......................................... 137 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 
139 
Chapter 7: Political culture and scrutiny .................................................................................. 143 
1. The concept of political culture .......................................................................................... 145 2. The case studies .................................................................................................................... 148 Denmark ................................................................................................................................ 148 Italy ......................................................................................................................................... 151 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 154 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 157 Chapter 8: Inter-parliamentary co-operation within Europe ................................................ 161 
1. The Assize .............................................................................................................................. 163 2. COSAC ................................................................................................................................... 165 3. The Conventions ................................................................................................................... 171 4. A second chamber? .............................................................................................................. 176 5. Other initiatives .................................................................................................................... 178 Conference of Speakers of the European Parliaments .................................................. 178 Other meetings and contacts ............................................................................................. 179 6. Conclusion .......................:..................................................................................................... 180 Chapter 9: Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 183 
1. Europeanisation .................................................................................................................... 184 2. National parliaments in the EU ......................................................................................... 189 3. Convergence .......................................................................................................................... 194 4. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 198 Appendix A: Research Notes 204 
Appendix B .................................................................................................................................... 206 
Questions for chairs of EU Committee ................................................................................. 206 Questions for chairs of select committees ............................................................................ 207 Questions for Danish ex-ministers ........................................................................................ 208 Appendix C. List of interviews .................................................................................................. 209 
Brussels ........................................................... ............................................................................ 209 Denmark 
........................................................ ............................................................................ 210 Italy ............................................................................................................................................. 211 United Kingdom ....................................................................................................................... 212 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 213 
4 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to extend my sincerest thanks and gratitude to all of those who gave their 
time for interviews or for answering questions via letters and emails. The information 
you so generously gave underpins this thesis-without you it would not exist. As my 
supervisor, John Peterson has also been invaluable in providing loyal support, 
guidance and contacts. Several people have honoured me by reading and commenting 
on various drafts of this thesis: Sven Bengtson, Robin Benson, Tapio Raunio, Rosemary 
Robertson and (especially) Murray Leith-thank you all. I am indebted to the 
University Association for Contemporary European Studies for providing me with the 
grant that allowed me to undertake invaluable fieldwork in Brussels and Rome. 
Thanks are also due to Peter Aimer from the University of Auckland who planted the 
initial seed of this thesis. My most special thanks, however, go to Robin: for your 
patience, love and support. 
5 
List of Figures: 
Figure 1.1: Power, authority and influence as methods of affecting behaviour 
Figure 3.1: Co-decision Procedure 
List of Tables: 
Table 3.1: voter turnout in elections for the European Parliament 
Table 3.2: Impact of national parliament in EU affairs 
Table 3.3: Types of actors in a two-level game 
Table 6.1: Relative strengths of party representation (after 2005 election) 
Table 8.1: Involvement by national parliaments in European affairs 
Table 9.1: Types of actors in a two-level game 
6 
List of Abbreviations 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives 
COSAC Conference of European affairs Committees 
DG Directorate General 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 
EEC European Economic Community 
EESC European Economic and Social Committee 
EP European Parliament 
ESC European Scrutiny Committee 
EU European Union 
EUC European Union Committee 
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community 
FPP First Past the Post 
IGC Intergovernmental Conference 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
MP Member of Parliament 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PCI Partito Comunista Italian (Italian Communist Party) 
QMV Qualified Majority Vote 
SEA Single European Act 
TEU Treaty of European Union 
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
7 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
National parliamentsl have always been involved in the affairs of the European Union 
(EU). z They have debated and voted on whether their member states should join what 
is now the EU and have ratified the European treaties negotiated by their governments. 
On a more regular basis, national parliaments have also, albeit to varying degrees, 
scrutinised European legislation and the European-level activities of their executives. 
While the EU's own institutions-the European Commission, Council of Ministers, and 
European Parliament (EP)-are the EU's primary decision-takers, it has become 
increasingly recognised that national parliaments underpin decisions taken at the 
European level by legitimising the actions of their executives. 
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the role of national parliaments in EU 
policy-making has changed and expanded, but only to a limited extent and as part of a 
more general process of Europeanisation (a process related to but distinct from 
European integration), in which other national institutions (especially administrations) 
have become considerably more intimately involved with European issues compared 
to national parliaments. The research has attempted to identify these changes and 
(some of) their causes. A related hypothesis is that national parliaments have expanded 
(or have the potential to expand) their role in the EU legislative process. Such 
expansion is achieved by scrutinising European legislation and holding national 
representatives in the Council accountable to the national electorates. In a process that 
has been initiated, as well as furthered, by Europeanisation national parliaments thus, 
theoretically at least, contribute to the legitimisation of the EU, although there remain 
unfulfilled demands-as reflected by the ungratified Constitutional Treaty-for further 
legitimisation by national parliaments. 
There is, however, little agreement on how national parliaments ought to engage in 
scrutiny activities or with the European level. An important finding of this thesis is that 
national parliaments have struggled to adapt to their new roles. While Europeanisation 
has contributed to changes in procedures, it has also emphasised the contradiction 
inherent in national parliaments engaging with activities at the European level. 
Differences in legislative procedures as well as timetables have meant that, although 
national parliamentarians have discussed the importance of developing scrutiny 
' Neil MacCormick has proposed that parliaments representing an entire EU member state be called a 
member state parliament, while the term 'state parliament' has also been suggested. Although these 
descriptions may be more accurate than the term 'national parliament', they have not (yet? ) caught on in 
literature on the subject, and the term 'national parliament' will therefore be adopted here. 
2 Throughout the text 'EU' will be used to describe the current Union as well as its historic predecessors. 
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procedures at the national level extensively, practical moves in that direction have been 
slow and (usually) limited. 
All EU Member State parliaments now have a committee dedicated to EU affairs. Yet 
this may, ironically, limit incentives for parliamentarians not involved with these 
committees to engage with EU affairs. Rather than undertaking the extra work 
required to scrutinise EU legislation, there is a strong temptation to refer European 
matters to the EU committee for consideration. National parliaments have therefore 
had to decide whether EU affairs must be dealt with by the entire parliament or a 
parliamentary 'sub-section'. A second finding of this thesis is thus that existing 
parliamentary rules for the treatment of domestic legislation have, to a considerable 
degree, determined how European legislation has been handled. With the partial 
exception of the UK, changes in parliamentary activities and procedures have 
conformed to existing rules at the national level. Differences between national 
parliaments, historic as well as procedural, therefore help explain how and why EU 
affairs are handled differently by individual parliaments. As will become evident in 
later chapters, certain common themes and challenges have emerged in national-level 
scrutiny of European legislation as all member states are subject to the effects of 
Europeanisation. 
In some ways, national parliaments have been somewhat shielded from the effects of 
Europeanisation. European affairs have traditionally been defined as foreign 
policy-and therefore a matter for the national executives rather than parliaments. The 
recent crisis over the EU's failure to ratify its Constitutional Treaty was a consequence 
of 'no' votes in the 2005 French and Dutch referendums, even as national parliaments 
in a majority of EU member states quietly (usually) voted to ratify the new Treaty. Still, 
as European integration has developed, national parliaments have found it 
increasingly difficult to maintain a distance from European affairs given the increasing 
impact European legislation has in most policy-areas at the domestic level. In turn, this 
intertwining of the domestic and the EU has increased the need for parliaments to 
scrutinise the activities of national executives at the European level. Indeed, national 
parliaments have gradually realised that they must alter their procedures and activities 
relating to European legislation. 
The fact that national parliaments focus on national-level legislation, together with the 
differences between national parliaments, means that inter-parliamentary cooperation 
on scrutiny of European legislation is often seen to be neither desirable nor particularly 
effective. A third major finding of this thesis is thus that inter-parliamentary 
cooperation has been useful mainly for the purposes of exchanging information and 
experiences. Although it has been recognised that changes affect all the national 
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parliaments of the EU, with fora for the exchange of information and common 
experiences being developed, it appears that these meetings have had little direct or 
traceable effect at the national level. However, it has also become clear that the drive 
for improved scrutiny-and for acceptable changes to national-level scrutiny 
procedures-must originate at the national level. 
Despite wide-spread agreement amongst national parliamentarians that their focus 
should remain at the national level, the introduction of appropriate methods for 
scrutiny of European legislation at the national level has also been difficult. Scrutiny of 
European affairs has thus come to present a significant challenge for national 
parliaments in two important ways. The first challenge is the increased number of 
decisions taken at the European level. Moving decision-making powers to the 
European level-in a framework that binds member states to uphold such 
decisions-limits the ability of parliaments to act autonomously within their own 
state. ' Vertical dispersion of decision-making (both upwards to the European level and 
downwards to regions) does not make national parliaments redundant, but reduces the 
areas over which they have full and exclusive influence, thereby limiting their ability to 
act independently as purveyors and guardians of national sovereignty. 
A second challenge has been responding to demands that national parliaments become 
more involved in Community affairs at both the national and European levels. Any 
such involvement poses a challenge to traditional patterns of activity as well as notions 
of what a parliament is and does. The consequences of European integration thus go 
beyond mere policy-impact and have prompted national parliaments to introduce new 
scrutiny procedures and activities. As part of this process, national parliamentarians 
have had to consider what level of involvement is appropriate-as well as possible-at 
both the national and European levels. Not only have national parliaments responded 
differently to the challenges of EU membership, they have done so at different times 
and stages of their state's membership. Individual solutions to the problem of Europe's 
`encroachment' on national affairs have been shaped by a wide variety of existing 
attitudes, procedures and political cultures, thereby creating a wide range of 
institutional models for parliamentary involvement. However, merely considering the 
formal rules and procedures that govern this involvement does not provide the entire 
picture. Informal arrangements and relations between parliaments and their respective 
governments and administrations must also be examined. 
3 William Wallace (1986, p. 367) defines national sovereignty as 'the formal ability of a nation to act on its 
own rather than under the instruction of another nation', whereas national autonomy is 'the ability of a 
nation to attain its objectives through unilateral action'. He argues that the former is undiminished while 
the latter has become highly constrained. In this text the term 'national sovereignty' will be used in a 
manner equating to Wallace's concept of national autonomy. 
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Despite the increased importance placed upon national parliaments and their 
contributions to the European integration process, their scrutiny activities have 
attracted relatively little scholarly attention. Moreover, research rarely moves beyond 
an acknowledgement of the formal rules and procedures in place for parliamentary 
scrutiny. ' Few book-length studies focusing solely on the role of national parliaments 
have been published (important contributions have been Katz and Wessels, 1999; 
Maurer and Wessels, 2001b; Norton, 1996c), with significant amounts of material 
instead found in individual articles or conference papers (examples include Bindi, 
2002; Fitzmaurice, 1996; Holzhacker, 2002; Judge, 1995; Raunio, 1999,2001) or 
documents issued by national parliaments themselves (for instance European 
Parliament, 2000c; Folketinget, 1999,2001a; House of Commons European Scrutiny 
Committee, 2002a). 
The aim of this thesis is to achieve a deeper understanding of national parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs. As national parliaments have increasingly been considered 
important legitimisers of European activities, it has become imperative to understand 
the role of national parliaments within the European context better. By supporting 
their governments at the national level, national parliaments also-albeit 
indirectly-help to uphold and legitimise government policies on Europe. 
Increasingly, parliaments have been unwilling to do so without question, creating a 
trend towards more substantial scrutiny by national parliaments of governmental 
activities at the European level. In other words, national parliaments have become 
important actors within European integration in a way that was never foreseen at the 
origins of what is now the EU. 
National procedures for scrutiny will likely remain a matter for individual parliaments 
to determine. European institutions do not have it within their powers to determine 
what such procedures should be like. Moreover, in all the three case studies of 
Denmark, Italy and the UK, the pressure to adapt has originated at the domestic level 
although European variables (specifically, European legislation and the decision- 
making procedures surrounding it) have influenced how national parliaments have 
adapted. It can thus be argued that Europeanisation, rather than European 
integration-two very distinct processes (see below)-has shaped scrutiny procedures 
within national parliaments. 
Section one of this introductory chapter will therefore introduce the concept of 
Europeanisation. It will explore what Europeanisation can contribute to the discussion 
`A good example is Hussein Kassim's (2005 (forthcoming))contnbution to Bulmer and Lesquesne's text on 
EU's member states. Table 2 (overview of European affairs committees in national legislatures (EU-15)) 
relies entirely on earlier, secondary sources and therefore does not reflect, for instance, developments in 
the Italian Senate (see Chapter five for details on these developments). 
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of scrutiny procedures within national parliaments, and how it can contribute to an 
understanding of how and why national parliamentary scrutiny procedures have 
changed. Section two examines what a parliament is and does, defines power and 
influence, and looks at vertical division of power and influence within the EU. The 
third section will, briefly, look at national parliaments in the European context while 
section four briefly introduces the three case studies. 
L 'Me impact of Europeanisation 
The two concepts of Europeanisation and European integration differ in many 
respects. There is still no uncontested definition of Europeanisation, and the concept 
continues to be applied in a variety of ways. In an authoritative article on the topic, 
Johan P. Olsen (2002, pp. 923-4) thus outlines five distinct possible uses: 
" changes in external boundaries; 
" developing institutions at the European level; 
" central penetration of national systems of governance; 
" exporting forms of political organisation and 
"a political unification project 
It is the third of these definitions that is of relevance here. Europeanisation as central 
penetration of national systems of governance is, according to Olsen, the most common 
way in which the term is used. He expands on this particular definition by stating that 
it 'focuses on change in core domestic institutions of governance and politics, 
understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, 
identities and policies' (2002, p. 932). This obviously includes changes that have taken 
place within national parliaments in response to events at the European level and 
indicates a tentative agreement that the concept of Europeanisation can be used to link 
national political culture with the European level-and therefore with European 
integration. 
Jos de Beus and Jeanette Mak consider Europeanisation and European integration to be 
sharply distinguished as 'European integration leaves national identity and political 
culture by and large untouched, while Europeanisation involves mutation of national 
identity and political culture' (2003, p. 2). In a more integrative approach, Claudio M. 
Radaelli (2004, p. 5) links the two concepts by stating that 'the theoretical effort in 
Europeanisation as a research agenda is all about bringing domestic politics back into 
our understanding of European integration, without assuming that the balance of 
power between the state and European institutions is being tilted in one direction or 
another' and that 'Europeanisation is mostly interested in adaptation to Europe'. In a 
12 
definition that will be adopted here, Radaelli subsequently (2004, p. 35) describes 
Europeanisation as 
processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of 
doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and 
public policies. 
The adaptation that has taken place within national parliaments has, in most cases, 
been quite limited, as well as preceded and exceeded by adaptation within national 
administrations and executives. Because of the different and uneven ways in which EU 
institutions impact upon the national level, various parts of national-level political 
systems have responded differently to Europeanisation. Olsen (2002, p 933) argues that 
'because European institution-building and policy-making are unevenly developed 
across institutional spheres and policy areas, the adaptive pressures on states and 
institutions vary'. In the context of parliamentary involvement in Community affairs, 
this uneven development is evident in the relatively late process of parliamentary 
adaptation to membership of the European Union. Whereas national administrations 
and governments have participated in policy-development and decision-making at the 
European level for as long as the state has been a member of the Community/Union 
(or even prior to this when negotiating membership terms), it is only very recently that 
most national parliaments have become involved in any significant or meaningful way. 
Moreover, public debate on Europe often appears limited to brief periods surrounding 
elections to the European Parliament or referenda on European matters. This can be 
seen as an indication that Europeanisation may have affected national subcultures (at 
the elite level of political classes) rather than fundamental aspects of national political 
cultures. 
While institutional differences exist, different member states (influenced by the 
adaptive pressure on the state) have also had fundamentally different approaches 
towards membership. It can thus be argued that, due to Euroscepticism within Britain 
and Denmark (expressed to some extent in the emphasis on economic rather than 
political rationale for joining the Community), the goverranents and administrations of 
both these countries have needed to be very pragmatic and 'result-oriented' in their 
approach to Community membership. On the other hand, Italy's membership was 
motivated mainly by ideological support for European integration, with the 
consequence that the issue of how much Italy has benefited (especially economically) 
has only recently become more prominent. In turn, this has meant that the Italian 
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administration and executive have been under less pressure to 'perform', specifically 
with regard to obtaining the best possible result for the Italian state and people, in the 
manner both British and Danish governments have. 
In all three case studies, and by its very definition, Europeanisation has altered the 
political environments within which national political institutions have operated. With 
the degree of misfit varying across the policy areas, processes and institutions, it is 
commonly assumed that '[t]he lower the compatibility ... the 
higher the adaptational 
pressure' (Börzel and Risse, 2000, p. 6). According to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse 
this adaptational pressure can cause three different degrees of change at the domestic 
level: absorption, accommodation and transformation, 
5 
each leading to low, modest or 
high degrees of change at the domestic level (2000, p. 10) 
6 This contrasts somewhat 
with Olsens view (2002, pp. 934-5) that 'a main finding (although with many nuances) 
is that there has been no radical change in any of the national systems and no 
significant convergence towards a common institutional model homogenizing the 
domestic structures of the European states'. In other words, '[e]stablished national 
patterns are resistant to, but also flexible enough to cope with, changes at the European 
level'. 
However, adaptation is not necessarily undertaken solely due to pressure from the 
European level. Scrutiny procedures within national parliaments have altered the most 
at times when European integration has taken significant steps, but changes have also 
taken place at other points in time. The development of scrutiny procedures can 
therefore be seen as a bottom-up process, a story which, in the words of Radaelli, 
`starts and finishes at the level of the domestic system of interaction' (2004, p. 9). The 
bottom-up process has thus developed beyond the initial approach which `was mainly 
concerned with how to conceptualize and explain the effect of member states on 
processes and outcomes of European integration' (Börzel, 2003, p. 1). The development 
of relations between national parliaments and European institutions has not been easy. 
' 'Absorption' is defined as an ability to 'incorporate European policies or ideas and readjust their 
institutions, respectively, without substantially modifying existing processes, policies and institutions'. 
Accommodation is when pressure for Europeanisation is accommodated 'by existing processes, policies 
and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective understanding 
attached to them', while transformation requires replacement of 'existing policies, processes, and 
institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential 
features and/or the underlying collective understanding are fundamentally changes' (Börzel and Risse, 
2000, p. 10). 
6A wide range of resources, political as well as administrative, contribute to the success or otherwise of 
any such change. Bbrzel thus argues that 
[tjhe administrative capacity of Member States to shape and take EU policies is a function of 
particular resources, such as staff-power, money, expertise, and coalition-building skill.... 
Member States, like Denmark or Britain, where EU related policy-making competencies are 
concentrated, are able to formulate and represent a coherent bargaining position and stand a 
better chance to be heard than counties like Greece or Italy, where competencies are highly 
fragmented as a result of which they often do not speak with one voice (2003, p. 7, emphasis 
in original). 
14 
Europeanisation has forced national parliaments to become acquainted with and take 
into consideration the workings of institutions at the European level. Thus, when 
conceptualising Europeanisation as a process and contributing factor in explaining 
domestic change (and therefore not as a separate theory), national parliaments, as 
political actors in their own right, become better understood. For the purposes of this 
thesis, an understanding of what a parliament is must be developed. The following 
section therefore looks at definitions of a parliament as well as the power. and influence 
exercised by parliaments. 
2. Legislatures and parliaments 
Parliaments are rule-making bodies within political systems. They are usually elected, 
although institutions such as the British House of Lords are exceptions to this rule. 
Institutions whose constituent members are elected will here be referred to as 
parliaments. Parliaments are often seen as the institutionalisation of representation: 
while the citizens remain sovereign, the power to decide on their behalf is vested in 
their parliamentary representatives. 
A suitable definition of a parliament would thus be 'a group of individuals operating 
on the behalf of others in a binding and legitimate manner and making decisions 
collectively but with formal equality' (Copeland and Patterson, 1994, p. 153). The 
emphasis on legitimacy implies that those represented must consent to the 'group of 
individuals' taking decisions on their behalf, with consent provided through 
participation in elections (or, at the very least, acknowledgement that elections provide 
legitimate parliamentary bodies). In contrast to 'parliaments', a definition of 
legislatures has been provided by Philip Norton (1990a, p. 1) as 'constitutionally 
designated institutions for giving assent to binding measures of public policy, that 
assent being given on behalf of a political community that extends beyond the 
government elite responsible for formulating those measures'. This definition is more 
overarching than that for 'parliaments' and in fact subsumes the latter as a category of 
'legislature', but does not include the specific requirement of legitimacy. In this study 
the term 'parliament' will be used, with the British House of Lords considered one 
chamber of the parliament. 
Parliaments' involvement in legislation and governance is discussed with frequent 
reference to the concepts of 'power' and 'influence'. Parliaments gain their right to 
exercise power, authority and influence by performing their three main tasks: 
legitimisation, linkage and decision-making (Copeland and Patterson, 1994, p. 154). In 
scrutinising, holding accountable, and providing support for the government of the 
day, parliaments legitimise governments as well as their policies. As representative 
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bodies parliaments also link citizens with governing bodies and structures, making it 
possible to govern larger territories. Madison believed that representative bodies also 
made it possible to address social conflict better by bringing it into a forum where it 
could be controlled. However, such control is only possible if representatives pursue 
the interests of their constituents (Pitkin, 1989, p. 146). The link between parliaments 
and executives also enables accountability to be exercised, as regular elections provide 
citizens the opportunity to pass judgement on both parliament and government. 
Parliamentary power and influence over legislation varies significantly throughout the 
democratic world. Norton (1994, p. 18) identifies three'levels' of parliaments: 
" policy-making (able to `modify or reject measures brought forward by the 
executive and can formulate and substitute policies of their own l; 
9 policy influencing (can 'modify or reject measures brought forward by the 
executive but cannot formulate and substitute policies of their own'); 
9 legislatures with little or no policy affect. 
Following this classification, Norton (1994, p. 19) placed EU national parliaments 
(those for which he has sufficient information) in the policy influencing category. More 
specifically, he argued that the Italian and Danish parliaments bordered on the policy- 
making category, while the British Parliament had only relatively recently begun to 
move away from the third category of legislatures with little or no policy affect. 
When considering European legislation, however, it can be argued that parliamentary 
power has been reduced to parliamentary influence. The two concepts are strongly 
linked and interrelated, with one often used to describe the other. Consider, for 
example, one definition of influence as 'power or sway resulting from ability, wealth, 
position, etc. ', or power defined as `political, financial, social, etc., force or influence' 
(Makins, 1991, pp. 794 and 1220). Moreover, both concepts are included in Robert 
Dahl's list of 'power terms' (1979, p. 406). In general, the concept of power is used to 
explain how one actor actively alters (or maintains) a particular environment or 
situation. Specific definitions include: 'the abilities of social agents to affect the world 
in some way or other' (Isaac, 1992), 'the ability to make people (or things) do what they 
would not otherwise have done' (Allison, 1996, p. 396), and Russell's definition of 
power as 'the production of intended effect' (cited in Allison, 1996). Arguably, Dahl's 
definition of power terms has been the most influential. To Dahl, power terms 'refer to 
subsets of relations among social units such that the behaviors of one or more units 
(the responsive units, R) depend in some circumstances on the behavior of other units 
(the controlling units, C)' (1979, p. 407). However, as indicated earlier, Dahl includes 
both 'power' and 'influence' in his 'power terms', and argues that 'the names for the 
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various categories are so completely unstandardized that what is labeled power in one 
scheme maybe called coercion or influence in another' (1979, p. 412). 
A significant problem in Dahl's conception is that it is concerned solely with what 
actually occurs. Other theorists, such as Steven Lukes, argue that power may be 
exercised even though there is no visible evidence of it. This makes it even more 
difficult to distinguish between power and influence, as it is often impossible to 
determine whether R's altered behavior is due to good argumentation (influence) or 
the threat of sanctions (power) on behalf of C. 
A further complication is the notion of legitimate power, what Jens Peter Frelund 
Thomsen calls authority. According to Thomsen, 'whether exercise of power is 
legitimate or illegitimate depends on the extent to which it is the result of a preceding 
democratic procedure' (2000, p. 58, author's translation). Thomsen !s three methods for 
affecting behaviour are summarized as follows: 
Figure L1 Power, authority and influence as methods of affecting behaviour 
Power Authority Influence 
Criteria Conflict Agreement Agreement 
Sanctions Sanctions Freedom 
Methods of Force Legislation Suggestions 
affecting Control Punishment Encouragement 
behaviour Manipulation Rewards Persuasion 
Disciplinary action Expertise Open dialogue 
Suppression of identity 
Source: Thomsen, 2000, p. 58, authors translation. 
As will become evident, the ability of national parliaments to influence the behaviour 
of actual decision-makers in the European legislative process is very limited. This 
contrasts with procedures at the national level where parliamentarians most often have 
the ability to affect changes in domestic legislation. At the European level it is only 
indirectly, through their own executives, that national parliaments can wield influence, 
with power over final decisions being beyond their grasp. One way of defining the two 
concepts of power and influence independently of each other thus lies in separating 
policy-shaping decisions-which alter the detailed provisions of legislative 
options-from decisions that actually choose (or 'set') policies (for a discussion of the 
concepts of policy-shaping and policy-setting (as well as history-making) see Peterson 
and Bomberg, 1999, Chapter one). It is thus possible to have influence without power, 
although power does bring its own amount of influence. In this study, influence will 
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thus be defined as a (sometimes indirect) say in policy-making and power as 
'possession' of legal authority to make decisions that definitively set policy. 
Within most liberal democratic states, national parliaments are considered as 
sovereign, with governments required to find a majority in support of its legislation. 
However, if applying the above definitions of power and influence to national 
parliaments and their participation in European affairs, very few can be classified as 
having formal power-or even authority-as they are limited to attempts at 
influencing their executives. Moreover, formal power and influence (as well as 
authority) has been significantly limited by (perceived) political realities, making it 
difficult for national parliaments to regain influence in this area (Siedentop, 2000, p. 
119). Few authors of written constitutions were able to foresee that foreign policy 
would be conducted at several different levels.? Constitutions, therefore, generally 
contain few or no provisions for parliamentary involvement in foreign policy, a policy 
sphere that is traditionally viewed as extending to issues of peace and war, life and 
death, and thus touching quite directly on national sovereignty. 
Vertical division of power 
Over time, and as a consequence of EU membership, the issues handled by national 
parliaments have changed. In turn, so have notions of 'proper' democratic procedures 
and institutions. All of the EU member states' parliaments have thus established 
committees dealing with EU-issues. Such committees are an example of the horizontal 
division of power that has become a standard feature of EU membership-although it 
also introduces certain problems. Where specialised EU committees handle 
Community affairs on an exclusive basis, Members of Parliament (MPs) who are not 
members of such committees may become complacent about EU affairs, choosing to 
refer these to the EU committee. The realisation that EU policy is no longer foreign, but 
also domestic policy, has only taken hold gradually. 
Regional devolution, as it has taken place in Europe, has implications for how 
European issues are handled, as regional authorities are often given the task of 
implementing European measures. The decision-making process within Europe can 
thus become further complicated, as the regional authorities may wish to influence 
negotiations on these issues. In countries with strong sub-national entities, Spain and 
Germany for example, there are important issues. However, regionalism, regional 
7 As will become evident in Chapter five. Italy, with its relatively young constitution, is an exception due 
to the option of limiting Italian sovereignty through international cooperation. 
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authorities and institutions (including regional parliaments where these exist) and 
their involvement in European affairs are matters beyond the scope of this thesis .3 
Within the EU, power has also flowed upwards with the emergence of an increasingly 
powerful European Parliament. The legal basis for this institution has changed several 
times in its relatively short lifetime, forcing it to adapt to new environments and 
challenges. The similarities between national parliaments and the EP lie in the 
provision of a linkage between EU's citizens and governing structures, as well as the 
EP's participation in decision-making. The greater distance (perceived or real) between 
representatives and represented has meant that Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) are perceived differently to national parliamentarians. According to Dahl 'it 
seems fanciful to expect that the European Parliament ... would ever 
become as 
responsive to the citizens of the European Union ... as the existing national 
parliaments of the present members of the EU' (1994, p. 32). Moreover, Karlheinz 
Neunriether (2000, p. 147) argues that 'for both constitutional and attitudinal reasons, 
the representation of the component wholes is likely to remain stronger than the 
majority of EP members are prepared to admit'. If these interpretations are correct, 
national parliaments will remain important actors in the European system of 
governance, providing a(nother) link between European citizens and the bodies where 
decisions governing their lives are taken. 
While the EP contributes to the legitimacy of Community legislation, the formal 
separation of powers between EU institutions means it does not provide any 
legitimacy for its legislative partner, the Council. Instead, national parliaments act as 
legitimisers of the Council, which is the EU-institution most closely resembling an 
executive. The Commission, however, is subject to a vote of confidence from the EP. 
Although the EP votes on the Commission en bloc, concerns about individual 
Commissioners have caused the EP to withhold (or threaten to withdraw) their 
support for the Commission, as occurred when the incoming Commission under Jose 
Manuel Barroso was forced to reconstitute itself, without the controversial Italian 
nominee, Rocco Buttiliogne, to secure a vote of investiture in 2004. In contrast to the 
EP's power over the Commission, no other EU institution can threaten to dissolve the 
EP. The guarantee of an un-interrupted five-year term has provided the EP with a 
certain degree of stability to pursue increased institutional power and influence for 
itself. While MEPs come from many different backgrounds and all sections of the 
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, despite being part of the Danish kingdom, are not part of the EU. 
The 
Faeroe Islands elected to not join with Denmark in 1973 while Greenland, after a referendum in 1982, 
chose to leave the Community. This leaves a potentially awkward situation due to the development of 
European cooperation on issues such as foreign policy, defence and justice which, despite 'home rule', 
remain the prerogative of the Danish Folketing. As the Greenlandic and Faroese populations do not 
participate in Danish referenda on European matters, they essentially have no say in where decisions 
governing critical aspects of their lives are taken. 
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political ideological spectrum, most have been united in seeking to empower the EP 
further. 
3. National parliaments and the EU 
The historic development of the EP is an important component in most theories of 
European integration. However, as will be discussed in Chapter two, few integration 
theorists concern themselves with national parliaments. In most cases, including in 
work on multi-level governance, the national actor considered is the 'state', which most 
frequently means the executive. Multi-level theorists thus describe European 
integration as 'a polity-creating process in which authority and policy-making 
influence are shared across multiple levels of government - subnational, national, and 
supranational', with multi-level governance being the 'dispersion of authoritative 
decision making across multiple territorial levels' (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, pp. xi and 
2). Despite the focus on multiple actors and levels within the model of multi-level 
governance, national parliaments rarely get a specific mention here. In the main, 
writers on multi-level governance consider national parliaments to be legitimisers of 
national governments rather than actors in their own right. The deepening integration 
process and lack of direct participation in the European decision-making process have 
weakened national parliaments institutionally. Membership of the Union has therefore 
been a constraint on parliaments' ability to legislate freely in all policy-areas. 
Decisions influencing the lives of European citizens are clearly taken at both the 
national and European levels. The EU therefore conforms well to Robert D. Putnam's 
model of two-level games. Putnam (1988, p. 434) contends that 
[a]t the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central 
decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign. 
National parliaments fit into this model as they can be considered one of the domestic 
groups pressuring the government at the national level. Moreover, if dissatisfied with 
the outcome of European-level decision-making, national parliaments have the 
potential to withdraw support for their executives-perhaps the ultimate `adverse 
consequence'. 
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However, central decision-makers, in the EU national executives through the Council, 
maintain a strong position when it comes to the negotiation of European legislation, a 
powerful contributing factor in the perceived decline of national parliaments in 
Europe. By monopolising (or strictly controlling) information relevant to EU 
negotiations, in conjunction with the principle of supremacy, 9 national executives have 
been in a position to control their own parliaments, rather than the other way round 
(Majone, 1996, p. 284). Parliamentary decline was first described in the 1920s, long 
before European integration was a factor, by Lord Bryce who saw power passing from 
the House of Commons to the Cabinet-and especially to the party leaders from the 
party supporting the Government of the day. ' Despite the parliamentary decline, Lord 
Bryce (1990, p. 56) still saw parliaments as important, claiming that they 
must remain the vital centre of the frame of government in every country 
not small enough to permit of the constant action of direct popular 
legislation; and even in such countries they cannot be altogether dispensed 
with.... The people as a whole cannot attend to details, still less exercise 
over the executive the watchful supervision needed to ensure honest and 
efficient administration. 
Lord Bryce's description of the declining parliament has remained influential. 
According to Norton (1990a, pp. 4-5) 
[t]wentieth-century study of legislatures has ... taken place within the 
inheritance of three basic and related axioms: that the fundamental task of 
legislatures is the making of laws; that legislatures in and since the 
nineteenth century have 'declined'; that the explanation for such decline 
lies in the growth of party, a growth that in the context of legislatures has 
been cancerous. 
EU membership could, initially, be interpreted as further contributing to the decline of 
parliaments. National executives took the lead in decision-making at the European 
level, with important areas of legislation transferred away from national parliaments to 
the Community level (obvious examples are protection of the environment and 
agricultural policy). Until the 1990s, the EP had very little legislative power or 
influence. Consequently, parliamentary scrutiny of measures decided at the European 
The principle of supremacy holds that Community law has supremacy over national law in case of a 
conflict, including in cases where national law has been enacted after the Community legislation. 
10 The importance of political parties was derived from the fact that they appointed the parliamentary 
candidates. These candidates thus no longer felt their allegiance to be with their constituencies, but rather 
with their party, on which they depended for reappointment as a candidate. 
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level was very limited, leading to allegations of a democratic deficit (see Chapter two 
for a definition and further discussion). 
More recently, however, there have been indications that parliaments have regained 
ground. This is especially so in proportional systems where the number of political 
parties has been on the increase, fragmenting parliaments and causing government 
coalitions to contain or be supported by a larger number of parties. Writing specifically 
on the Scandinavian Parliaments, Erik Damgaard outlines several changes that have 
occurred since the 1970s. Damgaard associates a higher level of parliamentary activity 
(examples include more bills and resolutions proposed, more activities in committees 
and an increased number of questions asked) with a higher level of conflict among 
political parties represented in parliament. Such increased activity and conflict also 
leads to more (public) disagreement and competition for the attention and votes of 
citizens (1994, p. 92). Consequently, the challenge of being in government has 
increased, as it has become more acceptable and practiced behaviour for opposition 
parties to voice concern regarding government policy as well as offering alternative 
policies to the public: '[t]he power of parliaments has increased vis-ä-vis the 
governments in the sense that party groups not participating in the governments have 
obtained increased policy influence and sometimes even the power to make the crucial 
decisions' (Damgaard, 1994, p. 93). 
As national parliaments have developed an understanding of how European 
legislation impacts upon domestic legislation, they have begun to scrutinise 
government activities at the European level more closely. In the scrutiny process, an 
important source of parliamentary power (even in the British House of Commons) is 
that of select committees. The resources available to them include finance, access to 
expert opinions and the power to call witnesses including members of the executive. 
The importance of committees has been recognised by parliaments themselves in 
recent years, with all EU member states' parliaments establishing or strengthening 
committees dealing specifically with EU issues. This can be interpreted as a 
(re)discovery by national parliaments that, ultimately, they control their 
governments-and thus, indirectly, the Council. EU committees have thus become 
potentially important sites of political control regarding the use of EU power (Lord, 
1998, p. 55). 
Since the Single European Act (SEA), but especially the Treaty of European Union 
(TEU), I' national parliamentarians have increasingly recognised their interdependence 
with the EU and the extent to which EU decisions circumscribe their ability to act at the 
national level. Moreover, MPs have also realised that unless they wish to become 
" These treaties came into force on 1 July 1987 and 1 November 1993 respectively. 
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bystanders to decisions affecting their own constituents, they have to develop methods 
for participating in European decision-making-even if this is achieved indirectly 
through scrutiny of their executives' activities at the European level. However, national 
parliamentarians have also realised that certain issues (especially those of a cross- 
border nature such as environmental issues) are better dealt with at the European level. 
A symbiotic relationship has thus developed between national parliaments and the EU, 
although one with limited direct contact between the national and European levels. It 
has therefore become widely recognised that democratic and legitimate cooperation at 
the European level cannot be achieved merely through parliamentarisation of the 
European level: Europeanisation of the national level is necessary too. 
In Norton's terms, the debate is about at what level it is most appropriate for national 
parliaments to operate. Norton distinguishes between the individual and collective 
levels, although he emphasises that they are not mutually exclusive. At the individual 
level, national parliaments have become more active in scrutinising their executives 
while, collectively, they can potentially act as a political constraint on governments at 
the supranational level (Norton, 1996a, p. 183). 
4. The case studies of Denmark, Italy and the UK 
These member state parliaments for the case studies were chosen as they form a 
continuum in terms of their ability to scrutinise their executives. The Italian parliament 
has no scrutiny reserve power, and appears preoccupied with legislation on the 
implementation of European legislation rather than involvement in the pre-decision 
process. Moreover, it has only very recently begun to realise that in order to influence 
European decisions, an effort at the earlier stage where problems can be developed 
into policy initiatives is required (see Greenwood, 1997, p. 27). However, both 
chambers of the Italian Parliament also include other select committees in their work 
and see this as essential to carry out proper scrutiny of European legislation. 
Cooperation between select committees is taken to its logical conclusion in the Senate 
where it is a requirement that members of the European committee are also members 
of another select committee. While this institutional arrangement manages to combine 
an interest in European affairs with specialised knowledge from the select committees, 
it also introduces problems, mainly by adding to the already onerous workload of 
parliamentarians. 
In the British parliament, ex ante participation in the legislative process is an unusual 
occurrence, and although the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) in the House of 
Commons can impose a scrutiny reserve power (thereby requiring ministers not to 
commit to measures still being scrutinised), the ESC is only now beginning to realise its 
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potential. Moreover, due to the committee's remit to provide an opinion on the legal 
and political importance of European documents (although an opinion on the merit of 
these documents is beyond the ESC), the scrutiny reserve power does not allow the 
ESC to impose its opinions on British Ministers. The House of Lords has traditionally 
been the Chamber undertaking investigations with the purpose of examining the 
merits of European legislation. However, it too is unable to bind ministers to particular 
behaviour and is therefore limited to influencing decisions through other means such 
as debates, writing of reports and other interactions with actors at the domestic as well 
as European levels. 
In contrast, the Danish European Union Committee (EUC) mandates Danish ministers, 
and does so prior to all Council meetings. It can be argued that Council meetings, as 
the very last stage of the decision-making process, are a very late point for the Folketing 
(Danish Parliament) to become involved. Yet, participants in the Danish decision- 
making process contend that civil servants and the government factor the knowledge 
that all decisions have to be accepted by the EUC into their negotiations on European- 
level decisions. Although the EUC delivers the final negotiation mandate in a meeting 
with the minister in question, its influence is largely indirect. The fact that most Danish 
governments are coalition (and often minority) governments, accounts for the strong 
involvement of the Folketing (through the EUC). The involvement of the Folketing 
ensures that a parliamentarian majority supports government policies, 
u 
although it 
still remains the prerogative of the Danish executive to conduct foreign (and therefore 
also European) policy. 
The case studies were also chosen with their contrasting electoral systems in mind 
(majoritarian and proportional), although this factor does not appear to have an impact 
on the parliamentary willingness to scrutinise European legislation. Both the Danish 
and British parliaments (one elected by a proportional and the other by a majoritarian 
electoral system) consider parliamentary scrutiny to be of significant importance. The 
impact of scrutiny is potentially higher in a proportionally elected parliament, 
although the Italian case indicates that this is not always the case, and that other factors 
for effective scrutiny are important too. The size of the member state does not appear 
to be of significance either. Size may have been thought to matter insofar as a large 
member state would be expected (despite being traditionally underrepresented in 
votes using qualified majority voting (QMV)) to have more influence in the Council. It 
may therefore be assumed that the national parliament would be less concerned with 
EU policy-making than the parliament of a smaller member state. However, as 
12 Technically the requirement is that no majority is against the government. 
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parliamentary scrutiny procedures are considered to be of great importance in the UK, 
this is obviously not the case. 
National parliamentary scrutiny procedures are best understood if placed within the 
context of the overall national political culture. Taken in isolation a scrutiny procedure 
conveys little. However, as an expression of political beliefs and convictions, or 
national political culture, it acquires more meaning. Within this particular context it 
becomes important to consider expectations placed on national parliaments, how 
parliament as an institution fits within the political system and how it contributes to 
national ideas of what democracy is and how it works. Because democracy and the role 
of parliaments within it are perceived differently in different countries, the concept of 
political culture can be useful in explaining the different approaches to parliamentary 
involvement in European matters, and the interaction between parliaments and 
executives in this area. 
A significant challenge common to EU's national parliaments remains, however, in the 
collective parliamentary activities at the European level. Their inability to control, 
fully, the actions of their executives at the European level has caused national 
parliaments to explore international cooperation closer. Such cooperation is not 
undertaken with the aim of participating directly in the legislative process at the 
European level, but to create a forum where ideas and opinions can be exchanged, and 
matters of importance to all parliaments can be discussed. As national parliaments 
have traditionally been very autonomous actors, the notion of having to cooperate with 
other parliaments in order to carry out their work effectively has posed a great 
challenge. 
Non-binding decisions and small steps towards deeper cooperation, all driven by 
national parliaments themselves, have characterized such cooperation. The extent to 
which inter-parliamentary cooperation will succeed may largely depend on how far 
national political cultures permit parliaments to 'stray'. In Italy, the willingness to 
cooperate at the international level is substantial, owing mainly to past political 
experiences and ideological support for European integration. Meanwhile, in 
Denmark, inter-parliamentary cooperation is considered in a positive light if it can aid 
the process of democratising scrutiny of European legislation further. However, 
European-level cooperation is considered more problematic in Britain, mainly due to 
the sharp divisions between committees within the UK Parliament's two Chambers as 
well as the inability of any one member or committee to commit the House they 
represent-let alone the entire Parliament. 
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Conclusion 
National parliaments have found themselves in a multi-leveled system of governance. 
New demands have been placed upon them as important contributors to democracy at 
both the national and European levels. Being national parliaments, the adaptation to 
involvement with European affairs has not always been easy. As one link between 
governors and the governed, it is the duty of national parliamentarians to represent the 
wishes of their constituents-but also their task to explain the development and impact 
of, for instance, European integration and globalisation. 
Increasing political interest in involving national parliaments in the work of the EU led 
to the inclusion of the 'Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union' in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Although the first paragraph of the protocol states 
that 'scrutiny by individual national parliaments of their own government in relation 
to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitutional organization 
and practice of each Member State' (Duff, 1997, p. 302), it goes on to encourage national 
parliaments' involvement in EU affairs. The provisions laid down in the protocol cover 
access to Commission consultation documents and proposals for legislation. It also 
provides direction for the work of the Conference of European Affairs Committees 
(COSAC), currently the most important forum for inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
It seems evident that collective activities have been important sources of inspiration for 
the development of scrutiny procedures in some national parliaments. Events like 
COSAC have thus also been 'show grounds' for parliaments with more developed 
scrutiny systems, making it difficult to speak of totally separate fields of events as the 
individual and collective arenas have clearly influenced each other. Although difficult 
to prove with certainty, it appears that collective activities have focused attention on 
the general need for national parliaments to become involved in European affairs. 
Despite the recognised value of such meetings, exchange of information has not been 
limited to formal meetings, with private conversations between participants at, for 
instance, COSAC meetings considered just as important. 
There is no doubt that national parliaments have the potential to become important 
players in European decision-making. It is also certain that this is a welcome step from 
the point of view of EU legitimacy. However, exactly how such involvement is to he 
carried out remains uncertain. Official recognition of the importance of national 
parliaments to the European integration project is still lacking while the future of the 
Constitutional Treaty remains unclear. Currently, avoidance of binding collective 
decisions remains an overriding feature of inter-parliamentary cooperation, making it 
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unlikely that national parliaments will work in anything other than an advisory 
capacity at the European level. 
For national parliaments to engage with the European level is still a significant 
departure from their traditional roles. Chapter two will therefore examine governance 
and democracy within the nation state, as well as how integration theories have 
approached national parliaments. Chapter three will look specifically at the European 
context and how relations between national parliaments and European institutions 
have developed. Chapters four, five and six will present the three case studies, while 
Chapter seven investigates the concept of political culture and its relevance in 
explaining the different approaches to parliamentary involvement in European 
matters. In Chapter eight the difficulties of developing inter-parliamentary cooperation 
are explored, while Chapter nine, the conclusion, draws together common themes and 
sets out the findings of this thesis. 
As will become evident, membership of the EU has redefined the role of national 
parliaments and has challenged traditional conceptions of what parliaments do, as well 
as concepts such as democracy and sovereignty. Notions of democracy and its 
requirements in an increasingly internationalised world have obviously changed with 
the development of the EU. The implications of these changes will be the starting point 
for Chapter two. 
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Chapter 2: Democracy and integration theory. 
[D]ifferent schools of researchers have exalted different parts of the 
integration 'elephant'. They have claimed either that their parts were in fact 
whole beasts, or that their parts were the most important ones. 
(Puchala, 1972, p. 268) 
For as long as societies have existed, effective governance has been central to their 
stability and development. Dahl (1989) has divided governance into stages separated 
by two 'transitions', with a third transition currently taking place. The first transition 
occurred when the ancient Greeks took upon themselves the ruling of their city-states. 
This move vested sovereignty with the demos and based governance on the rule of law 
and formal equality (in participation as well as before the law). To the Greeks (or at 
least to the exclusive male part of the population classified as citizens), democracy, 
literally translated 'government by the people', meant just that: every citizen had the 
duty to participate in the political life of their city-state. While the democratic 
experience of the ancient Greeks was relatively short-lived, the ideas of political 
equality, rule of law and sovereignty being vested in the citizens, lived on. Eventually 
these ideas were expressed in the governing principles of the European (especially 
Italian) city-states of the Renaissance. However, as territorial boundaries (and the 
number of citizens within these) grew, direct participation became more an ideal and 
less a reality, as the city-state gave way to the nation-state in the second of Dahl's 
transformations. 
The second transformation occurred through the practice of representation. This idea 
would most probably have seemed very undemocratic to a Greek from 400 BC, but it 
allowed for the popular government of a territory with a much larger citizenry than 
that of the Greek city-state. The institutions (a representative parliament and a 
government derived from it) and procedures (free, fair and competitive elections) 
associated with representative democracy now appear throughout the world in many 
variations, but their types are familiar to any modern student of politics. The term 
'democracy' is often taken to mean this set of institutions and procedures without any 
further definitions provided, leaving democracy 'one of the most generalised words of 
approval in the political lexicon' (Beetham, 1993, p. 6). Because of its legitimising 
associations, most states aspire to a `democratic' form of governance. 
Even as increasing numbers of states proclaim themselves to be democratic, they exist 
in a world that has become increasingly interconnected and in which states and 
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citizenries have become interdependent. While states remain important actors 
internationally, their roles have changed. David Held (2005) thus argues that 
[w]hile many states retain the ultimate legal claim to effective supremacy 
over what occurs within their own territories, this should be juxtaposed 
with, and understood in relation to, the expanding jurisdiction of global 
and regional governance and the constraints of, as well as the obligations 
derived from, new and changing forms of international regulation. 
Although globalisation involves and affects states, it is also characterised by its 
'transnational form'. In other words, 'it is based on exchange processes which, more or 
less, bypass both the state and the traditional international character of the world 
economy in the past' (Ladeur, 2004). ' Individual nation states find it ever more difficult 
to fulfill all the needs of their citizens (one example being protection from border- 
crossing pollution) and have developed methods for cooperation at the international 
level in a response to these difficulties. The EU can thus be seen as an 
acknowledgement of this process of globalisation and of a third transition to something 
at least approximating regional or global democracy. 
Increasingly, it is demanded that regional and international governing structures be 
subject to democratic scrutiny in a manner similar to what takes place in democratic 
nation-states. This has been especially so with the EU, where one institutional response 
to this demand has been the increased powers accorded the EP. A requirement for 
membership of the EU is that the applicant state is democratic, even though the EU 
itself is frequently accused of harbouring a 'democratic deficit'. Indeed, in the words of 
MEP David Martin, if the EU was to apply to become a member of itself 'it would be 
turned down on the grounds that it was not a democracy' (Martin, 1991, p. 16). Exactly 
how to assess democracy at the regional or international level remains open to debate. 
Although the EU's governance structures in some respects resemble those of a nation 
state (having institutions that largely conform to a national-level parliament, 
government and administration), the differences are still sufficient to cast the 
democratic criteria usually applied at the national level as inapplicable at the European 
level. Views on how best to democratise the EU are closely aligned with opinions on 
how further integration should be undertaken. Intergovernmentalists emphasise the 
role of national actors while supranationalist thinkers support the development of the 
EP, although both see a role for national parliaments. In the words of Beetham (1993, p. 
8) 
the degree of democracy in a society is not to be judged by the degree of 
support any particular governmental decision may enjoy - after all, even 
dictators may enjoy periods of great popularity. It is to be judged by the 
' For a definition of globalisation and further discussion of the concept see below. 
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effectiveness of the arrangements for ensuring popular control over 
decision makers on a regular basis. 
This chapter will not attempt to develop an exacting definition of democracy. Rather, it 
is the historic development of democracy and the importance of national parliaments 
in this development that will be discussed. Global interdependence has caused 
alterations in the nature of decision-making with an increasing number of decisions 
taken above the national level. In turn, this process has changed the demands placed 
on democracy in order that decisions remain legitimate. Parliaments remain the most 
important legitimisers of international cooperation, especially national parliaments, 
although at the international level their role is often indirect-and rarely explicitly 
recognised by integration theorists. 
In this chapter the second and third transitions of democracy will thus be explored in 
an attempt to better understand how familiar structures of governance (and national 
parliaments) have developed and are now being challenged. Following this discussion 
the term 'globalisation' will be examined together with the forces that gave rise to it. 
The final section will offer a brief overview of how various theories of European 
integration view democracy within the EU, attempting to identify their views on the 
role of national parliaments within the European construct. 
1. The nation state and its governance 
Arguably, the system of nation states to which we have become accustomed was 
established with the peace of Westphalia in 1648. At this time, four aspects of statehood 
(territoriality, sovereignty, autonomy and legality (McGrew, 1997)), became firmly 
established and formed the basis on which nation states could build their existence' 
Increasingly, territorial boundaries coincided with uniform systems of rule, a situation 
that was aided by the Protestant reformation as well as the emergence of absolute 
monarchs that encouraged national churches and national rule. As the peoples' rights 
and duties were no longer tied to the church, but to a territorial entity based on secular 
political powers, these people could claim sovereignty. In other words, they became 
'capable of being active citizens of a new political order - citizens of their state' (Held, 
1995, p. 37). While active citizenship was initially limited to a very small number of 
people, the development of both a capitalist economy and new ways of conducting 
war helped increase the scope of citizenship. Economic power and influence eventually 
translated into political power and influence for new sectors of society, while the 
development of the standing army made it necessary to extend political rights to 
2 See also James A. Caporaso's (1996, p. 34) discussion of the Westphalian state system, described as a 
world organised into 'territorially exclusive, sovereign nation-states, each with an internal monopoly of 
legitimate violence'. 
30 
significant parts of the male population. Although on a different scale, this, in effect, 
amounted to a repeat of events in ancient Greece some 2000 years earlier. 
As the nation state was significantly larger than the Greek city-states, representative 
democracy developed to ensure a link between citizens and the system of government. 
In other words, representative democracy ensures accountability as it `limits 
government power by establishing mechanisms of political control in which one 
institution (or a range of institutions) oversees the working and performance of 
another, scrutinising policy proposals and monitoring political performance' (Thomas, 
2005). 
Within representative systems of governance, executives have increasingly taken the 
lead in terms of initiation of legislation. An important role of parliaments has therefore 
become that of legislative scrutiny. Indeed, the British Parliament states that 'the 
Government is primarily responsible for arranging the business of both Houses. As the 
initiator of policy, it indicates which actions it wishes Parliament to take, and explains 
and defends its position in statements and public debate. Parliament is responsible for 
making the Government accountable for its actions' (The British Parliament, 2004b). 3 
In the main, the UK parliament conducts post-legislative scrutiny, whereas both the 
Danish and Italian parliaments are more heavily involved in the legislative process 
leading up to the decision-making. The Danish Folketing thus describes its roles as 
being those of legislation and control of the government, i. e. scrutiny. Whether 
conducted before or after legislation has been passed, the ability to ask questions of the 
government (in either the chamber or committees) has become an important means by 
which parliamentarians hold the government accountable. ' Moreover, the feeling that 
parliaments should be able to scrutinise their governments is now extending to 
European issues too, providing these with a democratic foundation which the EP on its 
own (due to it not having been granted co-legislative power in all areas of EU decision- 
making) is unable to provide. 
The protection of liberal values, expressed through civil and political rights, together 
with systems of representation (with governments derived from and answerable to a 
representative body), has resulted in most current democracies describing themselves 
as liberal democracies. Varying enormously in their institutional and constitutional 
3A more comprehensive list of ways in which the British Parliament holds its government accountable 
includes parliamentary questions, adjournment debates, early day motions (House of Commons), 
unstarred questions and general debates (House of Lords) (The British Parliament, 2004a) (in political 
systems where coalitions and/or minority governments are common, methods for holding the executive 
accountable to parliament are very similar, see for instance Folketinget, 2005a; Folketinget, 2005b). 
` The fact that British procedures for post-legislative scrutiny can be described as reactive and 
unsystematic does not detract from the fact that politicians-and the British public-feel that scrutiny is an 
important element of the work of MPs. 
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architecture, liberal democracies are still generally based on the territory of nation 
states whose citizens elect representatives to make decision on their behalf, including 
decisions made in international arenas. 
Consequently, a widely accepted definition of 'democracy' is very difficult to find. A 
very narrow, and purely procedural, definition of democracy is provided by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter (1943, p. 269) who states that 'the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote'. Politics is thus 
reduced to an economistic transaction with governmental performance, in effect, 
exchanged for electoral support. In contrast, Held (1987, p. 271) provides a 
considerably wider interpretation, requiring a much higher level of both knowledge 
and participation by citizens. His'principle of autonomy' states that 
individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions 
of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, 
equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates 
and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not 
deploy this framework to negate the rights of others. 
In between these two definitions lies that of Georg Sorensen (1998, pp. 12-13), for 
whom political democracy is a system of government which a) provides meaningful 
and extensive competition for all effective positions of government power, b) has a 
highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies 
and c) provides and protects a certain level of civil and political liberties. While this 
definition may not live up to Held's ideal, it is still extensive enough for most countries 
in today's world to fall short of all its requirements. 
The advantage of Sorensen's definition lies in its prescription of processes rather than 
particular sets of institutions and positions, thereby making it possible to compare 
presidential systems to that of constitutional monarchies, while also gauging 
democracy at the regional or international level. All of these definitions aim to define 
democracy within a liberal, representative system. While they may represent a 
continuum on a theoretical 'democracy-scale', all require a representative parliament as 
part of an institutional set-up. 
Any representative body in a democratic system would need to partake in decision- 
making-in other words, legislation-to fulfill the requirements of a democracy. It is 
not enough that representatives merely present the opinions and views of those 
represented, as without influence on policy-making the representative body, as well as 
the idea of democracy, is impotent. When decision-taking shifts upwards to the 
regional or international level, any direct participation by elected representatives 
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becomes difficult. With the third transition, towards increasing globalisation, national 
parliaments have become limited and indirect participants in increasingly important 
decision-taking processes, while also having their functions challenged by the 
introduction of multi-national parliaments such as the EP. The process of globalisation 
and its causes are therefore the subject of the next section. 
Globalisation 
Throughout history, no state has ever existed in total isolation. Moreover, few societies 
have been truly self-sufficient, always relying in some measure on trade and contacts 
with other societies. As economic integration has progressed, the term 'globalisation' 
has been used with increasing frequency to describe this trend. However, as with 
democracy, globalisation can be interpreted in many ways, and 'is sufficiently 
ubiquitous to make it relevant to discussion of issues in all academic disciplines today' 
(Gavin, 2001, p. 2). Although globalisation is most commonly associated with economic 
activity, it is more appropriately described as a multi-faceted process. Indeed, Held 
(1995, p. 21) argues that globalisation 'implies at least two distinct phenomena. First, it 
suggests that many chains of political, economic and social activity are becoming 
world-wide in scope. And, secondly, it suggests that there has been an intensification 
of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and 
societies'. Since the Second World War, globalisation has advanced with increasing 
rapidity as the ability to transfer raw materials, finished goods and (not least) know- 
how and economic resources has developed. 
The political dimension of globalisation has had several implications. According to 
Held (1995, p. 16) 'regional and global interconnectedness contests the traditional 
national resolutions of the key questions of democratic theory and practice. The very 
process of governance can escape the reach of the nation-state'. Held (Held, 2005) 
further argues that 
[t]he intimate connection between `physical setting', 'social situation' and 
politics, which distinguished most political associations from pre-modern 
to modern times, has been ruptured, new modes of understanding and 
new frames of political reference independent of direct contact with 
particular peoples, issues or events. 
Obviously, this has serious implications for national parliaments whose ability to hold 
their executives accountable diminishes as the number of decisions taken beyond the 
nation state increases. 
Developing globalisation has consequently brought with it a need for regulation at the 
international level, to which the EU has been one answer. However, the European 
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parliament has not been accorded powers similar to those ceded by national 
parliaments and, accordingly, it can be argued that a democratic deficit has developed 
(see below). Moreover, international institutions themselves have traditionally been 
assumed to acquire legitimacy indirectly 'by the consent of the participating 
governments and above all their capacity to solve the problems that led to their 
creation' (Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2005, p. 1). While Held (1995, p. 267) contends 
that globalisation has meant that 'democracy can only be fully sustained by ensuring 
the accountability of all related and interconnected power systems, from economics to 
politics', Rodger A. Payne and Nayef H. Samhat (2004, p. 132) put it differently, 
arguing that '[t]he challenge of democracy, then, is to open channels to 
"reinstrumentalize" the state away from the ideologies and influences of forces of 
neoliberal globalization-from-above- toward the redefinition of its role as a mediator 
between the logic of capital and the needs of its people. ' In both instances, it becomes 
obvious that national parliaments, if they wish to continue their activity of holding the 
executive accountable, must develop an understanding of international affairs and 
consider this dimension in their daily work. ' 
While globalisation has brought benefits (especially economic) to states in the EU, it 
has also impacted significantly on the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and 
autonomy. Within the EU, trade is the most heavily developed area of integration, with 
decisions on trade and how to regulate it moved upwards from the national to the 
European level-and in some cases further to the international level in cases where 
rules formed at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) apply. As a consequence of 
deepening globalisation, states have thus been limited in both their political and 
economic options, depriving them of certain instruments of self-government. 
In the European integration process, member states have willingly relinquished part of 
their ability to act independently. Consequently, in the international sphere, nation 
states have become but one type of actor, thereby limiting their significance. One 
example of this is the considerable importance lobby and interest groups play within 
Europe, especially in relation to the Commission during the formative stages of 
legislative drafting. ' 
' It is recognised that globalisation involves' activities carried out by non-executive actors (examples 
include trans-governmental networks and business and civil society organisations that organise at the 
international level). However, the focus here will be on activities by national executives. 
6 Justin Greenwood (1997, p. 2) thus argues that, as a whole, 
neither the outputs (purposive and non-purposive action and inaction), nor the outcomes 
(end-results), of European public policies can be understood without reference to, and 
analysis of, the behaviour and perspectives of those with interests in them. Similarly, the 
development of the EU cannot be fully understood without considering the role which key 
interests have played in encouraging the growth of European-level competencies. 
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States voluntarily sign up to the EU (and other international organizations-including 
the WTO), and do so in the full knowledge that membership imposes limits on both 
their sovereignty and autonomy, concepts that must now be re-interpreted in a 
globalised world. In the words of Held (1995, p. 113): 'any conception of sovereignty 
which assumes that it is an indivisible, illimitable, exclusive and perpetual form of 
public power - embodied within an individual state - is defunct': Despite 
globalisation, nation states have by no means lost their importance. Nation states are 
still the building blocks of international organisations, including the EU, and therefore 
important seats of political power. National parliaments thus remain important too, as 
they are the ultimate legitimisers of national governments and their actions at the 
international level. The EU is an important participant in the globalisation process, but 
can also be seen as a response to globalisation and the effects it has on nation states. 
However, democracy has been very difficult to achieve at the international level. While 
shifting decision-making upwards has not been a straightforward process, a similar 
transfer of institutions and procedures legitimising these decisions has proved very 
difficult, leaving national parliaments with important legitimising tasks. 
It may, however, be argued that democratic requirements applied to the national level 
are inappropriate for cooperation at the international level. Andrew Moravcsik (2002, 
p. 621) thus claims that'[wihen judged by the practices of existing nation-states and in 
the context of a multi-level system, there is little evidence that the EU suffers from a 
fundamental democratic deficit'. Moreover, the above discussion assumes the 
legitimacy of the EU to be input-based, and does not consider the legitimacy that may 
be derived from outputs of international cooperation. Fritz W. Scharpf (1999, pp. 10-11) 
argues that input-based legitimacy (government by the people) often relies on the 
rhetoric of participation and consensus and is derived from 'a pre-existing collective 
identity'. On the other hand, output-based legitimacy (government for the people) is 
based on the 'capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions' that cannot be 
solved by individual action, market exchanges or voluntary cooperation. Due to the 
lack of a pre-existing collective identity at the European level and thus Europe-wide 
political discourses, combined with the absence of a Europe-wide institutional 
infrastructure ensuring political accountability at the European level, Scharpf 
maintains a sceptical view of input-based legitimacy (1999, see especially the 
conclusion), stating that 'for the time being and for all currently practical purposes, the 
European polity will lack the quality of government by the people, and that all 
See also Chapter ten for a discussion of how the Commission has encouraged transnational groups-and 
how these provides it with 'a whole range of advantages, including loyalty transfer, pressures for further 
integration, a simplified consultation and participation structure, channels of communication, and sources 
such as information exchange, cooperation, and implementation mechanisms' (1997, p. 265). 
Held's use of the word 'sovereignty' in this particular context can only be compared with Wallace's 
definition of 'national autonomy' (see Chapter one, fn three). 
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discourses that attempt to draw on input-oriented legitimizing arguments can only 
exacerbate the perception of an irremediable European democratic deficit'. Moreover, 
in principle, 'there is no reason why governance at the European level should not also 
be supported by output-oriented legitimacy arguments' (Scharpf, 1999, p. 188). The 
advance of globalisation means that output-based legitimacy is an important element 
when justifying membership of the EU. However, while many problems are recognised 
as better dealt with at the European level, it is also becoming a requirement that these 
decisions are taken in a democratic and legitimate manner. In other words, the 
legitimacy of EU decisions must also, to a certain extent at least, be input-based. 
Decision-making at the European level can indeed be characterised as participatory 
and consensus-based, with decision-making processes that often require the building 
of compromises in order to succeed. Furthermore, while a collective identity may not 
exist among citizens of EU member states, actors who frequently perform in the 
European arena are more likely to develop such an identity. At the very least, they may 
develop a mutual understanding that they must find commonly acceptable solutions to 
certain policy problems presented to them! 
National parliaments do not participate directly in European-level decision-making, 
but have the potential to hold participants acting on their behalf accountable for their 
actions. As a direct consequence of globalisation, national parliaments have become 
important participants in a multi-leveled system of governance where they have had to 
re-evaluate their activities and methods of government scrutiny. They have become 
essential providers of input-based legitimacy for European cooperation. The EU, with 
its elaborate institutional set-up and decision-making procedures, is the most advanced 
example of attempts at democracy at the international level-although still not without 
its problems, as will be discussed in the next section. 
2. Democracy in the EU 
EU and the democratic process 
Integration can be seen as both a process and an outcome. It is thus important to realise 
where and how to apply democratic criteria. According to Moravcsik the EU does not 
fare badly, while Alex Warleigh (2003, p. 1) claims that 'European integration has 
never been democratic. Instead the process of constructing the Euro-polity has been 
about securing conditions in which democracy is a viable proposition'. The important 
I Greenwood (1997, p. 252) argues that 'years of collaboration within the structures of the EU has had an 
impact on the ways in which member states see issues, respond to them, and relate to one another and to 
supranational structures. Actors come to share assumptions and belief systems as a product of the 
institutions and interests in which they participate and interact, and socialise one another in so doing'. 
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issue then becomes the extent to which democracy exists within the developing 
European system of governance. 
If the EU is judged against the three criteria in Sorensen's definition of democracy it 
fails miserably. The only criterion that is fulfilled is the protection of political and civil 
liberties. Even this is not entirely due to these liberties being protected at EU level, but 
rather because they are protected at the national level, and through EU's member 
states signing up to the United Nation's Charter of Human Rights. The 'Solemn 
Proclamation' on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union agreed in 
2000 can be interpreted as an attempt to provide protection of citizens at the European 
level. However, not until member states ratify the Constitutional Treaty (if that ever 
happens), which incorporates the charter of Fundamental Rights and gives it legal 
force, can the EU itself be said to protect the political and civil liberties of its citizens. 
The remaining two criteria-meaningful and extensive competition for all effective 
positions of government power and a high level of inclusiveness relating to the 
selection of leaders and policies-remain unfulfilled. If 'positions of government 
power' is taken to mean positions within the executive, this corresponds to both the 
Council and the Commission at EU level. ' While EU citizens only indirectly choose 
who should represent them in the Council, they have even less influence over the 
Commission. Commissioners, chosen by national governments, are not directly 
responsible to the public. The EP's powers of investiture and dismissal are of the 
'nuclear type': the EP cannot sanction individual Commissioners, and the sacking of 
(or failure to confirm) the entire Commission is a serious undertaking, which has only 
been threatened on very few occasions. For the individual voter, influence over EU's 
governing institutions is thus very limited, as there is no way in which EU citizens can 
'throw the rascals out, replacing the governing body of the EU with one more to their 
liking. At best, any such replacement is done piecemeal, and thus with very limited 
effect (Lord, 1998, p. 93). 
For European citizens, participation at the EU level is limited to EP elections and the 
occasional referenda: 'there is no civic act of the European citizen where he or she can 
influence directly the outcome of any policy choice facing the Community and Union' 
(Weiler et al., 1996, p. 2). Elections to the EP do not result in a European government, 
and national elections only indirectly influence governance (and therefore policy 
choices) at the European level. Furthermore, in the limited number of member states 
who have held referenda on EU issues, the citizens have been presented with a 'take it 
or leave it' situation. The long negotiations preceding referenda on either membership 
of the EU or revisions of the treaties have traditionally been conducted by governments 
9 For a discussion of individual EU institutions as well as inter-institutional relations see Chapter three. 
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of the member states, often with no or very limited consultation of the European 
peoples or their representatives in parliaments. Although the Convention on the 
Future of Europe included national parliamentarians in work determining the future of 
European integration, this work was limited to a small number of parliamentarians 
from each participating country. Moreover, the participants have been described as 'a 
self-selected group of the European political elite' (Stuart, 2003), and although the 
'pedagogic impact' of parliamentarians' participation in the work of the Convention 
should not be underestimated, it is still that case that'[i]f the constitutional treaty is to 
deliver on its promise of securing progress for Europe's citizens there must be deeper 
understanding and more discussion of the Union and its impact in national and 
regional legislatures' (Norman, 2003, p. 329). Furthermore, the Constitution and its 
work did not generate as much attention as hoped (Norman, 2003, pp. 327-8). It can 
therefore still be argued that 'there is little sense in which this pattern of deliberative 
politics has been broadened out to include the public' (Lord, 1998, p. 79). 
Citizens' further involvement with EU affairs can be achieved through petitions to 
either Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the ombudsman" or participation 
in interest groups. Although the number of petitions to MEPs has increased over the 
years, it is still not significant (Corbett et al., 2000, pp. 275-278). Whether such activity 
can be deemed `participation' should also be questioned, especially in the case of mass- 
petitions, where most people do little more than sign a form. Participation in interest 
groups requires more from the individual citizen and potentially provides the 
opportunity to interact with the Commission and (increasingly) the EP, influencing 
decisions as well as the agenda. However, significant resources (time-wise as well as 
financial) are required to be effective at this level, restricting such activity to a limited 
number of people. Consequently, the number of citizens able to influence the agenda of 
the EU is severely circumscribed, as are the opportunities for influencing policy 
outcomes. 
The democratic deficit 
Governing structures at the European level are thus different to those of a nation state. 
Political power and influence is distributed in different ways, both vertically and 
horizontally, making it difficult for EU citizens and their representatives to oversee and 
control executive activities. The result is a democratic deficit that exists at both the 
national and European level. 
'° It is stipulated that 
The European Parliament shall appoint an Ombudsman empowered to receive complaints from any 
citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Community institutions or bodies, 
with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance'acting in their judicial role (Treaty 
of Nice, 20011, Article 195, para 1). 
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The source of the deficit is commonly attributed to the transfer of responsibility to the 
EU-level without a concomitant transfer of (input-based) democratic procedures and 
practices. In other words, decision-making powers are transferred from national 
parliaments to institutions at the European level-but without awarding the EP 
powers similar to those of national parliaments. This situation has led to 'deficiencies 
in representation, representativeness, accountability, transparency and legitimacy' 
(Eriksen and Fossum, 2000). The institution most commonly providing these traits in a 
democratic system (at the national level) is a representative parliament. However, 
despite becoming an equal co-legislator with the Council in a majority of policy-areas 
the EP has historically had limited influence (compared to national parliaments) on 
EU-legislation. National parliaments have been considered incapable of properly 
scrutinising EU-matters, mainly due to time-constraints and lack of appropriate 
documentation (Justice, 1996, p. 5), and have therefore been unable to complement the 
work of the EP. The democratic deficit within the EU thus has two dimensions (as 
identified by Lord, 1998, p. 14). The first dimension relates to a difference in the levels 
of democracy attained at national and EU-level and becomes important when 
competences are transferred from the national level to less democratic EU-institutions. 
In theory at least, this dimension of the deficit is rectifiable, being a matter of 
improving democratic practices at EU-level. The second dimension of the deficit relates 
to a discrepancy between democratic ideals and practices which, as pointed out above, 
exists in any political system. 
EU leaders have endeavoured to reduce the democratic deficit, including the attempt 
at embracing the principle of subsidiarity. The TEC stipulates that 'decisions are taken 
as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen' (Treaty on European 
Union, 1997, Article 1) but also that the Community is to act 'only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community' (Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997, 
Article 5). As these two 'definitions' do not sit easily together, the principle of 
subsidiarity may better be defined as a mechanism that 'regulates the allocation or the 
use of authority within a political order where there is no unitary sovereign' (Follesdal, 
1999). It has also been suggested that subsidiarity is an attempt to reconcile the 
incompatible objectives of sub-European independence and popular sovereignty at the 
European level (Katz, 2001, p. 75). Consequently, a decision may be lifted above or 
pushed below the national level, depending on which is more appropriate. However, 
the principle of subsidiarity cannot by itself depoliticise the issues it helps allocate. In 
effect, it is little more than 'a tool to help illuminate the costs and benefits of alternative 
choices' (Peterson, 1994, p. 130). Moreover, applying the principle of subsidiarity does 
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not guarantee that decisions are subject to appropriate democratic measures, most 
notably parliamentary scrutiny. 
Within the nation state, elections to a representative parliament have become the most 
important method for citizens to express their choice of leaders and policies. During 
election campaigns, political parties will offer their candidates for election, as well as a 
policy platform based on a certain political ideology, with citizens being free to choose 
between them. Although only a limited number of citizens choose to do so, they have 
the opportunity to become further involved at the party level where they can 
participate in the formulation of policies as well as in choosing which candidates are to 
stand for election. Historically the end destination for elected representatives, 
parliaments became important locations for the aggregation and consideration of 
citizens' wishes and choices. At the EU level this function is increasingly reflected in 
the gradual extension of the EP's powers (this despite a continual decline in 
participation at EP-elections, see Chapter three for further details). 
Contacts between national parliaments and the EP have also been limited, especially 
since direct elections to the EP began in 1979. Moreover, EU issues have been 
conspicuously absent from most national election campaigns-and even EP-elections 
have mainly featured national issues. European citizens have therefore had limited 
opportunities to become informed about and express opinions on issues dealt with at 
the European level. However, as the line between domestic and foreign affairs 
continues to blur, it is questionable whether such a distinction remains valid. 
Increasingly, decisions at one level will have consequences at other levels of 
governance. The ability of national parliaments to deal exclusively with 'national' 
issues, and the EP with 'EU-issues', must consequently be questioned. Moreover, the 
nation-state (with its concomitant administration) has acquired the additional function 
of being a 'sorting office'; deciding at what level a decision should be handled as well 
as what institutions are most appropriate for solving particular issues. In the words of 
Held 'the sovereign state now lies at the crossroads of a vast array of networks and 
organizations that have been established to regulate and manage diverse areas of 
international and transnational activity - trade, communications, crime and so on', 
while globalisation 'is associated with a transformation or an 'unbundling' of the 
relationship between sovereignty, territoriality and political power' (2005, pp. 242 and 
243). 
One implication is that national executives or citizen's representatives can no longer, at 
any one level, address issues on their own. Instead, it has become necessary to debate 
and inform at several different levels and in several different forums simultaneously. 
Legitimisation of multi-level governance is, to a large extent, reliant on national 
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parliaments. However, as will become evident in the case studies below, many national 
parliaments have been unwilling to take on the additional work required to scrutinise 
government activities above the national level. Because of the ability of national 
executives to evade the most direct form of scrutiny of its activities at the European 
level, it can be argued that a structural (or input-based) democratic deficit exists within 
the EU. Although Moravcsik argues that 'indirect democratic control via national 
governments (together with constitutional checks and balances and the increasingly 
powerful European Parliament) provide 'in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, 
effective, and politically responsive' decision making (2005, p. 224, emphasis not 
reproduced), he does not consider the issue of accountability of national governments 
to national parliaments. 
The case study chapters that follow in this thesis will seek to demonstrate that taking 
this level of accountability for granted is an error, as national parliaments generally do 
not have the ability to hold their executives to account for activities at the European 
level. As the following section will show, few integration theorists have considered 
national parliaments as independent actors in the European decision-making process. 
It has been done only infrequently-and rarely explicitly. 
3. European integration: theories and the parliaments 
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 'integrate' originates from the Latin 
'integrare', meaning to make whole. Supporters of European integration can thus be 
said to favour the construction of a 'whole Europe'. However, what constitutes a 
'whole Europe'-and how to achieve this construction-has been much debated, with 
means often being dictated by visions of the end result. Donald J. Puchala's image 
(1972) of the blind men fumbling around trying to identify the elephant seems apt in 
this context. Attempts at defining European integration and governing processes are 
further complicated by the fact that events can often be interpreted in several different 
ways. One example is the Treaty of Maastricht which, on the basis of its contents, can 
be interpreted as a victory for integrationists, but also, due to the way in which it was 
negotiated, as vindication of the (liberal) intergovernmental model (see Moravcsik 
(1998), chapter six). It has become increasingly evident that one theory cannot fulfill all 
three requirements of a model (description, explanation and prediction) for all aspects 
of the integration process. In the words of Ben Rosamond 'theorists have to decide 
what they plan to explain from the array of multiple games embedded in any single 
situation' as 'different theoretical perspectives produce and reproduce different types 
of knowledge' (2000, pp. 6 and 7). This point has also been argued by John Peterson, 
who writes that the choice 'is about what, precisely, is being explained, and at what 
level of analysis in a system of government which is clearly and uniquely multi-tiered' 
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(2001, p. 291). In the following sections, a brief historical development of integration 
theories will be sketched, with special emphasis on the role of national parliaments 
within each theory. 
Federalism, transactionalism, and functionalism 
Of the three theories dealt with in this section, federalism is the oldest and may be 
more appropriately described as a movement or ideology. The carnage left by the First 
World War sparked an interest in a federal Europe that still exists, albeit in modified 
form. The Schuman declaration, which speaks of pooling of coal and steel production 
as `a first step in the federation of Europe' (Fontaine, 2000, p. 36), can be seen as one of 
the first expressions of a desire for a federal Europe. Common institutions and systems 
of governance would bind the nation states together, making it less likely that they 
would fight one another. A federation clearly calls for representation of the people(s) at 
the central level and would therefore require a central parliament, in effect 'bringing 
along' its own democracy. Such a parliament would most likely hold powers superior 
to those held by the EP today. However, in all existing federations, state-level 
parliaments are of significant importance too. This is especially so in systems like 
Germany's, where central level governance is partially made up from representatives 
from the constituent parts. If the EU was to become a federation, national parliaments 
would thus continue to exist and be an important part of the institutional construction 
of this federation. In existing federations the central government commonly deals with 
'high politics' such as defence and foreign policy, issues that are currently only weakly 
developed at the European level, with individual states maintaining . significant 
autonomy in these areas. Any move in a federal direction would thus change the role 
of national parliaments as well as the topics over which they have influence. 
National parliaments are also important components of the decision-making process 
within the theory of transactionalism (also known as the communications or pluralist 
theory), as is a central parliament. When writing about the 'amalgated' approach, the 
best known writer on transactionalism, Karl W. Deutch, prescribes a common set of 
institutions, requiring 'a degree of compliance and popular support for functioning'. 
Without such compliance, authority can be left with the 'components' of the system, 
creating a 'pluralistic' decision system (Deutsch, 1964, p. 60). The means of achieving a 
'system' is, in both instances, communication or transactions, with transactions 
understood as communication between societies as well as groups and individuals 
encompassed therein. 
The idea of contacts and cooperation between components of societies is also the 
guiding principle in David Mitrany's theory of functionalism. To Mitrany, the essential 
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question was not the form international cooperation was to take, but its function 
(Rosamond, 2000, p. 32). He dismissed regional cooperation on the basis that these 
'represent merely a rationalized nationalism, with wider limits for the individual units, 
but otherwise reproducing the working characteristics of the system of national states'. 
In other words, 'peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it' 
(Mitrany, 1943, pp. 19 and 54). To facilitate international cooperation Mitrany 
suggested instead to 'proceed by means of a natural selection, binding together those 
interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they 
are common' (Mitrany, 1943, p. 32). The areas to cooperate on would be chosen 
according to need and requirements, and national governments would not be involved 
in the setting up of appropriate bodies through which to conduct the cooperation. 
Equally, no international organisations would be set up. Although Mitrany briefly 
discussed an international assembly consisting of representatives from national 
assemblies, such a body was only intended to 'discuss and ventilate general policies, as 
an expression of the mind and will of the public opinion; but it could not actually 
prescribe policy, or this might turn out to be at odds with the policy of governments' 
(Mitrany, 1943, p. 37). As national governments would determine what areas would be 
subject to cooperation at the supranational level, it can be assumed that national 
parliaments would participate, at least indirectly, in this decision-making process. 
However, if any cooperation beyond the nation state was considered a matter of 
foreign affairs, it is very conceivable that national parliamentarians would have only a 
cursory input into decisions on how to engage at the regional or international level. 
The functionalist approach is prone to charges of being 'hopelessly naive', relying too 
heavily on rational behaviour (Rosamond, 2000, p. 40), as well as maintaining a distinct 
division between 'technical /functional' and 'political/ constitutional' issues (Cram, 
1997, pp. 11-12). However, functionalism, together with both federalism and 
transactionalism, raised important issues about both agency and structure, issues on 
which later models have expanded. 
Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism has, arguably, taken inspiration from all of the above-mentioned 
theories of integration. The best known advocate of neofunctionalism is Ernst Haas, 
who defined political integration as `the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states' (Haas, 1968, p. 16). The end result is 
thus similar to what federalists advocated, differing from functionalism in emphasising 
regional government-within which a regional parliament would be required. 
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To neofunctionalists, achieving the development of a political community is dependent 
on the cooperation of elites within societies. A certain amount of political will is 
necessary to further the integration process, mainly through the 'spillover effect' as 
'[e]arlier decisions ... spill over into new functional contexts, involve more and more 
interbureaucratic contact and consultation, thereby creating their own logic in favor of 
later decisions, meeting, in a pro-community direction, the new problems which grow 
out of the earlier compromises'. " Haas (1961, p. 372) therefore argues that 'policies 
made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task 
itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the 
task'. The emphasis on elites and 'interbureaucratic contact and consultation' may, 
despite the mention of a central parliament above, indicate a limited concern for 
democracy, with the upwards transfer of cooperation being more important than the 
simultaneous transfer of democratic practices. 
In his studies of early attempts at European institution-building, Haas emphasised the 
importance of supranational institutions. As facilitator of 'the transfer of elite loyalties' 
as well as being a 'honest broker' (Cram, 1997, p. 13), the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community played an important role in the development of 
the nascent European Community. However, the Common Assembly was also 
important to this development for two specific reasons. Firstly, the parliamentarians in 
the Common Assembly worked 'deliberately and self-consciously' to 'create a federal 
Europe by prescribing appropriate policy for the High Authority'. Secondly, the 
parliamentarians also stressed their 'latent "legislative" powers' and pushed for 
further integrative treaties. According to Haas, the early parliamentarians were 
'advocates and proponents of federation in their parliamentary activity' (Haas, 1968, p. 
390). With early institutional developments, national parliaments also maintained a 
place within the institutional framework, although their role would likely change as 
cooperation at the European level, and thereby a new political community, developed. 
Realism/intergovernmentalism 
Haas' most influential writings were published in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
However, it soon became evident that the spillover effect and the theory of 
neofunctionalism had its limitations, and did not fully explain European integration. 
The slowdown in the integration process after the early 1960s was not accounted for in 
the theory of neofunctionalism. Although nation states were considered important 
elements of the theory, the continued importance they obviously enjoyed was not 
" Haas noted the interest that the UK expressed in becoming a member of the European Community 
(1968, p. 317), and concluded that spill-over could be geographical as well as functional. 
44 
explained. In the words of Stanley Hoffmann '[nation states] go on faule de mieux 
despite their alleged obsolescence; indeed, not only do they profit from man's 
incapacity to bring about a better order, but their very existence is a formidable 
obstacle to their replacement' (1966, p. 863). Hoffmann (1966, p. 882) goes on to 
describe the logic of integration as that of 'a blender which crunches the most diverse 
products, overcomes their different tastes and perfumes, and replaces them with one, 
presumably delicious juice'. This 'presumably delicious juice' may be acceptable to 
national governments and their agents if the ingredients are of relatively little 
importance or cost, or if the certainty regarding the deliciousness of the final product is 
relatively high. According to Hoffmann: '[t]he logic of diversity ... suggests that, in 
areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self- 
controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the 
untested blender' (1966, p. 882). 
For national parliaments the important aspect of these considerations is the extent to 
which they are considered foreign policy. With foreign policy it is mainly executives 
who will determine what is contributed to the blender. On the other hand, it is likely 
that parliaments have to judge the final juice without knowing exactly what 
ingredients went into it, what the method of production was or how their own 
government contributed. Any influence is thus indirect and difficult to assess. 
The above criticisms of the functional and neofunctional approaches should not be 
taken to imply that Hoffmann denies the influence of the European integration process 
on European nation states. Hoffmann writes of a 'transformation' of the nations in 
Europe 'promoted by the Common Market itself', but still maintains that the most 
visible aspect of the European balance sheet is 'the survival of the nation states' (1966, 
pp. 889). The survival, and continued importance, of the nation states is fundamental 
to intergovernmental theories. 
Intergovernmentalism in the context of European integration has been interpreted by 
Moravcsik as the process whereby 
the EC has been based on interstate bargains between its leading member 
states. Heads of government, backed by a small group of ministers and 
advisers, initiate and negotiate major initiatives in the Council of Ministers 
or the European Council. Each government views the EC through the lens 
of its own policy preferences; EC politics is the continuation of domestic 
policies by other means. (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 25) 
As in Hoffmann's writings, Moravcsik considers the rational nation state to be the 
basic unit of European cooperation. International regimes exist for purely functional 
reasons as long as they serve nation states: '[s]tates are the principal actors in the 
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international system. ... International regimes shape interstate politics by providing a 
common framework that reduces the uncertainty and transaction costs of interstate 
interactions' (1991, p. 27). Moravcsik (1998, p. 472) thus views integration as 'a series of 
rational adaptations by national leaders to constraints and opportunities stemming 
from the evolution of an interdependent world economy, the relative power of states in 
the international system, and the potential for international institutions to bolster the 
credibility of interstate commitments'. He goes on to argue that the 'EC has been, for 
the most part, the deliberate creation of statesmen and citizens seeking to realize 
economic interests through traditional diplomatic means' (1998, p. 501). 
Although the end result of treaty negotiations are presented to national parliaments for 
ratification, parliamentarians are, in effect, faced with a fait accompli, having had no 
voice during negotiations and very limited influence over the final outcome. Only with 
the Convention on the Future of Europe did parliamentarians (European and national) 
gain a direct voice in the drafting of a constitutional text. Final negotiations were still, 
however, kept in the hands of national governments at International Government 
Conferences (IGCs). The strong focus on the state as a source of political legitimacy 
means that within intergovernmental theories, supranational institutions are necessary 
only to uphold the terms of bargains states make with one another. Moravcsik accords 
them little proactive importance in the process of European integration, and considers 
the driving force to be states and their domestically determined requirements. 
Governance is thus a national or domestic issue, with democratic accountability and 
legitimacy derived from the national level, a process that necessarily must involve 
national parliaments. In Moravcsik's theory of liberal intergovernmentalism there is no 
need for accountability and legitimacy to be derived from the European level, as 
decision-making is carried out by the states according to domestically derived 
interests. 
Multi-level governance 
The focus on traditional means of diplomacy, economic interests and the state does, 
however, leave certain phenomena unexplained. For instance, European governance 
has become too complex, as well as independent of national governments, to be 
explained by the intergovernmental model. This point is developed by Daniel Wincott, 
who also points to 'intergovernmentalism's failure to theorize the significance of policy 
feedbacks into the EU system that are the consequence of previous decisions' (see 
Rosamond, 2000, pp. 145-7). 
Even if one accepts that national governments are the main driving forces behind EU 
policies, the preferences of these national governments will be influenced by 
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membership of the EU. Wayne Sandholtz (1993, p. 3) writes that `national interests of 
EC states do not have independent existence; they are not formed in a vacuum and 
then brought to Brussels'. In a critique of the dichotomous view of European 
integration which the 'rivalry' between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism 
provides, Sandholtz concludes that '[p]erhaps our explanatory goals are best served by 
specifying the analytic strengths-and limitations-of approaches that work better in 
combination than alone' (1993, p. 39). 
The concept of multi-level governance is an attempt to explain how multiple 
participants with affiliations at different territorial levels take part in the European 
integration process. Not only are national-level actors influenced by events, procedures 
and decisions from the European level, they have also been forced to cede influence to 
actors at the European level (and in some cases also to sub-national level actors). What 
is being explained is thus the 'dispersion of authoritative decision making across 
multiple territorial levels', with European integration described as 'a polity-creating 
process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple 
levels of government - subnational, national, and supranational' (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001, pp. 2 and xi). 
As decision-making has moved both horizontally and vertically, more actors have 
become involved in the process. National governments are still key actors, but their 
role has altered in that they have to share their power with other participants. States 
'are an integral and powerful part of the EU, but they no longer provide the sole 
interface between supranational and subnational arenas, and they share, rather than 
monopolize, control over many activities that take place in their respective territories' 
(Marks et al., 1996, p. 347). 
The focus on multiple actors and levels within multi-level governance rarely leads to 
direct discussion or even mention of national parliaments. In the main, writers on 
multi-level governance consider national parliaments to be legitimisers of national 
governments rather than actors in their own right. One of the few areas where this is 
not the case is in the ratification process of new treaties. Whereas national governments 
are still considered key actors when treaties are being negotiated, the ratification 
process of the TEU has meant that national executives now 'have to contend with the 
participation of many kinds of domestic actors' (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 
6)-including national parliaments. Parliamentarians have become more involved in 
(especially) oversight procedures due to a perceived need for greater public scrutiny, 
with the result that 'action has shifted from national governments and technocrats in 
semi-isolation to domestic politics in the broad and usual sense: party programs, 
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electoral competition, parliamentary debates and votes, public opinion polls, and 
public referenda" (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 10). 
Despite different visions regarding the destination of European integration, integration 
theories often seem united in the view that national parliaments are not very important 
in this process. While national executives are most frequently considered the main 
actors at the national level, national parliaments and their support for executive policy 
are often taken for granted. However, the nature of European policy at the domestic 
level has often not been considered by integration theorists, and potential sources of 
difficulty for the conduct of coherent EU policy therefore not investigated. 
Whether or not European integration continues to deepen, national parliaments are 
likely to develop their methods of scrutiny further. Such a development may, 
potentially, cause existing broad interparliamentary agreements on the EU to dissolve, 
leaving EU policy vulnerable to the cleavages traditionally found within national 
parliaments. As a consequence, national parliaments may come to be thought of as 
important national-level actors on European policy. 
Conclusion 
As the territory in which 'democracy' has been the chosen form of governance has 
expanded, so the nature of that democracy has altered. Where once individual citizens 
were able to participate directly in the affairs of their city-state, individual states now 
represent their citizens in regional or international forums where issues that directly 
affect the citizens are decided. The transformation from direct to representative 
democracy is well documented, with theories on a third transition towards global and 
multi-levelled governance-and how it might be democratised-currently being 
developed. 
It is clear that governance at the international level does not comply with the 
democratic criteria developed above. " At EU level the selection of many leaders is 
indirect, as is the protection of many civil and political liberties. However, the EU does 
have a directly elected parliament and national representatives are required to find 
support for most policy decisions at the national level. Globalisation may thus have 
necessitated cooperation at the international level, but it has not made nation states 
(including national parliaments) redundant. 
U This point is little disputed if democracy is defined as a system of governance providing meaningful and 
extensive competition for all effective positions of government power, a highly inclusive level of political 
participation in the selection of leaders and policies and provision and protections of a certain level of civil 
and political liberties. 
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Over time, demands that governance at the European level be developed in a 
democratic manner have grown stronger. It is commonly accepted that the role of 
national parliaments is focused at the national level and that their involvement in 
European legislation is indirect through national executives. The extent to which EU 
decisions reach into all corners of the lives of EU citizens, and the associated reduction 
in national parliamentary autonomy, has meant that the role of national parliaments 
has changed. While EU membership was initially seen as a limitation of their roles, the 
case study chapters will explore how national parliaments have explored potential 
sources of power and influence. 
The limited role national parliaments play at the European level is reflected in how 
integration theories consider the role of national parliaments. While all integration 
theories consider parliaments to be important in legitimising the activities of their 
executives, most theorists do not recognise parliaments as important and independent 
actors within the explanatory frameworks they deploy. 
One partial exception to this limited attention to national parliaments is in treaty- 
ratification procedures. Although national parliamentarians do not partake directly in 
treaty negotiations, the Convention on the Future of Europe saw them involved in the 
preparatory work for the IGC that followed the Convention. Their inclusion in this 
Convention was partially a result of the difficulties surrounding the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which served to emphasise the need for public consultation and 
involvement during negotiations of new treaties. 
Having national parliamentarians contribute to the Convention may have given them a 
sense of ownership regarding the final result, thereby easing the paths of ratification. 
However, their involvement in the Convention may also have opened their eyes to the 
extent to which European matters impact on legislative activities within national 
parliaments, underlining the need for scrutiny of European affairs. 
The ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty has, if anything, underlined this 
view. The French and Dutch rejections of the Treaty in referenda were a clear 
indication that the European peoples are not in agreement with their politicians on the 
issue of European integration. " Clearly, deeper and more nuanced debates are 
necessary if politicians and citizens are to understand each other on European issues. 
13 , he rpilfc in the fwn referomria were as follows- 
No-vote (percent) Turnout (r cent) 
France 5468 69.34 
The Netherlands 61.7 63 
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Such debates may also influence how scrutiny systems within national parliaments 
develop. 
As will become evident through the case studies, how national parliaments have 
reacted to the European integration process has varied considerably between 
parliaments. To a large extent, responses have depended on traditional political 
cultures, practices and procedures, although they have also often been reactive rather 
than proactive. However, the blindfolds are coming off, gradually revealing the 
integration elephant in its entirety. 
National parliaments therefore remain on a steep learning curve as their contact with 
and understanding of the European level is becoming more important but has often 
been limited. The relationship between national parliaments and European institutions 
will be explored in the next chapter, together with an overview of how national 
parliaments have been considered at the European level in the various treaties ratified 
so far. 
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Chapter 3: The European Union and national parliaments: 
Together but apart? 
[T]he national Parliament shall have a real opportunity to use the 
information received to gain an influence on its own country's European 
policy and thereby the common decisions made in the Community. 
(COSAC, 2003b, section I). 
As legitimisers of European integration national parliaments have so far ratified all EU 
treaties placed in front of them. However, their ability to influence the treaty texts has 
traditionally been negligible, only existing indirectly through their national executives. 
The ratification of (especially) the Treaty on European Union (TEU) made it clear that 
the EU and its institutions had not managed to develop the legitimacy claimed by 
national institutions. As Europeanisation has developed, it has become increasingly 
obvious that national level institutions, especially national parliaments, are integral to 
the legitimisation of the Community and its policies. The premises for the involvement 
of national parliament in European affairs have therefore been altered. Despite the 
importance of the legitimising function, a specific role for national parliaments in the 
European construct has mot been included in any of the treaties ratified to date. Indeed, 
until very recently the importance of this function has not been widely recognised 
amongst national parliaments themselves. The two Conventions on Human Rights and 
the Future of Europe (for more details see Chapter eight) have changed this picture, 
with national parliamentarians participating directly at the European level, and it is 
now inconceivable that preparations for future IGCs will exclude national 
parliamentarians. 
In contrast, the EP has been included in the treaties as a fundamental element of the 
European institutional order from the onset of European cooperation. While MEPs 
have worked to increase the EP's power and influence, their involvement in European 
decision-making has never been questioned. The idea of direct involvement by 
national parliaments at the European level has been raised at different points in time, 
but has always been rejected in favour of national parliaments limiting their legislative 
activities to the national level. Contacts between national parliaments and European- 
level institutions have been limited although the two levels have increasingly found 
themselves needing the other: European cooperation is, to a large extent, legitimised by 
national parliaments, but it has also been recognised that certain issues of relevance to 
voters at the national level are better dealt with at the European level. 
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In this chapter the relationship between national parliaments and the European level 
will therefore be examined. Firstly, the EU's development will be investigated through 
consecutive treaties, focusing on the limited extent to which national parliaments are 
included in these treaties. In the second section the Community's main institutions are 
described, with a focus on their relations with national parliaments. The final section is 
a brief overview of how national parliaments have attempted to scrutinise their 
governments' behaviour and actions at the European level. National parliaments can 
be classified according to their influence on either national or European legislation, 
with no certainty that the two categories overlap. Greater influence over domestic 
legislation does not automatically translate into influence over European legislation 
(even indirectly through the activities of executives at the European level). Another 
important factor in efficient scrutiny is the amount and type of information available to 
national parliamentarians, with too much information as much a problem as too little. 
Specific national circumstances also influence parliamentary levels of ambition, with 
some parliaments perceiving themselves as needing to be supportive rather than 
critical of their governments' European policies. European institutions or treaties have 
not dictated scrutiny activities undertaken at the national level. Indeed, they have 
barely mentioned national parliaments. The gradual recognition of their role within 
Europe is the subject of the first sections of this chapter. 
1. The EU's founding treaties 
The origins of what is now known as the European Union lie in the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), whose founding treaty was the first of those upon which the 
EU of today is based. The ECSC treaty was signed in April 1951 by Belgium, France, 
the Republic of Germany ('West Germany'), Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, 
also known as 'the six'. The ECSC was to 'contribute, in harmony with the general 
economy of the Member States and through the establishment of a common market ... 
to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the 
Member States' (Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 
April 1951), Article 2). To this end four main institutions were established: a High 
Authority, a Common Assembly, a Special Council of Ministers (Council), and a Court 
of Justice. The Common Assembly, composed of members appointed from member 
states' national parliaments, was intended to represent the peoples of the member 
states in the Community, and was granted supervisory powers accordingly. However, 
its influence was limited, and the Assembly remained a marginal player for many 
years. The only direct way for national parliaments to be involved in the emerging 
integration process was thus extremely circumscribed, with the only other method 
being indirectly through national executives in the Council. 
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The institutional design altered little when the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) came into force in January 
1958. The aim of the EEC was similar to that of the ECSC, namely the establishment of 
a common market, promotion of economic activities, increased standard of living 
through continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, and closer 
relations between the Member States (Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (Rome, 25 March 1957), Treaty of Rome, Article 2). 
The new Communities established their own Councils and Commissions, although it 
was decided that the Assembly, renamed the European Parliamentary Assembly, 
should be common to all three Communities (Palmer, 1981, p. 23). The Assembly 
remained a body to be consulted, but whose views neither the Council nor the 
Commission was obligated to take into consideration. Significantly, though, the 
Assembly was requested to draw up proposals for `elections by direct universal 
suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States' (Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957), Article 138, 
paragraph 3). Although never implemented, the Assembly worked hard to develop 
such procedures. The requirement for unanimity within the Council meant that no 
uniform election procedure could be agreed upon, and it was only in 1976 that the Act 
on direct elections of members to the Assembly was signed. However, direct elections 
did not take place until 1979 and are still conducted according to electoral procedures 
chosen at the national level. 
Direct elections brought a measure of legitimacy to the Assembly, which its members 
claimed entitled it to increased influence. Despite the claims to greater legitimacy, 
further influence was not granted until the introduction of the Single European Act 
(SEA). Moreover, direct elections also broke the direct link with national parliaments. 
At this point the involvement of national parliaments in European matters thus 
diminished, ' being reduced to the requirement that they ratify the Treaties 
underpinning European integration. As they were intergovernmental in nature, 
negotiations leading to these treaties remained a matter purely for national executives, 
effectively leaving national parliaments in a 'take it or leave it' situation, with no scope 
for directly influencing the contents of the treaties. 
The next significant institutional change arrived with the adoption of the SEA, which 
came into force July 1987. The Act reinforced economic cooperation by committing 
member states to complete the internal market by the end of 1992. Furthermore, 
common policies were extended, and new objectives pursued in the fields of 'economic 
' Contacts resulting from MEPs holding double mandates have also reduced, as the practice has become 
less frequent with many political parties no longer permitting this practice. 
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and social cohesion' policy (Article 23), research and technological development 
(Article 24) and the environment. 
For the first time the specific aim of a European Union was mentioned in the preamble, 
thereby making explicit the political goals of European integration. The need to 'speak 
with one voice', as well as act with 'consistency and solidarity' to protect 'common 
interests and independence', while also contributing to the 'preservation of 
international peace and security' was thus recognised, and the political nature of 
Community cooperation provided with a legal basis. Furthermore, promotion of 
democracy was, also for the first time, mentioned in the preamble. To this end the 
signatory states saw the EP as an 'indispensable means of expression' for the European 
peoples. However, national parliaments were not mentioned, leaving citizens with few 
opportunities to influence the decision-making process, and the EU short of the 
democratic requirements discussed in Chapter two. 
The SEA also introduced increased powers for the EP that somewhat alleviated the 
developing democratic deficit. For the first time in an official European Treaty the EP 
was referred to as the 'European Parliament', a name it had adopted for itself in 1962. It 
was also invested with the co-operation (see Figure 3.1) and assent2 procedures, 
significantly increasing the influence of the EP in the areas covered by these 
procedures. National parliaments, however, were still limited to expressing their 
opinions indirectly through the Council. 
The Maastricht Treaty (signed February 1992, and coming into force November 1993) 
has to date been the most controversial, as well as the most ambitious, of the 
Community's Treaties. Again, the preamble is a helpful indicator of how far the 
member states had moved since the last treaty amendment. The desire to promote 
economic and social progress was reiterated, as was the aim of an ever closer Union. 
Moreover, the Union was reinforced through the provision of a European citizenship 
extended to all nationals of the member states. The Union's attachment to the principle 
of democracy was confirmed and enhanced through the principle of subsidiarity, 
which holds that decisions should be taken as closely to the citizen as possible. 
2 The assent procedure requires the EP to approve a proposal before the Council can adopt it. 
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Figure 3.1 Co-decision procedure (Source: Corbett et al., 2000, p. 190). 
As with previous treaty amendments, the institution most affected by the Maastricht 
treaty was the EP. Its powers were increased with the introduction of the co-decision 
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procedure' and the extended use of the co-operation procedure to most of the areas 
where the Council uses qualified majority voting (for an overview of other changes 
affecting the EP see Corbett et al., 2000, p. 300). For the first time national parliaments 
were also, in protocols thirteen and fourteen annexed to the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), mentioned in the Community treaties. Protocol thirteen on the role of national 
parliaments in the European Union mentions the importance of encouraging 'greater 
involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union', 
recommending 'exchange of information between the national Parliaments and the 
European Parliament' as well as 'granting of appropriate reciprocal facilities and 
regular meetings between members of Parliament interested in the same issues' (Treaty 
on European Union, 1992, Protocol 13). Protocol fourteen on the 'Conference of the 
Parliaments' encourages the formation of 'Assizes', meetings between the EP and 
national parliaments. ` The protocols do not, however, indicate a more specific role for 
national parliaments, nor do they accord these institutions any specific rights at the 
European level. Protocol thirteen does say that 'governments of the Member States will 
ensure, inter alia, that national parliaments receive Commission proposals for 
legislation in good time for information of possible examination', although this can 
hardly be deemed a right. Furthermore, as national governments provide this 
information for scrutiny at the national level, national parliaments were still not 
explicitly recognised in the European decision-making process and thus still did not 
have their importance to the European construct recognised in the treaties. This very 
marginal mention of national parliaments in Community treaties contrasts with the 
treatment of the EP, which, although initially only a consultative body, was accorded 
treaty-based rights and duties from the very outset of the European integrative 
process. 
With the Amsterdam Treaty it can be argued that a new era in treaty development 
began. The ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty had clearly indicated that 
accept of deepening cooperation was not automatic. The Amsterdam and Nice treaties, 
due mainly to public opinion on the EU but also because of the upcoming enlargement, 
shifted the negotiators' focus to internal structures and inter-institutional relations. As 
a consequence, the agenda for the 1996 IGC was more limited than that for the TEU. In 
the words of Geoffrey Edwards and Georg Wiessala (1998, p. 4): 'what the relative lack 
3 It should be noted that the only point at which national parliaments can influence decisions is when the 
Council announces its common position, a very indirect method of participation. For the most part the co- 
decision procedure is an open procedure, permitting national parliaments to follow the legislative 
procedure. If a conciliation committee is convened, following the legislative process becomes more 
difficult, causing national parliaments to rely heavily on their governments for information about 
proceedings. It is even more difficult, however, for national parliaments to follow comitology procedures. 
Comitology has been summarised as 'the various types of committees (regulatory, consultative, and 
management) created to oversee the implementation of Community law, a power delegated to the 
Commission by the Council. These committees are composed of experts from the member states and 
chaired by a representative of the Commission' (Hayes-Renshaw, 2002, p. 70 n. 5). 
4 The Assizes was intended as a body to be consulted'on the main features of the European Union'. 
56 
of ambition in the IGC also revealed was an increased awareness of the problems of the 
general acceptability and legitimacy of the European venture'. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam can thus be described as consolidating rather than groundbreaking, while 
the Nice Treaty attempted to ready the EU's institutions for the upcoming 
enlargement. 
In a Protocol (number 9) to the Amsterdam Treaty, provision of information from the 
EU to national parliaments is discussed, and the Conference of Community and 
European Affairs Committees (COSAC) is mentioned for the first time. This can be 
considered as evidence that the topic of national parliaments and their relevance to 
Europe was finding its way on to the European agenda. Confirmation of this could be 
found in the Treaty of Nice, where national parliaments became an important item on 
the European agenda as, in Declaration 23, the agenda for the 2004 IGC is outlined and 
includes 'the role of national parliaments in the European architecture' (Treaty of Nice, 
2001, Declaration 23,5). 
National parliaments were not included in negotiations leading to the Amsterdam and 
Nice treaties. They were, however, involved in the Convention leading to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and were important contributors to the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (for further discussion see Chapter eight). With 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights being incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty 
and the second Convention delivering recommendations to the 2004 IGC, national 
parliaments had been directly involved at the European level in an unprecedented 
manner and are unlikely to be excluded from any Convention-like undertakings in the 
future. 
These two events aside, contact between national parliaments and European-level 
institutions has been limited and mainly indirect. Direct contacts have been especially 
rare after direct elections to the EP began in 1979. To understand the relationship 
between national parliament and European-level institutions better, the next section 
will investigate how European institutions have developed, and what level of contact 
has existed between them and national parliaments. 
2. The EU institutions 
The Commission 
It is common to talk of 'the Commission as if it is a unitary actor although, in reality, 
there are two 'arms' of the Commission. One of these is the administration which 
consists of sectorally based Directorate Generals (DGs) and the coordinating services, 
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while the political arm is made up of the Commission President, the Commissioners 
(individually as well as collectively in the college) and the cabinets of the individual 
Commissioners (Nugent, 1997, pp. 2-7; but see also Nugent, 2002; Peterson, 2002). Far 
from being a singular entity, the Commission can thus be described as a multifaceted 
institution, and its officials may represent either national, institutional, political or 
sectoral interests (Peterson, 1999, p. 58). The Commission's many roles and functions 
remain very important to the functioning of the EU, it being an ally to and blamed by 
all (Fitzmaurice, 1994, p. 179), as well as central to the EU's'self-definition'. 
The tasks of the Commission have vaguely been identified in the treaties as ensuring 
'the proper functioning and development of the common market' (Article 211). 
Complying with this requirement, the Commission has developed four main functions 
for itself. It initiates legislation; it administrates, manages and guards the treaties; it 
mediates and it represents the Union internationally (outline by Edwards and Spence, 
1997, p. 4). In fulfilling all of these tasks the Commission relies heavily on the member 
states and their agencies for implementation, only maintaining a relatively small 
bureaucracy itself. The effectiveness of the Commission thus depends heavily on both 
administrative and political support at the national level, and the Commission must 
remain sensitive to the moods in national capitals. These points were illustrated by the 
Prodi Commission, which lacked support from national governments. Often showing 
insensitivity to national agendas, the result was a general 'lack of obvious political 
capital for Prodi to fall back on (Taylor, 2000b). ' 
Direct contact between the Commission and national parliaments has been much less 
frequent than contact with national executives. However, as the role of national 
parliaments at the European level is being reconsidered, this may change too. Protocol 
9 in the Amsterdam Treaty thus outlines three requirements the Commission must 
fulfill in relation to national parliaments, although these mainly serve to ease 
procedures at the national level. Firstly, all consultation documents (Green and White 
Papers included) must be forwarded to member state parliaments as soon as possible; 
secondly, legislative proposals must be forwarded so that national executives can 
ensure adequate time for the national parliaments to receive these according to 
national rules; thirdly, at least six weeks must pass between legislation being proposed 
and it being placed on the Council's agenda with the purpose of adopting a common 
position. To improve relations with national parliaments, it has been suggested that 
with the increase in the number of Commissioners two should be assigned to each 
'portfolio', one with the task of maintaining contacts with national parliament on issues 
s See also Taylor (2000a) for further analysis of the Prodi Commission, and Peterson (1999) for a historical 
(as well as normative and theoretical) analysis of (especially) the Delors and Santer Commissions. 
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falling within their remit. 6 A further suggestion is that national parliamentarians 
should elect the Commission President, a move Simon Hix argues would give national 
parliaments 'genuinely significant role in the EU system' (Hix, 2002, p. 22). While these 
changes will not ensure national parliaments any further influence over decision- 
making at the European level, they may contribute to improved scrutiny at the national 
level. 
The Council 
While the Commission guards the treaties and initiates and implements legislation, the 
role of the Council' is to 'ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the 
Member States' (Article 202). It also defines and implements work in the second and 
third pillars and, together with the EP, is the Community's budgetary authority. 
According to the treaties, the Council is, in legal terms, one entity. In reality, however, 
it meets in several forms based on sectoral divisions, with ministers from the member 
state governments representing national interests. " Although ministers meet on a 
regular basis, the Council is heavily dependent on other Community institutions as 
well as on close cooperation between national officials. 
When votes are taken in the Council these must be published. However, a vote is very 
rarely taken, with the chairperson merely indicating whether a majority in favour has 
been established or not. In such cases it is difficult for a national parliament to hold 
their negotiators accountable, as they simply do not have the information to achieve 
this. Ministers can thus blame unappetising decisions on 'Brussels' while claiming 
victory when decisions are in line with domestic wishes. Although all Council 
decisions are formally taken at Council meetings, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) and its working groups (attended by member state civil 
servants) in effect prepare and effectively agree most decisions. This makes it even 
more difficult for national parliaments to follow decisions made at the European level. 
As the historically most important institution for decision-making within the European 
Community, the Council has been heavily criticised for the secrecy maintained at all 
levels in its decision-making process. This is a very unsatisfactory situation for the 
public, parliaments (at both national and European levels), lobbyists and the press 
6 Interview B-10. 
7 The role of the European Council, which brings together Heads of State or government of the member 
states, assisted by their Ministers of foreign affairs, is to provide the EU with the necessary impetus for its 
development as well as define its general guidelines (Article 4), but will not be discussed in any further 
detail here. 
n It is important to note that not only do member states have different goals regarding what they wish to 
achieve, they also behave in different ways, and are by no means unitary actors. See for instance (Hayes- 
Renshaw and Wallace, 1997, pp. 230-3). 
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alike. The lack of transparency at all levels of the Council restricts parliamentary 
scrutiny-by both the EP and national parliaments. While the EP participates in the 
decision-making process, the co-decision procedure still does not cover all areas of 
cooperation. Furthermore, the Council has traditionally been accused of not being 
transparent enough. The forthcoming constitutional treaty attempts to alleviate this 
problem with the Council being required to meet in public when deliberating and 
voting on draft legislative acts. 
As individual institutions operating at the national level, national parliaments have 
obvious difficulties in asserting any influence over the Council as an institution 
operating at the European level. In order to do so, collective activities would have to 
develop significantly, as would cooperation with the EP. It therefore seems clear that 
any impact must be developed at the national level, with national parliaments 
attempting to scrutinise their own executives' activities at the European level. 
The European Court of Justice 
Although the Council (including the European Council) has provided direction and 
guidance to the European integration project, the development of the Community 
beyond a traditional international organisation has in large part been based on rulings 
and opinions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). ' The duty of the ECJ is to ensure 
that the law is upheld in the interpretation and application of the treaties (Article 220), 
a task the ECJ initially fulfilled during a long period of 'benign neglect by the powers 
that be' (as first identified in Eric Stein's article on the ECJ (1981)). Fundamental to 
developing the Community beyond a 'normal' international agreement are the 
principles of direct effect and supremacy which establish that 'EU law may confer 
rights or impose obligations on individuals which national courts are bound to 
recognise and enforce', and that European legislation takes precedence over national 
legislation (see also Dehousse, 1998; Hunnings, 1996; Nugent, 1999, p. 219). Of 
importance has also been the use of preliminary reference, which, indirectly, has 
allowed individuals access to the ECJ. ' The requirement that the ECJ interprets means 
that its opinions are always abstracted, only providing opinions on the law, not on 
specific cases. In the words of Neill Nugent, the ECJ 'fills the gaps in the law and, in 
doing so, it not only clarifies the law but it also extends it' (1999, p. 258). However, the 
ECJ has often gone to great efforts to make its opinions as directly implementable as 
Although the EP's right to take proceedings before the ECJ developed gradually, 'the Court has 
consistently refused to exclude the Parliament from the scope of provisions which refer to the institutions 
of the Community in general terms' (Amull, 1990, p. 691-2). 
" Article 234 of the TEU allows lower courts (and requires Courts of last instance) to request a ruling 
(preliminary reference) on matters of the interpretation of the Treaty; the validity and interpretation of acts 
of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB; and of the interpretation of the statutes of bodies 
established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. 
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possible. According to G. Federico Mancini: '[t]he national judge is thus led hand in 
hand as far as the door; crossing the threshold is his job, but now a job no harder than 
child's play' (1989, p. 606). 
From the point of view of national parliaments this situation is very unsatisfactory, as 
their role as legislators becomes circumscribed by a body over which they have no 
influence, and with which they have no direct contact. Despite the right to submit 
reasoned opinions on whether a piece of legislation complies with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality embedded in the Constitutional Treaty, national 
parliaments can still not go directly to the ECJ to seek this test (for further details see 
Chapter eight). Essentially, national rules determine whether a member state, in effect 
the executive, is to take a case to the ECJ, and parliaments still operate individually at 
the national level, seeking to influence their executives. While national parliaments can 
coordinate activities in an effort to obtain enough votes to force the Commission to 
review its position (see Article 6 of the protocol for the exact rules), there is still no 
direct or collective way for MPs to express their concerns at the European level. 
In contrast to national parliaments, the EP has benefited significantly from the EQ's 
influence on the integration process. Most important was perhaps the Isoglucose case 
in 1980 which stated that the Council could not adopt a piece of legislation unless it 
had received the EP's opinion. Further cases brought before the ECJ gradually 
recognised the EP as a litigator, allowing it to bring cases of annulment before the ECJ 
in order to protect its prerogatives by means other than a vote of no confidence. 
The European Parliament 
Although the EP is no longer the only international directly elected body, " it remains 
the 'most far-reaching experiment in trans-national democracy' (Corbett et al., 2000, p. 
2). One reason is that MEPs have organised themselves in political groups, which are 
fundamental to the organisation of the EP and its work. Historically, positions such as 
President, Vice-President and Quastors, but also committee chairs and rapporteurs, 
have all been allocated according to the size of the political groups. Moreover, debates 
within committees are conducted on the basis of the political groups' standpoints, 
while the allocation of speaking time in plenary sessions is also determined by 
membership of political groups. 
MEPs were initially chosen by and from members of the national parliaments, thus 
only indirectly representing the European peoples at the European level, but ensuring 
" The Central American parliament is the only other multi-national parliament that is directly elected 
(Corbett et al., 2000, p. 10). 
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a link between national parliaments and the EP. Direct elections to the EP began in 
1979 and have occurred at five-year intervals since. The elections marked a turning 
point in the life of the EP as it began to accumulate significant powers and influence. It 
was hoped that direct elections would provide a measure of legitimacy for the EP and 
the Community as such. However, there were also concerns that low turnout and 
general lack of interest in the elections would reduce credibility in the EP and the 
entire process of European cooperation. ' Direct elections also meant that links to 
national parliaments were severed, the only link being parliamentarians with double 
mandates, a practice which is increasingly discouraged. 
Despite an emerging political system at the European level (see for instance 
Thomassen and Schmitt, 1997), interest in European elections has generally been 
limited. To date, the highest level of participation (65.9 per cent) was measured at the 
first elections in 1979. The lowest level of participation was recorded in the 2004 
election, when participation was 45.7 per cent. " Mark Franklin and Cees van der Eijk 
argue that EP elections are, essentially, 'second-order national elections' (1996). For his 
part, Martin Westlake (1994, Chapter two) argues that European issues are emerging, 
that 'Europeanisation' of elections to the EP is not just about the substance of the 
debate, but also evident in the fact that MEPs are elected to the same institution, and 
that these elections occur simultaneously. There is thus little agreement on how 
elections to the EP are perceived and how this influences the voter turnout. 
Table 3.1 Voter turnout in elections for the European Parliament 
Member State 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Denmark 47.8 52.4 46.2 52.9 50.5 47.9 
Italy 84.9 83.4 81.5 74.8 70.8 73.1 
United 
Kingdom 
32.2 32.6 36.2 36.4 24 38.83 
EU Average 63 61 58.5 56.8 49.8 45.7 
Source: 1 ne turopean Yarltament, www. electionsZW4. eu. mt/ ep- 
elections / sites/ en/ results1306 / turnout_html 
The EP's activities resemble those of a national parliament-although it remains a co- 
legislator. Procedures for the EP's involvement have developed gradually over the 
years, with the 'Isoglucose' ruling in 1980 representing a significant turning point. In 
u For a more in depth discussion of these problems, see for instance Lodge (1986), and, for a later analysis, 
Lodge (1996b). 
13 The figures mask significant national differences. Some countries (Belgium, Greece and until recently 
Italy) have compulsory voting, thus bringing the average level of participation up. In 1999 the highest and 
lowest levels of participation were thus 90.7 per cent (Belgium) and 24 per cent (UK) respectively (see, for 
instance, Blondel et al., 1997 for possible explanations as to why participation is so low in comparison with 
participation in national elections). 
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this ruling, the ECJ made it clear to the Council that it could not adopt Community 
legislation before the EP had given its opinion if the treaties required it. " With the 
Isoglucose ruling the ECJ gave the EP a significant card to play, in effect allowing it to 
delay an opinion in order to pressure the Commission or Council into adopting 
suggested changes. Although the EP could not be seen to delay legislation blatantly, it 
became possible to refer legislation back to committees for reconsideration, potentially 
causing considerable delay. 
The old adage that 'the Commission proposes and the Council disposes' thus clearly 
no longer holds true as the EU's decision-making process has developed into a 
triangular institutional setting where the EP plays an important part together with the 
Council and Commission (and occasionally the ECJ). However, the EP remains heavily 
reliant on the Commission for practical purposes, mainly in terms of the Commission 
providing the EP with information in areas where the EP's level of influence is not well 
developed. The reliance of the EP on the Commission is so strong that it has been 
suggested that 'Parliament's theoretical constitutional independence is heavily 
compromised' (Westlake, 1997, p. 261). 
On the other hand, the Council has traditionally been more hesitant in cooperating 
with the EP, guarding its own status as the main decision-maker within the EU. As the 
EP's legislative influence has grown, contact between the two institutions has increased 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a result, the Council has come a long way in 
acknowledging the EP's 'significant but contingent' contribution to Community 
legislation (Earnshaw and Judge, 1996, p. 124). Still, the EP's relationship with the 
Council is complicated by the fact that the Council is both legislator and executive. 
While the EP can participate constructively in the legislative process, it has no 
influence over the Council's actions as executive, having to rely on national 
parliaments for this purpose. Cooperation with national parliaments is also a necessity 
if the Council as legislator is to be held fully accountable, with national parliaments 
ensuring domestic points of view are being taken into account, as well as scrutinising 
the Council's actions in areas where the EP has no or little influence (including at 
IGCs). 
National parliaments have often perceived the EP as a competitor, and have thus been 
reluctant to increase the EP's power and influence within the EU. MEPs, on the other 
hand, have tended to resist national parliaments becoming directly active at the 
European level, arguing that their role is at the national level in relation to their 
executives. However, it is increasingly recognised by national parliaments that the EP 
has an important role to fulfill, especially in relation to the Council, which national 
14 For more information on the case and its implications see Corbett eLal. (2000, pp. 179-181). 
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parliaments cannot undertake. Suspicion has thus slowly given way to tentative 
cooperation, expressed in multilateral parliamentary meetings (such as COSAC and 
the Speakers' Conference, discussed in greater detail in Chapter eight), but also in 
meetings between members from select committees at different levels of governance. 
The European Parliament is thus the European-level institutions with which national 
parliaments have the highest level of contacts-and the ECJ that with which they have 
the least. Relations with the Council exist mainly at the individual level, with national 
parliaments scrutinising the activities of their participants in the Council, making it 
difficult for national parliaments to develop a joint and coherent approach towards the 
Council as an institution has been. Such a relationship is easier to develop with the 
Commission, as this institution is becoming an important provider of information for 
national parliaments which all have similar informational needs. By receiving further 
information, directly from the European level, national parliaments are, theoretically, 
better able to scrutinise the activities of their executives at the European level. An 
overview of scrutiny procedures will be developed in the next section, where it will 
become evident that national parliaments have pursued scrutiny activities with 
varying levels of vigour and success. 
3. National parliaments and the EU 
Parliaments can be classified according to several criteria such as methods of election, 
functions or influence over the executive. Michael L. Mezey began to classify 
parliaments according to their influence over the executive based on two criteria: their 
mass and elite support, and their policy-making power. On this basis, Mezey 
introduced three categories of parliament: those with strong policy-making power 
(able to modify and/or reject legislation proposed by the government); those with 
modest policy-making power (able to modify government legislation); and those with 
little or no policy-making power (Mezey, 1990; Norton, 1990b). Philip Norton (1994, p. 
17) builds on this 'useful but not problem-free' classification, arguing that Mezey only 
includes parliaments able to respond to executive activities, and thus does not consider 
reactive actions. Incorporating the reactive ways in which parliaments can act, Norton 
(1994; but see also Norton, 1996b; Norton, 1998a) thus refines Mezey's parliamentary 
categories to: 
" Policy-making legislatures (able to modify or reject measures brought forward 
by the executive, can formulate and substitute policies of their own). 
" Policy-influencing legislatures (able to modify or reject measures brought 
forward by the executive but cannot formulate and substitute policies of their 
own). 
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" Legislatures with little or no policy affect (can neither modify or reject policies 
brought forward by the executive nor formulate and substitute policies of their 
own). 
All of the seven parliaments investigated in Norton's initial outline of the model fall 
within the policy-influencing category. Italy and Denmark lie very close to the policy- 
making category, with the Netherlands not far behind. Germany and the UK sit in the 
middle of the policy-influencing category, with Ireland and France towards the bottom 
(Norton, 1994, p. 20). The legislation over which parliaments in this analysis have 
power is domestic legislation. If a similar categorisation is used with regard to the 
influence national parliaments15 have over European legislation, their placements 
within the three categories alters significantly (European Centre for Parliamentary 
Research and Documentation, 2003; Maurer, 2001). An extract from Andreas Maurer's 
table shows three categories: parliamentary policy-making, policy-influencing and 
weak impact. While each category contains at least one parliament, some parliaments 
straddle two of the categories. The Folketing is the only parliament present solely in the 
policy-making category, while the Austrian, Finnish, German and Swedish parliaments 
cover both the policy making and influencing categories. Sitting only in the policy 
influencing category are the parliaments of France, the Netherlands and the UK, while 
weak parliaments are considered to be those in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Seven of the fifteen member state parliaments 
included in this study are thus considered to have a weak impact on European matters. 
Table 3.2" Impact of national parliaments in EU affairs 
Country Weak influence Policy influence Policy making 
Austria X X 
Belgium X 
Denmark X 
Finland X X 
France X 
Germany X X 
Greece X 
Ireland X 
Italy X 
Luxembourg X 
Netherlands X 
15 'National parliaments' still refers to the parliaments of the 15 nation states who were members of the 
Community prior to I May 2004. For brief information about scrutiny in a number of the new member 
states (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia), see the Annex to 
COSAC's first 'Report on developments in European Union procedures and practices relevant to 
parliamentary scrutiny' (2004). 
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Portugal X 
Spain X 
Sweden x x 
UK x 
bource: (Maurer, ZUU1, p. 24) 
A table like this raises several questions. For example, what determines which category 
a parliament is placed within? Moreover, does this placement correspond to the 
parliament's influence in domestic matters? The remainder of this chapter will look 
briefly at these questions in a historic and comparative manner (and will draw 
significantly on European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation, 
2003; Maurer, 2001; Maurer and Wessels, 2001b; Wessels et at., 2003). 
Historic developments 
Initial involvement by national parliaments in European affairs was limited in the early 
years of the European Economic Community. Not until the Single European Act and 
the Maastricht Treaty did many national-level parliamentarians realise that for their 
parliaments to maintain influence over legislation applied within their country, they 
had to take an interest in European matters too. A table providing an overview of 
developments in EU committees between 1957 and 1997 (Maurer, 2001, pp. 6-7) thus 
shows a total of 37 entries (as some committees have been re-established with renewed 
or altered remits), 21 of which occur post - SEA. Despite this 'awakening' and increased 
committee activity, only three parliaments moved one step to the right in table 3.2 
above. In France, new legislation and determined action on behalf of the Assemblee and 
Senate moved these institutions from the category of 'Weak legislature' to that of 
'Policy influence' (for a description of this development see Szukala, 2003; Szukala and 
Rozenberg, 2001). The British Parliament made a similar move to the 'Policy influence' 
category (especially post-1997 as Labour implemented its manifesto commitments on 
domestic reform), although it was the Maastricht Treaty, rather than the SEA, which 
caused parliamentarians here to reflect on their scrutiny procedures. While 
adjustments also took place during the 1980s and early 1990s, it has been argued that 
change 'was by far outweighed by the changes in the decision-making processes 
introduced in the Single European Act' (Hansen and Scholl, 2002, p. 10). Scrutiny 
procedures, even if they develop, must therefore not be looked at in isolation, but in 
relation to developments at the European level. Perhaps the most significant 
development has taken place in Germany, which, according to Maurer's table, has 
moved from the 'Weak legislature' category to straddling the 'Policy influencing and 
'Policy making' categories. Significant influence is limited to narrow areas of policy 
making, but the Bundestag's EU committee has developed to a point where it is now 
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considered to be 'a useful instrument for holding the government to account' (see also 
Hölscheidt, 2001; Maurer, 2003, p. 131). 
In most other parliaments, changes have mainly been related to rights of information 
and improved communication between parliament, government and the 
administration. As several parliaments are still heavily dependent on their executives 
for the transfer of information, improvements in transfer procedures contribute 
significantly to parliaments' abilities to hold the executive to account in European 
matters. The importance of inter-institutional relations at the national level is reflected 
in the fact that Working Group IV in the Convention on the Future of Europe discussed 
the subject and produced several recommendations on the subject (The European 
Convention Working Group IV, 2002a, pp. 8-9). However, while the (timely) transfer of 
information is important, explanatory notes are perhaps even more so. Regular reports 
from executives to parliaments on European affairs and on the executives' activities at 
the European level are thus also of significant importance (for more information on the 
development of information transfer, see Maurer, 2001). 
Information 
Appropriate information is fundamental to parliaments if they are to conduct scrutiny 
in an adequate manner. However, notions about what constitutes 'appropriate' levels 
of information vary significantly between member states. On matters falling under the 
European Community Treaty, Greek parliamentarians are thus entitled to receive all 
draft proposals by the Commission, with the Greek Government submitting a report 
on developments in EC affairs at the end of each parliamentary session. On both the 
common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs, the Government 
submits progress reports (European Centre for Parliamentary Research and 
Documentation, 2003, pp. 22-3). In contrast, the Finnish Parliament receives, in all three 
areas, 'comprehensive information on the drafting of EU policy, on request and where 
needed', and the Danish Folketing has developed a system whereby documents are 
automatically transferred from the Commission's database to the database of the 
Folketing's EUC, ensuring that all documents from the Commission are received by the 
EUC on their day of publication (COSAC, 2004; European Centre for Parliamentary 
Research and Documentation, 2003). The scope of information received thus differs 
significantly-and, consequently, so does the ability of national parliaments to 
scrutinise their governments. In the Greek case, parliamentarians can do little but 
accept the outcome of events. In fact, it has been argued that effective scrutiny in the 
Greek parliament is absent, and that 'EU affairs are usually dealt with long after their 
news-worthiness has evaporated and debate is usually derailed by general party 
bickering' (Frangakis and Papayannides, 2003, p. 172). On the other hand, the Finnish 
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Parliament is in a position to influence its government's activities at the European 
level. As it is kept informed of how European legislation is developing, the Finnish 
Parliament has the opportunity to contribute to the government's negotiating stance 
during both the initial stages of decision-making, as well as at the final decision taking 
in the Council. This involvement has developed to a point where the Parliament has 
been described as 'an active participant in the formulation of Finnish EU policy' 
(Tiilikainen, 2003, p. 156). 
The timely arrival of information is a problem most parliaments seem to encounter, 
especially if translation into a less used language is required. However, even British 
parliamentarians often consider the transfer of documents to be too slow. Ministries of 
foreign affairs still hold a central position in the coordination of most member states' 
European policy, and are thus frequently also in charge of the transfer of documents to 
their parliaments. While this extra stop on a document's route to a national parliament 
may be considered necessary within a national political context, it never the less causes 
delays which may hamper the parliament's ability to scrutinise the government's 
actions in European matters. 
Where required, explanatory memoranda are often transmitted simultaneously with 
European documents from governments and administrations. These are an important 
component of parliaments' basis for participation in the pre-decision stages of 
European legislation. Such notes are likely to spell out the governments' view on the 
matter at hand, where political and legal problems may arise and, occasionally, also the 
anticipated negotiating stances of other member states. 
To counter the problem of missing or delayed information, as well as a reliance on the 
executive and administration, some parliaments have set up their own offices in the 
European Parliament. " These offices are staffed with 'spies' (a term used by national 
parliamentarians themselves), who may be able to obtain information about upcoming 
legislation, possibly before official channels communicate this to their parliaments, 
while documents may also be obtained directly. Furthermore, staff in these offices 
often develop a thorough understanding of how decision-making at the European level 
takes place, and may thus be able to explain procedures and processes to 
parliamentarians if required, as well as set up meetings with people at the European 
level. 
'b By late 2004 the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia and the UK either had (or were expected to have very shortly) 
representatives in the EP. 
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Unfortunately few MPs seem aware of the existence of these offices or the potential use 
they could make of the staff employed there. British politicians (unless involved with 
one of the European scrutiny committees within Parliament) thus seemed generally 
unaware of the existence of the British parliamentary office in Brussels. For instance, 
David Curry, MP and chair of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee 2001 - 
2003, declared that he "did not have the faintest idea they existed'. " When told about 
the office and its functions several politicians, including Curry, questioned the use they 
could make of a parliamentary office in Brussels. Indeed, Curry claimed that staff in 
Brussels 'wouldn't tell me anything that's not in the FT', '° while Michael Ancram 
(shadow Foreign Secretary 2001 - 2005) and Lord Oxburgh (chair of the Science and 
Technology Select Committee in the House of Lords) also questioned how they could 
use the office. 19 Members of the Danish parliament seem more aware of the existence of 
the parliamentary office in Brussels although several admit to not utilising the resource 
to its fullest. " 
A further source of information for parliamentarians is personal contact with 
parliamentarians in other countries or in the EP. Interparliamentary meetings are 
conducted on an infrequent basis, and usually at the invitation of the EP, providing 
parliamentarians with a forum where specific issues can be discussed and personal 
contacts be established. Specifically aimed at discussing the role of national 
parliaments is COSAC, which will be discussed further in Chapter eight. Although 
dismissed, until very recently, as a 'talking club', COSAC is increasingly seen as a place 
where ideas can be exchanged on how national parliaments are to engage themselves 
in the European debate. Concluding 'contributions' are still not binding on COSAC 
participants, but working groups and the recent establishment of a permanent 
secretariat are indications that COSAC has the potential to develop into a useful and 
constructive forum. In contrast to these formal channels, direct contact with MEPs is 
often through party contacts at the national level. Only the Belgian parliament 
explicitly involves MEPs in its joint committee on European affairs, while MEPs may 
attend meetings of the Community committees in the German and Greek parliaments, 
although they have no voting rights in either. On the other hand, four parliaments (the 
Danish Folketing, Austrian Bundesrat, Swedish Riksdag and UK House of Commons) 
explicitly exclude MEPs from European Committee meetings. 
" Interview UK-7. 
is Interview UK-7. 
19 Michael Ancram asked '[w]hat do you use it for? What contacts do you want to make? The easiest thing 
for me as an MP is to ring up one of my MEPs from my party and say I'm coming over to Brussels, can you 
arrange for me to see A, B and C? ' (Interview UK-1) while Lord Oxburgh stated that he did not'know how 
we could use them' (Interview UK-13). 
9 E. g. interviews DK-11 and 15. 
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Levels of power 
Even the most extensive rights to information are worth naught if parliamentarians can 
do little with the information obtained. When it comes to actual scrutiny of national 
governments, several factors influence how parliaments choose to monitor their 
governments' actions at the European level. Formal powers and responsibilities are 
important, but political restrictions at the national level may prevent parliaments from 
using their full powers of scrutiny. On the other hand, formal and legal powers may 
not be necessary for a parliament to influence its government. 
The Danish Folketing is still unique within the Community, having established its 
mandating powers for itself shortly after Denmark entered the Community in 1973. 
With frequent minority governments the Folketing plays an important role at the 
domestic level, a role it has simply extended to European issues. However, the EUC's 
ability to mandate Danish ministers rests on a political agreement with no formal legal 
basis. It is inconceivable that the political agreement should be broken, and the spirit of 
the agreement remains more important than its actual legal standing. This can be 
contrasted with the Austrian Bundesrat, whose power to mandate the executive has 
been so rarely used that it has been classified as a weak participant at the European 
level (Maurer and Wessels, 2001a, p. 510). In an investigation of scrutiny procedures in 
Austria, Finland and Sweden, Hans Hegeland and Christine Neuhold (2002, p. 13) 
state that 'it is not enough to have formal rules; the rules must also be implemented' (as 
will become evident in Chapter five, the Italian parliament has also found this to be 
true). 
At the domestic level there may be reasons for parliaments to curtail the use of formal 
powers. The German Bundestag thus for a long time resisted pressuring the 
government over European issues, mainly due to the 'permissive consensus' existing 
on European integration (Hansen and Scholl, 2002, p. 14). A similar consensus-seeking 
style can be found in the Netherlands, which is considered a strong player at the 
national level, but having latent or potential policy influence at the European level. 
Both the French and British parliaments are better able than the Dutch parliament to 
confront their governments over European policy. However, having 'only' a scrutiny 
reserve power does not enable them to force their governments to alter policies and 
directions pursued at the European level. These two parliaments can thus be labelled 
as 'modest policy-making legislatures' with weak influence at the national level too. In 
most other member states (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Spain), deliberation of European affairs takes place on an infrequent basis, and 
parliamentarians often consider their role to be supportive rather than critical of the 
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government. The classifications of the different parliaments can be summarised in the 
following table: 
Table 3.3: Types of actors in a two-level game 
Strong national player Weak national player 
Strong European player DK, SF EP 
Modestly strong European 
player 
D, S F, UK 
Weak European player A, I, NL B, E, GR, IR, LUX, P 
i aoce aaaptea rrom: (Maurer and Wessels, ZUUla, p. 5Uu). 
The level of influence wielded by national parliaments can therefore not be argued to 
rest solely on legal provisions for scrutiny. Nor is there necessarily a connection 
between institutional impact on domestic matters and ability to influence European- 
level activities. Considerations specific to individual member states therefore 
contribute significantly to explanations of how national parliaments have involved 
themselves with European affairs. One example are the concerns of the German 
Bundesrat mentioned above, another is the Italian parliament, where specific reasons 
for joining the Community have historically made EU matters a 'non-issue' with which 
parliament had no interest in engaging (see Chapter five for further details). 
Conclusion 
Since the SEA, but especially the TEU, national parliaments have woken up to the fact 
that they are 'married' to the EU, and that, unless they wish to become bystanders to 
decision-making within their own country, they have to develop methods for 
participating in European decision-making, even if this is done indirectly through 
scrutiny of their executives' activities at the European level. Europeanisation has 
caused national parliaments to become indirect legitimisers of Council decisions, 
providing them with the potential to play an important role in the European construct, 
although this role has not been recognised in the EU treaties. The EP, on the other 
hand, has always been provided with a role through the treaties-which have also 
increased its powers to the extent that the EP can now be described as, politically and 
legally, an equal co-legislator with the Council in a majority of policy areas. National 
parliaments have thus had the disadvantage (compared to the EP) of having an ill- 
defined role to fulfill, although this has also permitted the better development of 
individual responses to particular, national political requirements for scrutiny 
procedures. 
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The appropriateness of national parliaments only participating indirectly at the 
European level has been questioned on several occasions and in several forums over 
the years. The idea of direct participation has most commonly been dismissed as 
undesirable, unworkable or not suitable for the continued development of European 
integration. However, as national parliaments have gradually become more involved 
with European affairs, it has been accepted that certain issues are better dealt with at 
the European level. A symbiotic relationship is thus developing, although this is one 
without much direct contact between the national and European levels. Each level, 
however, needs the other: Europe cannot become democratic merely through 
parliamentarisation at the European level; Europeanisation of the national level is 
necessary too. 
National parliaments have experienced limited contact with (especially) the Eq and 
the Commission. However, contacts with the Commission seem destined to develop as 
it becomes increasingly acceptable for national parliaments to receive documents 
directly from the Commission without first going through coordinating bodies (most 
often ministries of foreign affairs). To develop relations with the Council as an 
institution has been difficult for national parliaments, with national interests most 
often outweighing any concerns national parliaments, as institutions, may have. 
Influence over Council-decisions is therefore focused on the national level. 
Consequently, the only European-level institution with which national parliaments 
have regular (and anything approaching frequent) contact is the EP. Recognition that a 
European-level parliament is indispensable to a democratic EU has gradually led 
national parliaments to develop cooperation with this institution, although at times 
still hesitant and guarded. 
Although all national parliaments accept that their role in European affairs has altered, 
scrutiny efforts undertaken at the national level vary significantly in extent and have 
differing degrees of impact. Differences are only to a limited extent dependent on the 
availability of information, as national parliaments are all entitled to European 
documentation as well as time to examine it. Moreover, documents are often available 
on the internet, and parliamentary 'spies' at the European level are able to provide 
further information and contacts where required. To some extent parliaments can be 
provided with too much information, with the task of sifting it and determining what 
is important requiring significant resources. It thus becomes important for national 
parliaments to develop quality over quantity when it comes to provision of 
information, as they otherwise stand no chance of making any perceptible impact on 
the activities of their executives. 
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In the three case studies chosen for this research (the parliaments of Denmark, Italy 
and the United Kingdom), developmental continua exist on several dimensions, while 
they are also all strong parliaments or resting on a strong parliamentary tradition. In all 
three countries the parliaments are very important institutions in the national political 
process, although their ability to influence domestic legislation differs, with the UK 
being the weakest. In terms of influence over European legislation, the influence 
exercised by the Danish Folketing reflects the influence it has over domestic legislation, 
whereas the British House of Commons arguably has more influence over European 
than national matters and the Italian Parliament less. In the following three chapters 
the case studies will be further examined, and reasons for the differences outlined 
above investigated. 
73 
Chapter 4: Denmark 
I always experienced it as a constructive and positive challenge [to meet 
with Folketing committees prior to meeting in the Council]. I felt a deep 
responsibility to answer as satisfactorily as possible, to have prepared 
properly and thereby provide the EU Committee and select committees 
with a concrete and secure basis [for the provision of mandates]. This is 
traditional in the relationship between the Folketing's committees and the 
government. 
(Rasmussen, 2002, Danish Prime Minister 1993 - 2001) 
The political institutions in Denmark are very similar to those of most other democratic 
countries. Voters elect parliamentarians to the Danish Folketing (Parliament) from 
which a government is formed. Non-political civil servants staff the administration, 
laws are upheld by (independent) courts, ` and the principle of universal suffrage is 
adhered to. Although the Monarch has formal duties to carry out in relation to the 
governance of Denmark (such as appointing or dismissing ministers), absolute 
monarchy was abolished with the signing of the Constitution in 1849. 
However, the Danish system of governance is distinguished by how democracy is 
translated into a 'people's democracy' (folkestyre) where openness and transparency are 
fundamental to political institutions and processes-including the public 
administration. Folkestyre has emerged for a variety of reasons, one being a relatively 
flat societal structure. The limited social hierarchy helped establish demands for direct 
influence on governance structures and activities during the 19'x' Century, although it 
was not until the early 20`x' Century that the right to vote was awarded women and 
servants. 
The relatively long struggle for general suffrage has contributed to the feeling that 
democracy is 'valuable' to the individual citizen, still reflected in relatively high rates 
of participation in elections and referenda. Danish folkestyre has developed in 
conjunction with representative democracy with the consequence that close scrutiny of 
government activities has become fundamental to Danish political culture-greatly 
assisted by the fact that Danish governments are often (minority) coalition 
governments. Close scrutiny is also evident in EU affairs where the EUC mandates all 
ministers negotiating for Denmark in the Council and all select committees are 
increasingly involved in scrutiny of European affairs. 
' The oldest Danish law from 1241 begins with the statement 'Med by skal land bygges', which means 
'with law shall a country be built'. 
74 
Historically, the Folketing's scrutiny of EU affairs has been carried out by the 
'Europaudvalget' (European Affairs Committee (EUC)), the second oldest 
parliamentary committee on Community Affairs within the EU. The committee was 
established in 1961, twelve years prior to Danish membership of the Community, 
although only formalised and institutionalised by law in 1972, the year before 
Denmark took up membership of the Communities. The initial purpose of the 
committee was to be a forum of debate where Denmark's options regarding 
membership of the Community could be discussed-a function reflected in the 
committee's first name: The Market Negotiation Committee. Later on, Danish terms of 
accession were discussed within the committee, and, after 1 January 1973, it became the 
main parliamentary forum for the debate of Community affairs. The changes in the 
committee's functions, as well as developments at the European level, have been 
reflected in the committee's name, which was altered, initially, to 'The Market 
Committee' in 1972, and again in 1993 to the European Affairs Committee. 
As will become evident, the handling of European affairs has been based on the 
systems developed for national legislation-but European legislation (and 
Europeanisation) has also altered the work of the Folketing in general. Whether 
parliamentarians approve of EU membership or not, it increasingly influences the 
work of all Danish MPs. In turn, membership is also beginning to impact on Danish 
political culture, as membership affects Danish governance, institutionalisation and 
discourse (see Radaelli, 2004, pp. 10-14). While EU issues have traditionally been 
treated separately from domestic issues by the EUC, select committees are beginning to 
think of scrutiny of European legislation as being (almost) as important as their work 
on domestic legislation. Potentially, this development may bring an end to the broad 
parliamentary agreement that has so far existed on EU affairs, instead subjecting 
European legislation to more traditional political cleavages. If these broad agreements 
cease to exist, it is likely that the Folketing and its select committees will become 
increasingly important in the formulation of Danish EU policy, making it imperative to 
fully understand how the Folketing engages in this process and what level of influence 
the select committees can develop. 
Changes at the European level, through successive treaties and other arrangements 
have also been reflected in the work of the EUC although its basic function has 
remained the same throughout its institutionalised history. The EUC's primary task is 
to coordinate the Folketing's EU policy and to provide Danish ministers negotiating in 
the Council with mandates to carry out this policy. It is still the Danish government's 
prerogative to develop Denmark's EU policy, and it is not for the Folketing to take over 
this role. Still, parliamentary influence on EU policy can be described as substantial 
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because of the considerable involvement of the EUC. This involvement can, on one 
hand, be argued to only occur at a very late stage and therefore leaving 
parliamentarians with no real opportunity to influence European legislation. On the 
other hand, the Danish government as well as civil servants are aware of the need to 
obtain agreement on European issues from the EUC, and they keep this in mind during 
preparatory stages of the decision-making process, thereby providing the EUC with 
indirect influence. 
As early as 1923 the Folketing set up an advisory foreign Affairs Committee the 
government was to consult on all major issues (Fitzmaurice, 1981, p. 136). 
Parliamentary involvement in foreign policy thus has a long history in Denmark, as 
does the institutionalisation of committees within the Folkeling, although their role and 
importance has varied over the years. The last significant reform of the committee 
system was undertaken in the 1970s, when the Folketing's activities were made 
considerably more dependent on work carried out within committees. To fully 
understand the changes that have taken place within the Folketing and the inter- 
relationship between procedures for national and European legislation the first section 
of this chapter will focus on the Folketing's committees, how they are appointed, the 
basis of their membership and how voting is carried out. This will be followed by a 
closer examination of the EUC whose modus operandi is contrasted to that of 'normal' 
select committees! 
An increasingly important aspect of the scrutiny procedure is cooperation between the 
EUC and other select committees within the Folketing. It has been recognised that the 
specialised knowledge available in the select committees is required in order to fully 
assess the impact of European proposals at the national level. The role of select 
committees in the scrutiny process, and their relationship with the EUC, will thus also 
be investigated. Members of select committees have become aware that scrutiny of 
European legislation can be a significant task that, with mandating still undertaken by 
the EUC (to preserve the overview and coordination) does not appear especially 
rewarding. Consequently, select committees have been reluctant to undertake such 
work and the involvement of select committees in scrutiny of European legislation has 
therefore developed gradually over a significant period of time. 
The last section of this chapter will explore the crucial relationship between the 
administration and the Folketing. These relations have developed significantly as select 
committees have become involved in scrutiny procedures, while the EUC's 
2 Committees within the Folketing are called 'Wende udvalg', which, literally translated, means 'standing 
committees', a term the Italian Parliament also employs. However, for the sake of consistency, they will all 
be called select committees. 
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relationship with the administration has also been affected by changes in European- 
level cooperation. New demands for the provision of information have continuously 
been placed on the administration as Parliament relies heavily on such information 
when carrying out its scrutiny. Parliamentary treatment of individual ministers 
depends on the individual relationship, specifically the amount of trust that has 
developed between a select committee and 'its' minister. If ministers are trusted to 
uphold the spirit of a negotiating mandate, they, and their civil servants, will likely 
find it easier to negotiate the terms of mandates than will ministers who have not 
developed such trust. However, before reaching the stage of mandating, Danish 
ministers are first questioned in select committees. Because of the fundamental role 
select committees play within the Folketing, this is where this chapter will start. 
1. Select committees within the Folketing 
According to the Folketing itself, committees are its 'workshops' (Folketinget, 2000), 
whereas plenary sessions are reserved for major debates and voting. Decisions are 
prepared in select committees, of which 24 currently exist with remits corresponding 
roughly to those of each Danish Ministry. Two are considered as being particularly 
powerful: the Finance Committee and the EUC (Folketinget, 2000). ' MPs are often, 
simultaneously, members of several committees, a practice that can test members of 
small parties severely, as each MP has to cover a large number of topics within both 
the Folketing's committees and in the party's relations with the press. In the larger 
parties MPs can share the workload and three people may, for example, be appointed 
to the Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Committee, with one person specializing in each 
of the topics this committee covers. 
The importance accorded EU affairs by the Folketing is evident in party nominations to 
the EUC, most of which are party 'heavyweights', thereby contributing to the 
committee's significant authority: Just as parties are allocated seats in the EUC on the 
basis of their representation in the chamber, voting within the EUC is carried out on 
this basis as well. In an unusual deviation from common practice, the chair of the EUC 
does not count 'heads' (or hands) when a vote is taken, but the number of seats each 
3 The importance of these two committees is illustrated by the fact that in material generated for the public 
about the Folketing, one information sheet covers committees in general, while the EUC and the finance 
committee-but only those two-are described in individual information sheets. 
4 Examples from the 2003-20)4 memberships include Pia Gjellerup and Kristian Thulesen Dahl (group 
chairs from the Social Democrats and the Danish Progress Party respectively), Jacob Buksti (former 
minister of transport) and Ritt Bjerregaard (former agricultural minister and European Commissioner). 
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member of the committee represents in the Folketing. ' As the EUC takes decisions on 
behalf of the Folketing that, at a later date, may have to be implemented by the 
Folketing, the counting of parliamentary rather than committee seats minimises the risk 
of a minister being provided with a mandate that may not be carried in a plenary vote 
(Jensen, 2003). In a further deviation from common practice, the EUC generally 
operates in secrecy, based on the fact that Denmark's negotiating position would 
otherwise be compromised. 
When assessing the relationship between committees of the Folketing and the 
government, the fact that, since the Second World War, six governments (from a total 
of 29) have been majority governments (none of them single-party) becomes 
important' With minority governments being the norm rather than the exception, the 
importance of committees within the Folketing takes on a new dimension. Being a 
parliament of committees, both backbench and opposition MPs have been provided 
with an important means of influencing, in some instances even controlling, the 
government. The influence of the opposition can be gleaned from the number of votes 
on which governments have been defeated in plenary sessions. Between 1982 and 1988 
governments (all Conservative) lost 108 of 1356 final votes on EU-related issues. These 
defeats did not cause 108 elections, indeed, 'in all but three cases - recourse to a 
popular referendum on the issue of the Single European Act in February 1986 was one 
- the Government accepted defeat with a view to staying in office' (Arter, 1996, p. 119). 
The notion that a government can lose approximately 8 per cent of votes on a 
particular topic is inconceivable in, for instance, the United Kingdom, where such 
events would have brought about the Government's downfall. Frequent minority 
governments and the salience of EU issues have thus allowed the EUC and other 
committees to wield significant influence. The EUC does not, however, replace the 
government and still 'cannot develop a positive, alternative strategy in Market policy' 
(Fitzmaurice, 1979, p. 215). 
The ability to maintain democratic control over the decision-making processes, 
including decisions taken at the European level, has always been important for the 
Folketing. National democracy is the most frequently cited reason for the thoroughness 
of the Danish scrutiny system and is often used as justification for the involved process 
by politicians from the entire political spectrum. When asked whether ministers found 
having to obtain mandates from the EUC inconvenient, a Conservative Party politician 
answered that that was a given, 'but this is the democratic process that has to be 
5 Political parties are considered to be unitary actors 'in the politically most important sense, that their 
members in the parliamentary chamber on the whole exhibits a uniform decision-taking pattern' (Jensen, 
2002, p. 216). However, the EU is a contentious issue, and Danish political parties are not always united on 
EU policy. How disagreements are managed when it comes to defining and agreeing a common line 
within the EUC is, however, beyond the scope of this study. 
Indeed, the government formed immediately after the Second World War was an all-party government. 
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adhered to'. Another member of the Conservative Party believed the scrutiny process 
to be worth the trouble 'because we know the decision has a democratic legitimacy and 
that parliaments have not been pushed aside'. At the opposite end of the political 
spectrum a member of the Socialist People's Party stated (even if reluctantly): 'I don't 
think, in the world of realities, that it is possible to do things much better'! 
When Denmark joined the Communities, the Luxembourg Compromise was still in 
effect, ensuring that the EUC, through the Danish representative in the Council, 
wielded significant influence over EU decisions, even if indirect. John Fitzmaurice 
claims that 'the Luxembourg agreement was part of the legal and political basis for 
Danish membership', and that the EUC 'discussed possible ways of exercising 
democratic control of decision-making, and concluded that control over the Council of 
Ministers, which would be essential, would have to be performed by national 
parliaments' (Fitzmaurice, 1976, p. 285). Accepting that the Luxembourg compromise 
was valid when Denmark became a member of the EU, post-initiative involvement 
would be sufficient for the Folkeling to wield considerable influence, as all initiatives 
could be vetoed at the Council stage. With Danish representatives in the Council being 
mandated by the EUC, the committee was able to influence EU decisions effectively. 
However, the EU no longer functions on the basis of the Luxembourg compromise. 
When, as is increasingly the case, QMV is used in the Council even a mandated 
negotiator can be voted down. Moreover, only a small percentage of cases are actually 
discussed by participants at Council meetings, with the vast majority of issues having 
been solved at working group or COREPER level (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997). 
For national parliamentarians to be effective in such an environment they not only 
must become involved at a much earlier stage, they also have to become familiar with 
European institutions and procedures. 
In a 1995 study, Torbert K. Jensen investigated how Danish MPs differed in terms of 
contacts abroad. Although EUC members were found to have significantly more 
contacts abroad, both with other parliamentarians and other 'political actors' than other 
MPs, they were by no means part of a 'trans-national parliamentary network of 
contacts'. EUC members were not considered a separate group with regard to basic 
attitudes to and opinions on 'decision-making competencies, EU-institutions and the 
Danish decision-making processes'. The study concludes that 'Danish politicians ... 
seem to operate within a traditional confederalist universe, and, perhaps precisely 
because of this, do not seem to be especially well suited to the challenges presented by 
Europeanisation ' (Jensen, 1995, p. 478, author's translation). It may thus appear that, at 
the time this research was carried out, Danish MPs did not participate in European 
' Interviews DK-8,3 and 11. 
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decision-making to their maximum ability, in part because they did not understand the 
nature of the environment they operated in. The latest report from the EUC (available 
in draft form only (Europaudvalget, 2004)) indicates that changes are taking place to 
improve the impact of the EUC, with one of the most important elements in this report 
being the more efficient organisation of select committee involvement in scrutiny of 
European affairs. Incorporating scrutiny of European legislation into the tasks of select 
committees (listed in the Folkefing's standing orders) would serve to make such activity 
more of a normal occurrence, while also developing a better understanding amongst 
Ml's of how Danish and European decision-making procedures are interconnected and 
interdependent. Such an improved understanding would likely lead to a clearer 
perception of the overall legislative environment within Europe-and therefore enable 
Danish MPs to maximise their influence within it. 
Select committees have come to be fundamental to the workings of a political system 
that is characterised by a fragmented parliament and coalition governments. The 
Folketing has therefore been able to develop significant influence, including in the areas 
of foreign and EU policy. Danish political culture is also, however, influenced by a 
strong scepticism regarding further integration with Europe. This scepticism has 
contributed to demands for strong scrutiny that itself has grown out of existing 
procedures for legislative involvement. 
2. The European Union Committee 
The competencies of the EUC are listed in the Folketing's rules of procedure and 
include the scrutiny and coordination of EU issues on behalf of the Folketing. The legal 
basis for the work of the EUC rests on the law of accession from 1972 which states that 
'the Government informs a Committee, established by the Folketing, about 
Commission initiatives which will be immediately applicable in Denmark, or for which 
the implementation necessitates the cooperation of the Folketing' (Folketinget, 1995, 
author's translation). However, of more significance for determining the powers of the 
EUC was the first report issued on March 291973, by the then Market Committee. The 
report was concerned with the Committee's work and competencies, and stated that: 
'the Government consults [the Folketing] on Community issues of some significance, in 
a way which respects both the influence of the Folkeling as well as the freedom of 
negotiation of the Government' (Folketinget, 1995, author's translation). This has 
resulted in a situation where the EUC, on behalf of the Folkefing, provides ministers 
with a negotiating mandate prior to meetings in the Council. 
The accusation that the Danish system of mandating ministers delays decision-making 
at the European level tends to be denied by both parliamentary staff and politicians 
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(including ex-ministers). Indeed, having experienced the process of obtaining a 
negotiating mandate from the EUC, ex-ministers spoke mainly of the advantages of 
this process: a better understanding of the topic and certainty that the issue would go 
through the Danish parliament and implementation without being challenged. " In fact, 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Prime Minister 1993 - 2001) (2002) states that he 'under no 
circumstances' found the Danish mandating process slow or leading to delays in 
activities at the European level. On the contrary, he found the Danish system 
democratic, transparent and a good method for preventing mistakes. 
To carry out its work, the EUC is provided with 'all the information it could possibly 
want' according to Claus Larsen-Jensen (EUC-chair 2000 - 2005). ' Despite this 
seemingly idyllic situation, Larsen-Jensen (in the same interview) requested better and 
improved information. Specifically, he would like to see more concrete information, 
with the accompanying governmental notes outlining exactly what the issue is, where 
any problems may be, and what Denmark's negotiating partners are expected to bring 
to the table. Although the Folketing now receives all legislative proposals directly from 
the Commission (COSAC, 2004), important information is still received from the 
government with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the coordinating body. For 
instance, to accompany Commission initiatives the government forwards factual notes. 
Further information is provided to the EUC by interest organisations and the 
Folketing's representative in Brussels. Moreover, members of the EUC travel to Brussels 
and also visit the parliament in the member state holding the Presidency of the EU. On 
the other hand, even for the purposes of information gathering, cooperation with MEPs 
has, historically, not featured as a significant part of the EUC's work. To the extent that 
MEPs are involved in national affairs, contacts have primarily existed within the 
political party or group-organisation from which the MEP is elected, while systematic 
contact with the EUC has been non-existent. The latest report from the EUC seeks to 
address this situation by establishing regular, monthly meetings between the EUC and 
Danish MEPs (Europaudvalget, 2004). Such meetings potentially benefit both sides by 
establishing new, direct channels of communication that are easily tailored to the needs 
of the participants. 
The Folketing encounters several problems in its attempts to scrutinise the Danish 
Government on EU policy. One issue is that of translations which may not be available 
until several days after the original documents have been released. In such instances 
MPs have two options: they can either wait for the translations, and thereby risk not 
understanding or following a topic properly, or learn one of the major languages of the 
tl For instance interviews DK 2,10 and 31. 
9 Interview DK-16. 
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Community and attempt to work with documents available in that language. " While 
the lack of translations is often considered an inevitable part of closer integration, it 
remains a nuisance and causes delays, potentially limiting the ability of MPs to 
undertake national-level scrutiny in as comprehensive a manner as they wish. 
Paradoxically, an equally serious problem is that of too much information. " Both 
politicians and civil servants agree that the amount of information is substantial, and 
that it is often difficult (or impossible) to examine it all, even with the simple aim of 
distinguishing the important from the not-so-important. The sense of being 
overwhelmed exists even in select committees-despite these 'only' dealing with what 
falls within their remit. Although in many committees staff could easily spend their 
entire time simply following Community cases within their remit, their main focus is 
still on national legislation. " 
While politicians insist it is their job to follow 'important' cases, in reality the 
importance of an issue is often determined by recommendations of committee or 
personal staff, citizens or the media. It thus becomes essential to determine how an 
'important' issue is defined. While, historically, broad agreement on EU policy has 
existed within the Folketing, this may well change as European issues increasingly 
become part of everyday parliamentary activities. The distinction between domestic 
and European affairs will thus continue to blur, with traditional political cleavages 
possibly establishing themselves more firmly on European issues, bringing criteria 
relating to the importance of domestic legislation to bear on European legislation too. 
Such a development is likely to increase the importance of select committees further, as 
this is where most parliamentary work is carried out. 
Interview DK-11. 
" Erling Olsen, 7e' ious speaker of the Folketing, thus related how he, in a newspaper, once saw a picture 
of the chair of EUC carrying a pile of papers. The papers, approximately 1000 pages, were to be 
discussed at the EUC meeting the following Friday and had been made available to MPs on the 
Wednesday before the meeting. In other words, members of the EUC had two days to sift through the 
1000 pages. Olsen claimed this was done so the administration could claim that they had not hidden 
anything. His response to this was that 'if you put forward 1000 pages you have not put everything on the 
table, you have hidden everything'. His plan therefore was to develop a system where each important case 
was to be covered in a document of no longer than ten pages, preferably no more than five, and the focus 
should be on political issues, not technical or legal aspects (interview DK-22). As Larsen-Jensen was still 
able to find shortcomings in the information provided, systems for drawing up appropriate information 
for MPs are obviously undergoing continuous development. 
" This state of affairs became evident through interviews with Danish politicians and parliamentary civil 
servants, but see also Bostrup (2002). 
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Two further (and related) problems for the EUC are those of the overall time frame and 
the final decision making process for Community proposals. Margrethe Vestager" 
expressed it as follows: 
The process of a directive can be very fast right at the beginning, by taking 
a decision to set this thing going, and then it moves so slowly that one cries 
for mercy until suddenly, right towards the end of the process, everything 
has to move very quickly again. This makes it very difficult for people 
involved to maintain a momentum. You may become engaged at the 
beginning, a few headlines will probably appear, somebody has heard that 
now they're going to ban - whatever, but then nothing happens for a long 
time until years later things pick up speed again. I think this is difficult for 
politicians, not just for politicians as participants in a system, but for 
politicians as human beings, to maintain the focus during such a long 
process, and I think this creates problems'. " 
Examining the co-decision procedure, it soon becomes obvious that national 
parliaments have very few 'points of entry' (even indirect) where they can voice their 
opinion. This is only possible at the beginning of the actual decision-taking process 
when the Council, essentially the mouthpiece of national parliaments at the European 
level, establishes its common position. The Council establishing its common position is 
the beginning of the final 'sprint' towards a piece of European legislation being 
adopted, and the final stage where things speed up significantly after the long period 
of inactivity described by Vestager. This is also, however, the stage where actors 
influence Community legislation the least, with the most effective lobbying having 
been carried out prior to legislation being formally proposed by the Commission. 
Because of the long legislative process at the European level it is not enough for a 
parliament to focus on this last 'sprint' towards adoption of a piece of legislation. To be 
effective, parliaments must retain an overview of a proposal right from the initial idea, 
through possible Green and White Papers, to the final proposal, adoption and 
implementation. A legislative procedure taking seven years or more is, in all countries 
within the EU, likely to cover at least two election periods, making a changed 
membership of parliamentary committees almost a certainty, with continuous 
monitoring of legislative proposals correspondingly difficult. Executives and their 
administrations are at a natural advantage in this situation, as one of their important 
tasks is to maintain an overview and be a permanent and stable force. For members of 
the EUC it is not possible to counter the administration, nor is it necessary, as it is not 
the task of the EUC to create policy, merely to scrutinise it. 
" Ex-minister of ecclesiastical affairs and education. While these topics are not areas of dose European 
cooperation, Vestager has also been a stagiere with the European Parliament, and is therefore aware of how 
the two levels of governance impact upon each other, as well as of processes and procedures of European 
legislation. 
14 Interview DK-29. 
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3. The involvement of select committees in European affairs 
As the EUC works on behalf of the Folketing, the Danish Parliament as a whole has 
rarely been involved directly in Community affairs. This situation is changing, 
however, as the EUC has progressively involved other select committees in its work. 
Although a relatively new development, 'farming out' of work from the EUC has been 
an option since 1973 when the Market Committee, in its first report, claimed the right 
to 'request an opinion from other select committees in cases which are of relevance to 
these' (Folketinget, 1999, p. 1, author's translation). Despite having the option to 
involve other select committees, the EUC very rarely did so for several reasons. One 
important reason was the persistent belief amongst members of select committees that 
EU affairs were a topic separate from domestic policy, and therefore not their domain 15 
A second reason, perhaps equally significant, was the similar attitude of various chairs 
of the EUC and its predecessors: EU affairs were a matter for specialists, and therefore 
to be kept within the confines of the EUC. 
A significant, albeit procedural, step towards greater involvement of other select 
committees was taken in May 1994 with the publication of a report on the 
Government's duty to inform the Folketing on Community issues (Folketinget, 1999). In 
this report it was decided that select committees were to receive all relevant 
information from the ministries. Information from the government was forwarded 
from the ministry of foreign affairs (the coordinating body for the government on EU 
affairs, see below) through the EUC to the select committees. Information not 
originating from the government was provided to the EUC and relevant select 
committee(s) simultaneously. The report also emphasised that the rules should not 
hinder further requests for information from the select committees, thus allowing them 
to scrutinise 'their' minister and ministry further. It was also, however, left to 
individual committees to decide how to use the information with which they were 
being provided, making it possible to claim involvement without committing to full 
scrutiny of matters within the committee's remit. While all committees now require the 
minister to appear before them prior to meetings in the Council, some committees go 
further than that, agreeing with 'their' ministry that a resume of activities is to be 
forwarded to the committee every six months, typically in connection with the change 
of Presidency of the Union. 
The Folketing is thus attempting to combine the expertise from the select committees 
with the specialised knowledge and coordination ability of the EUC. This has also been 
15 The number of agenda items (relating to EU issues) found on the ordinary agendas of select committees 
has increased from ten in the 1979-80 parliamentary year to 205 in 2001-2. The Environmental and 
Planning Committee is responsible for a significant number of these, namely 7 in 1979-80, and 41 in 2001-2 
(Jensen, 2003, p. 114). 
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attempted in the Italian Senate through members of the European committee also 
being members of other select committees. Within the Folketing such structural means 
for achieving the combination of knowledge have not been employed. Instead, the 
EUC has relied on select committees to understand the importance of their 
involvement in scrutiny procedures and their willingness to undertake the work 
required. 
While the EUC would like other select committees to forward written 
recommendations to it, only the committee on the environment has done so for a 
substantial period of time. It is thus possible to detect a significant divide in 
behavioural patterns between committees dealing with issues over which the 
Community has well developed competencies (agriculture, fishing and the 
environment are obvious examples) and areas where the Community has little 
competence (health and social issues for instance), with the latter according EU issues 
much less importance than the former. Committee personnel has been an important 
factor both in developing interest in European affairs and the building of scrutiny 
procedures within committees. It is evident that committees with chairs and/or 
members who have participated in the work of the EUC often have a better 
understanding of how EU legislation affects their work at the national level. As a 
consequence, these committees tend to be much more interested in participating in the 
framing of European legislation. " 
The debate on how to involve select committees further has continued within 
parliamentary groups and the parliamentary Prxsidium (governing body). A report 
from the EUC (published February 1999) thus once more included discussion on the 
role of select committees (Folketinget, 1999, pp. 96-105). It was argued that because the 
EU affects the Folketing's committees differently, no single model for how select 
committees should deal with EU affairs could be developed and implemented. The 
EUC did, however, encourage select committees to become involved at an early stage 
where the ability to influence the stance of the government is the greatest. The EUC 
also (again) made it very clear that the final mandating of ministers takes place within 
the EUC. This point was reiterated in a report from 2001 (Folketinget, 2001a) which 
also contained a catalogue of ideas for how select committees could potentially 
develop their work on Community affairs. " 
76 An example of this is the select committee on Fiscal affairs. Jens Peter Vemersen (chair 2001 - 2005) was a 
member of the EUC prior to the 2001 election and has instigated several new initiatives within the 
committee he now chairs. Although the EU is not-currently-harmonising tax legislation, it is an area of 
much contention, and the committee has developed a system for keeping track of current legislation, while 
also asking the ministry to indicate which areas, in the short, medium and long term, they expect to be the 
subject of negotiation at the European level (interview DK-27). 
17 In the 2001 report it was also decided that an EU consultant, whose specific job it would be to inform 
and assist the select committees, should be employed by the Folketing. 
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In the latest (draft) report from 2004, a more systematic and independent involvement 
of select committees is envisaged. It is thus suggested that the first review of EU 
legislation should take place in select committees that then report to the EUC. The EUC 
itself would still provide the final negotiating mandate in order to 'ensure unity and 
continuity in the Folketing's treatment of EU-cases' (Europaudvalget, 2004, p. 4, 
author's translation). For select committees to fulfill this role they need to 
'systematically undertake an independent investigation of new proposals from the 
Commission' (Europaudvalget, 2004, p. 6, author's translation). Such independent 
activities require their involvement to begin at a very early stage, while cooperation 
with the EUC must also be very close. 
The potential reward for the significant amount of work such scrutiny requires is 
indirect through submissions to the EUC, although an improved understanding of 
Community affairs and their impact at the national level can also be achieved. Despite 
the wishes of the EUC and the obvious impact of European legislation on domestic 
legislative activities, the incentives for select committees to become involved with 
Community issues remain limited. Any involvement means adding to the workload of 
committee members and staff as well as a steep learning curve as the processes, 
vocabulary and style of Community legislation are different to those that apply to 
national legislation. Although politicians are aware that they need to include a 
European dimension in their work, they are also aware of the difficulties. One Danish 
MP thus stated that 'it demands significant engagement, it is all or nothing', '" while 
another MP commented that 'one can always philosophise about whether everybody 
can work it out, at times one doubts that somewhat. Partly because sometimes material 
arrives in a foreign language, while at the same time it is somewhat complicated'. " To 
alleviate the effect of the different legislative procedures Olsen pushed for hearings on 
Green and White papers from the Commission. These hearings were supposed to help 
MPs become aware of forthcoming issues at the European level. However, 'the 
problem is that they can not be bothered to turn up because it may take several years 
from the introduction of a Green paper to the implementation of it, and before [the 
implementation] a national election is to be held, there is a party at home in the 
electorate with a picnic and the whole lot, and that is what matters in terms of being 
reelected': ' An ex-ministern echoed this sentiment, arguing that: 
The minister turns up [in a select committee] to inform about a topic 
because the Commission has decided to make a directive or policy on that 
topic. Then we inform, the committee can have an opinion, take a 
is Interview DK-5. 
19 Interview DK-31. 
= Interview DK-22. 
21 Interview DK-12. 
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standpoint, read some things about it and then, in principle, three years go 
by before the topic returns. And then it has become a directive that is to be 
implemented where you can't move a comma and where the ownership of 
the case is close to non-existent. Then it easily becomes a matter of leaning 
back and saying 'ah well, it is EU legislation, I can't do anything about it', 
and that means that the engagement with European issues is very limited 
However, the perhaps biggest disincentive for members of select committees to engage 
with European affairs remains the lack of mandating powers for select committees. 
While the EUC and the Pr&sidium have pushed for select committees to involve 
themselves more in EU affairs and contribute to debate in the EUC and in the 
formulation of and commenting on mandates, the EUC has repeatedly underlined that 
mandates are-and will continue to be-delivered by the EUC. This has often resulted 
in Community issues finding their way to the bottom of the pile of papers to be 
considered at select committees meetings. A Folketing staff member suggested that 
select committees had the 'safety network' of the EUC to address Community issues 
and therefore did not need to develop a comprehensive understanding of them. ' If 
they have no involvement in the final stage, that is, the granting of the negotiating 
mandate, members of select committees may question the usefulness of undertaking all 
the preparatory work. 
Other scrutiny-related problems mentioned by Danish MPs on select committees are 
similar to those of the EUC, namely those of timely arrival of papers, mainly 
translations of papers from the European institutions, as well as the quantity of papers. 
The Government has not been directly accused of drowning the parliament in papers, 
but several MPs indicated that a summary, setting out the issues and likely problems 
together with the government's position, would be helpful to busy parliamentarians. 
As the administration has learnt about how to inform parliament, MPs are being 
provided with better tools for carrying out their scrutiny. Procedural improvements do 
not, however, solve the issue of lack of participation by non-EUC members in the final 
provision of mandates. However, shifting the mandating of ministers to select 
committees would only create other problems, the main one being a loss of 
coordination on EU issues within the Folketing. 
With the increased engagement of select committees in Community affairs, a greater 
number of MPs are involved with these issues on several levels. Not only is 
coordination between the EUC and select committees necessary, it has also become 
increasingly necessary to coordinate party positions across policy areas. For instance, 
the spokesperson on agriculture must coordinate with the party's representative in the 
EUC when issues falling under the remit of the agriculture committee are discussed. 
Many politicians interviewed mentioned this increased coordination as being 
22 Interview DK-25. 
87 
imperative to the smooth functioning of the work within parliamentary party groups. 
Party spokespeople have historically been responsible for the coordination of policy. 
However, it becomes increasingly difficult for one person, or even a small committee, 
to formulate a party's EU policy if they have to defer to the entire spectrum of select 
committees. The increased requirements for coordination of EU legislation, both at the 
intra-party and inter-committee levels, may thus contribute to Community matters 
increasingly becoming 'everyday' politics to be considered in the formulation of 
domestic policy preferences. 
Currently, the roles of select committees remain limited by the EUC's monopoly on 
coordination of the Folketing's EU policy. Although most politicians accept this state of 
affairs at the moment, some feel the opposite approach should be taken and that EU 
policy could well be coordinated in the select committees. Tove Videbxk, chair of the 
Social Committee in the Folketing, thus argues that the coordination process could 
simply be reversed. In other words, the spokesperson from the select committee could 
ensure that a proposal conforms to their party's EU policy, rather than the 
spokesperson on EU policy checking whether a proposal falls within party policy on 
the given topic. 
While it is very likely that placing the mandating procedure with select committees 
would result in increased interest in Community affairs, maintaining the EUC as a 
coordinating body makes sense institutionally. It is still the prerogative of the 
government to conduct Danish foreign policy and Community affairs are still 
organised by the government administration in a manner very similar to foreign affairs 
with strong central coordination. Compared to the government administration, the 
Folketing has limited resources and must thus maintain tight coordination if it is to be 
effective in its control of the government. 
4. The Administration 
The government's right to conduct foreign policy is constitutionally based (Folketinget, 
2001b, Chapter III, Article 19, para. 1). While the government is obliged to inform 
parliament and obtain its approval on matters pertaining to inter-state agreements and 
any alteration of the Danish Kingdom's territory, the Constitution does not mention the 
parliament as a participant in foreign affairs. Although civil servants within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintain that Community matters have never been 
considered foreign affairs by the ministry, " the coordination of EU affairs remains 
subject to strong centralisation. The administration's coordination of relations with the 
23 Interview DK-30. 
24 Interview DK-9. 
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Folkefing as well as the Government's negotiations at the European level thus takes 
place within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Speaking specifically about relations with 
the Folkefing, a centrally placed civil servant maintained that 'no paper goes to the 
Folketing without it first passing over my desk'. ' 
While the procedure of channeling all information through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs ensures continuity in style and form, as well as guaranteeing coordination for 
the government, it also introduces an extra bureaucratic layer, potentially causing 
delays that may prevent a thorough examination of a topic by the Folketing. It is not 
disputed that it is the Government's duty to inform the Folketing, but how this is 
achieved has been the subject of many debates, with the administration repeatedly 
adjusting to new demands made by Danish MPs. Provision of information to the 
Folketing can therefore be described as a learning process for politicians as well as the 
administration. While politicians on select committees have had to discover what 
questions to ask and what information to request, staff within the administration have 
had to learn how to accommodate the MPs' demands. 
Although structures and procedures for formulating negotiating briefs and directions 
are centralised within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and other interested parties are also involved through an EU 
Committee established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This coordinating 
committee has several sub-committees, each dedicated to an area roughly 
corresponding to a ministry within the Danish administration. ' The sub-committees 
prepare the basis for Danish negotiators, with final decision taken in the EU committee 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Danish Government's committee on 
foreign policy (with no participants from outside the government or administration). 
Parliamentarians do not participate in any of these committees. While they receive 
papers from committee meetings, the section outlining the Danish government's 
negotiation stance and goals has always been withheld. The government has 
maintained that this is done for reasons of confidentiality, arguing that if 
parliamentarians leaked the government's goals and aims to the press the Danish 
negotiation position would immediately be compromised. While this argument has a 
strong element of plausibility to it, the section removed from the documents forwarded 
to the Parliament is also, ironically, the one which parliamentarians would find most 
useful in their scrutiny of the Government's actions at the European level. However, 
the government has recognised that parliamentarians may find the sections so far 
25 Interview DK-9. 
2 Participants, on an ad hoc basis, are mainly industry and labour organisations. Less frequently 
organisations protecting, for instance, the rights of consumers will also be involved. At the latest count 35 
committees, each with between 4 and 67 participants, were established under the EU committee within the 
ministry of foreign affairs (Folketingets EU-Oplysning, 2003)). 
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removed useful, and a compromise appears to have emerged in the latest (draft) report 
from the EUC. The government has agreed to include its overall opinion on an EU 
proposal in the notes forwarded to the Folketing. In return, the Folketing accepts that the 
wording of the opinion may not be identical to the negotiation mandate later presented 
to the EUC (Europaudvalget, 2004, pp. 12-3). It is not in the interest of the EUC to 
undermine the government's negotiating position, this would only serve to diminish 
its own influence, but the new demands on information provided by the 
administration do, overall, enhance the basis on which the Folketing operates. 
Civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all officially support the 
development of scrutiny in the Folketing's select committees. However, off the record, 
they often speak with some disdain of the parliamentary claims of 'significant 
improvements' in parliamentary scrutiny through involvement of select committees. It 
is pointed out that such involvement has been a possibility for many years and is 
happening only very slowly-often with great reluctance on behalf of the members of 
the select committees. " However, the administration has its own difficulties to deal 
with. In particular, the insistence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that all papers pass 
through its offices has been a source of resentment within other ministries. 
For individual ministries, the involvement of select committees in scrutiny of the 
government on EU affairs has offered a chance to gain a level of independence hitherto 
unattainable owing to the central coordinating function of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. As select committees involve themselves more in Community matters, they 
place greater demands on their respective ministries through requests for information 
and direct communication. The relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the other specialised ministries has become an inter-administration 
issue-although more often hinted at than directly discussed. 
As they are only alluded to, it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty how fierce 
inter-ministerial 'battles' have been. However, one example that is relatively well 
known is that of Svend Auken (ex-minister of environmental affairs) and his fight 
against beverages being sold in cans within Denmark. Auken was mentioned as one 
minister who acted very independently of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while he 
himself has spoken of Foreign Service civil servants' dislike of the Folketing's 
involvement. ' The Danish ban on beverages sold in cans (because these did not fit into 
the already existing recycling scheme for bottles' is one example of Auken's 
ministerial independence that was mentioned during interviews. For Auken it became 
2' Interview DK-9. 
28 Interview DK-2. 
29 In Denmark a deposit is paid for the bottle itself (on top of the price for the drink) when buying bottled 
beverages. This deposit is then refunded when the bottle is returned to an authorised collection point. 
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a personal battle when the European Commission considered the ban on cans a 
hindrance to entering the Danish beverage market. Due to his influence within the 
cabinet, Auken resisted significant pressure from other cabinet members to comply 
with Commission requests. His stubbornness on the issue was an embarrassment to 
some who saw it as an unnecessary distraction, as well as a battle he was destined to 
lose. It caused friction within the Cabinet as well as between ministries, taking up time 
and resources many thought could be better employed on other issues. Consequently, 
other ministers felt that the strong independence exercised by the Ministry of 
Environmental Affairs was detrimental to the government's overall EU strategy. 
Although suppliers have had to set up a recycling scheme similar to that for bottles 
after a long, drawn-out battle, beverages are now available in cans in Danish shops. 
For a small state such as Denmark, the overall coordination of the Government's 
strategy is of great importance in ensuring that it can bring influence to bear on EU 
negotiations. Many ministers felt that the close links between their ministry and the 
Folketing benefited their work-both when it came to individual cases and the 
development of an overall strategy for Denmark's EU policy. 3' The greatest benefit of 
strong parliamentary involvement, mentioned by all those interviewed, was the added 
knowledge it naturally provided to ministers. As a consequence of the scrutiny 
procedure in the Folketing, they were made aware of where political problems in a 
proposal were, developed a good knowledge of the issue, and were thus better able to 
defend Denmark's position in Council negotiations. With the heavy involvement of 
both select committees and the EUC, they could not get away with just reading the 
briefing papers on the plane to Brussels-something other Council participants were 
sometimes accused of. Niels Helveg Peterson (minister of foreign affairs 1993 - 2000) 
thus argues that: 
the government, at a very early point, has to identify where the problems 
are, both the factual and the political problems. But because of the often 
very long period between the time a case appears on the agenda of the 
Council to the point where a decision has to be taken, in most cases there is 
plenty of time to prepare decision. So if one acts wisely, one has informed 
the EUC thoroughly before the final decision-making phase is reached so 
they are familiar with the case 3' 
Moreover, Marianne Delved (minister of finance 1994 - 2001) stated that 'I believe the 
preparatory work [in the EUC and select committees] qualifies. That you, as a minister, 
must also be able to convince opposition parties of the rightness of the government's 
30 The ministers interviewed for this project were all ex-ministers at the time of the interviews (June 2002), 
following the change in government taking place November 2001. 
33 Interview DK-32. 
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proposal gives your arguments totally different weight in the Council, . 
32 While Jacob 
Buksti (minister of traffic 2000 - 2001) declared that: 
the strength in the Danish system is not that the mandate limits the 
minister, it is that the mandate strengthens the minister, understood in the 
way that it is the minister, the ministry, who formulates the mandate-and 
that is of course related to the negotiation situation. It can be very limiting, 
or it can be very wide, but the important thing is that you are not bound, 
the important thing is that you have a very clear feeling for the limits 
within which you can move. ' 
Despite the proclaimed benefits that the Danish scrutiny system has brought its 
participants it is not without problems. Time and resources must be allocated to it, 
occasionally to such an extent that some ministers felt procedures became more 
important than issues. At least some participants in the Danish scrutiny procedures 
thus felt that better results could have been achieved if resources had been focused 
more on the negotiations taking place at the European level rather than on national 
level parliamentarians bleating about democracy. To some extent, this situation can be 
alleviated by trust developing between ministers and parliament. 
A trend towards governments being re-elected and parliaments sitting their full term 
(beginning in the early and late 1980s respectively) has contributed towards the 
development of such trust between the Folketing on the one side and the administration 
on the other. This has allowed MPs to concentrate on work within the committees, 
getting to grips with the subject and thus being able to present a more credible 
challenge to the well-established expertise of the administration. The importance of the 
stability this creates in the minister-Folketing relationship should not be underestimated 
as trust has a significant impact on the granting of mandates. If the level of trust is 
high, the minister is likely to receive more flexible mandates, as the EUC is confident 
the spirit of the agreement will not be broken. However, if ministers show signs of not 
cooperating with the EUC, they and their civil servants are likely to be kept on a much 
shorter leash. ' 
Although at times difficult, it is possible for Danish parliamentarians to remain 
informed about European-level legislation going through the Council. Difficulties arise 
if they wish to follow and scrutinise legislation carried out by the Commission through 
comitology procedures. To alleviate this situation the Folketing has agreed with the 
Danish government that the government must inform Parliament about important 
cases decided using the comitology procedure (Folketinget, 2001c, pp. 75-8). This duty 
'V Interview DK-10. 
" Interview DK-31. 
34 Interviews DK-12 and 32. 
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to inform covers important cases in the regulatory committees, and follows the same 
guidelines as for cases dealt with by the Council in its meetings. In other words, in 
important cases the government, or rather its civil servants, must obtain a negotiating 
mandate from the Folketing. Furthermore, in special cases, the Government must also 
inform about cases decided in management committees if these are of a more general 
nature. Cases of this kind have increased significantly in recent years (Folketinget, 
2001c, p. 76). 
Having to inform the Folketing in cases of this type obviously places the administration 
under increased pressure. It could be argued that if politicians left civil servants to get 
on with negotiations at the European level without interference, better results could be 
achieved. However, much depends on the definition of 'better'. The requirements 
stemming from deep-rooted notions of a public democracy (now carried out through 
parliamentary representatives) have to be fulfilled. A-technically-good result may 
be achieved without the involvement of elected politicians, but lacking democratic 
scrutiny it has no legitimacy and may thus be considered a worse result than none at 
all. Civil servants too are aware of these democratic limitations on their ability to act 
and operate. Members of the Danish permanent representation in Brussels thus 
sometimes provide information to the Folketing if they believe the topic is something 
the Folketing would be interested in-even though established procedures do not 
necessarily require it. 35 
Danish membership of the EU, and the resulting adaptation of scrutiny procedures in 
the Folketing, has forced significant changes within the administration. It has set new 
tasks and duties, but also provided new channels of communication and influence. 
Ove K. Pedersen asserts that such developments have benefited the administration and 
that 'European integration has strengthened the position of the administration in 
relation to the government and Folketing'. However, he adds that 'it is still striking 
how the Danish system of coordination and the many years' experience of European 
integration has subjected the every-day integration to democratic control and 
guidance' (Pedersen, 2002, p. 208, author's translation). Although the relationship 
between the civil service and the Folketing is generally not as well understood as other 
inter-institutional relationships (for instance parliament - government), it remains 
crucial to the smooth functioning of the Danish scrutiny procedure. 
Conclusion 
The Danish scrutiny system is comprehensive in its involvement of the Folketing. It 
offers parliamentarians significant influence through the ability to mandate ministers 
35 Interview DK-19. 
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before they go to meetings in the Council. Although this active involvement comes at a 
very late stage in the decision-making process, the views and opinions of 
parliamentarians are taken into account in the preparation of the negotiating mandate 
by civil servants and the government. The Folketing (through the EUC) is thereby 
provided with an early, albeit indirect, voice in the domestic-level preparatory work on 
European legislation. This strong parliamentary involvement reflects the perceived 
need to comply with democratic demands. The requirement of strong public 
involvement in decision-making has manifested itself through the people's 
representatives in parliament exerting significant influence, even power, over areas of 
policy traditionally considered the domain of the government. It is also, however, a 
result of institutional circumstances, as the proportional electoral system returns a 
fragmented parliament, making coalitions a necessity and minority governments a 
frequent occurrence. A third factor contributing to the strong scrutiny of European 
policy is the controversy surrounding Denmark's membership of the EU. 
Virtually all Danish politicians and civil servants are (officially at least) in favour of the 
strong scrutiny system. Yet, many also express specific concerns about it. Most focus 
on procedures that could be improved, resources that could be utilised to better effect 
and the question of mandating ministers and whether this power should be granted to 
select committees. No one consulted for the purposes of this study, however, 
suggested a reduction in the involvement of the Folketing in European affairs. 
That said, the extent of desired changes differed significantly. Those who simply 
wanted to improve current procedures and 'tinker' rather than reform root and branch 
tended to be stronger supporters of European integration than were those advocating 
more radical changes. The latter were more often critical of the integration process and 
the consequences it has had for Denmark. Jens Peter Vernersen has thus described the 
current system as one in which politicians have the possibility to follow cases right to 
the end, to 'the last drop of blood'" He has further argued that if the democratic aspect 
of the process is not good enough, the blame can only be placed with the politicians 
themselves, as so many possibilities for following cases are available to Danish 
politicians. On the other hand, Jern Jespersen (from the Socialist People's Party) found 
it impossible to imagine 'what reforms it would require before I seriously felt I was a 
real participant in a democratic decision-making process'' The sheer enormity of the 
workload, the slow processing of documents and the late stage at which MPs in reality 
become involved in the process were cited as major reasons for holding this belief. 
36 Interview DK-27. 
37 Interview DK-11. 
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The EUC itself has also been criticised, with Professor Seren Dosenrode describing it as 
a 'pussycat' (Dosenrode, 2002). According to Dosenrode the EUC is handicapped by a 
severe case of paralysis: as a political institution it has significant powers, but dare not 
use them for fear of exposing internal party-divisions on EU matters-or indeed 
antagonising potential voters. While it is still the prerogative of the government to 
formulate foreign policy (including EU affairs), Dosenrode further argues that 
parliament is not the main alternative influence on these policies, and that this role is 
instead played by the civil service and a wide range of interest groups. 
Many politicians also speak of a general agreement on EU matters across the middle of 
Danish politics. The extent to which this agreement extends from the parliamentary 
party groups to the entire party is a topic that warrants further research, as does the 
wider question of differences in opinion on the EU in general. Although beyond the 
parameters of this study, questions arise as to whether political elites are 'conditioned' 
on European issues in a way that does not 'spill over' to their party members. If this 
turns out to be the case, it must be asked what the consequences are-apart from 
turning the EUC into a 'pussycat'. A further question is whether agreement is limited 
to the big overarching topics and whether divisions occur with regard to day-to-day 
politics. In other words, does the agreement on EU policy disappear when it begins to 
resemble domestic legislation where cleavages such as the traditional left-right come 
into play? 
Although the Danish procedure ensures that parliamentarians have a voice in the 
process of European legislation, the lateness of this involvement remains a problem. If 
MPs are serious about bringing Europe to the Danes''", then they will have to become 
active participants in the decision-making process at a much earlier stage. Currently, 
sustained involvement by MPs at the national level is difficult due to the long 
legislative processes at the European level as well as the fact that relatively few 
changes are made to legislative proposals after if has been officially proposed by the 
Commission (which, realistically, is the earliest point at which national parliaments can 
become formally involved). For a variety of reasons MPs therefore have considerable 
difficulties maintaining an overview of and influencing (in a meaningful way) the 
European legislative process. As a consequence, parliamentarians may concentrate 
their efforts where they are most visible rather than where they are most effective. 
Overall the Danish scrutiny system can be described as very extensive. The democratic 
strength of the Danish system is reflected in the fact that ministers must obtain a 
mandate in the EUC prior to negotiations in the Council. The entire process is centred 
on the weekly EUC meetings, ensuring the involvement of parliamentarians. 
.M Interview DK-16. 
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Moreover, the involvement in earlier stages of the process by NGOs and interest 
groups is further evidence of the Danish political culture of openness and 
inclusiveness. It is still debatable, however, whether a `democratic surplus' actually 
exists, and whether it is possible to use such an expression when it comes to the Danish 
aspect of the European legislative process. Pedersen thus argues that the Folketing, but 
also the administration and in some ways even the government, have increased their 
influence over European matters. ' The question then becomes whether one believes in 
a finite amount of influence and whether one institution increasing the influence it has 
over a process necessarily means that another institution must have its influence 
reduced. If this argument is refuted (which it is by Pedersen), it becomes meaningless 
to speak of a democratic deficit or surplus. 
However, the institution' whose influence is being reduced may, in this case, be that of 
an autonomous decision-making process at the European level. If all member states 
were to employ similarly extensive and involved scrutiny procedures, it may well be 
that only very few decisions would be taken at Council meetings. On the other hand, 
the Danish parliamentary scrutiny system may also be viewed as one step in the 
government's preparatory work for Council meetings, with other governments 
undertaking similar preparations, albeit with other (or less obvious) national-level 
actors providing guidelines as to how far the government can move during 
negotiations. The secrecy that has traditionally surrounded Council meetings makes it 
very difficult to ascertain the extent to which the Danish scrutiny system can be 
blamed for delaying negotiations in this forum-something Danish politicians and 
civil servants deny takes place. Outside observers of the scrutiny system that has 
developed within the Folketing may see it as causing delays. It does, however, fulfill the 
demands of Danish political culture (and the current domestic political climate) for 
scrutiny through strong parliamentary involvement and accountability of government 
actions. 
There can be no doubt that Europeanisation has had an effect within the Danish 
Folketing-or that the changes in procedures and activities have been very closely 
tailored to conform with existing practices and requirements. However, it is also 
becoming apparent that the influence of Europeanisation goes beyond parliamentary 
structures to also affect discourse. Increasing numbers of parliamentarians find 
themselves involved in debates on EU affairs, with the distinction between European 
and domestic legislation becoming increasingly blurred. Although legislation may 
originate at different levels, it is becoming increasingly obvious that parliamentarians 
3' Interview DK-23. 
43 An institution can be an organisation, but also a social practice 'consisting of easily recognised roles 
coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles' 
(Jönsson et al., 2000, p. 6). 
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must be capable of handling both types and develop appropriate procedures for doing 
so. 
97 
Chapter 5: Italy 
[Fortune] shows her potency where there is no well regulated power to 
resist her, and her impetus is felt where she knows there are no 
embankments and dykes built to restrain her. If you consider Italy, the 
theatre of those changes and variations I mentioned, which first appeared 
here, you will see that she is a country without embankments and without 
dykes: for if Italy had been adequately reinforced, like Germany, Spain, 
and France, either this flood would not have caused the great changes it 
has, or it would not have swept in at all. 
(Machiavelli, 1981) 
The Italian parliament is significantly younger than either the British or Danish 
parliaments and has had a much more tumultuous existence. Italy was unified only in 
1861, with regionalism still playing an important role in Italian politics. The oft-cited 
statement by former Prime Minister of Piedmont, Massimo d'Azeglio, that 'we have 
made Italy; now we must make Italians', is, in some regards, still true. Due to its 
relatively late unification, Italy has had a much shorter time than both Denmark and 
the UK to develop a uniform political culture. Moreover, Italians have developed their 
democracy in the face of significant challenges. According to Vittorio Bufacchi and 
Simon Burgess (2001) 'it was always going to be difficult for a liberal political culture to 
flourish in a country held hostage by three great illiberal forces: Fascism, Catholicism 
and Communism'. These three forces have each placed their distinct marks on the 
Italian political environment. The fascist dictatorship-and the subsequent political 
reaction to it-is perhaps most evident in the Italian constitution. Having experienced 
fascist rule, those involved in drawing up the new Italian constitution made sure that 
the political elite was subjected to regular elections for a central parliament from which 
a government would be formed. Despite the electoral system initially being 
proportional, generally thought to favour parties with a geographically broad political 
base, Italian politicians maintained strong links with their local area. Regionalism 
remained important with the transformation to the Second Republic which was firmly 
established by the 1996 election. The collapse of the First Republic (which lasted, 
roughly, from the end of the Second World War to the late 1980s) also caused a 
restructuring of the political map with old political parties disappearing and new ones 
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mainly having a regional basis. ' Historically, close links with the local area were vitally 
important for re-election and secured through preferential treatment and benefits to 
local interests (Hine, 1993, pp. 173-4). Politicians were able to obtain such benefits 
through legislation, making sure that programmes and projects benefited interests in 
their area. This process was aided by parliament predominantly legislating through its 
select committees, a situation which provided poor oversight and budget control, but 
permitting the fulfilling of multiple interests. 
The Italian Parliament has thus been an important element in the development of 
Italy's own brand of democracy. It has survived the transformation from the First to 
the Second Republic relatively unscathed, while the executive and political parties 
have undergone significant transformations. Historically, the Italian parliament has 
been a strong legislature, although this status has, partly, been achieved due to a 
comparatively weak executive. However, the shift to the Second Republic may have 
altered this situation. As the executive is becoming more cohesive and political parties 
more unified, parliament as an institution may be losing in the inter-institutional 
relationship. One area in which this trend could be countered is European affairs, 
where the Italian parliament has gradually begun to realise the importance of oversight 
and scrutiny of the executive, activities which Parliament has begun to develop in 
recent years. 
These developments make the Italian Parliament an interesting case study because of 
the way in which it has attempted to participate in European affairs. Legislation has 
been the primary focus-but legislation on implementation. Only very recently has it 
become apparent to Italian politicians that the pre-decision stage is of considerable 
significance and that scrutiny procedures addressing this stage of the decision-making 
process must be developed. When discussing parliamentary involvement with 
European affairs, Parliamentarians strongly emphasise the legge comunitaria 
(Community law), despite this annual piece of legislation only dealing with the 
implementation of European measures. MPs thus do not exercise any direct control 
over the content of the legislation, a fact that is slowly being understood and acted 
upon. 
To fully understand existing scrutiny procedures in the Italian parliament, this chapter 
begins with a historical overview, examining Italy's development of the First Republic 
' The transition from the First to the Second Republic was gradual, taking place over a period from the late 
1980s to the mid-1990s. It did not involve a new constitution (as has been the case, for instance, in France), 
but has consisted more of a series of events (like the fall of the Berlin wall and the corruption scandals of 
the early 1990s) that contributed to the demise of the old political parties-and the emergence of new ones. 
With the new political parties (and the reformed electoral system) a political environment where one party 
did not monopolise being in power and real alteration between the political left and right wings have 
taken place, has emerged. This contrasts strongly with the First Republic which was heavily dominated by 
the Christian Democrats. 
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as well as the transformation from the First to the Second Republic. The Italian 
Parliament and its committee-based legislative procedures are investigated in order to 
assess whether its reputation as a strong parliament is justified, followed by 
examination of parliamentary methods of scrutiny. While the Italian parliament has the 
potential to influence its executive in this area it has largely opted not to do so. The 
historic legacy of a legislating parliament has been difficult to overcome, and has 
meant that scrutiny and oversight activities are poorly developed within the Italian 
Parliament. Moreover, the historic lack of controversy surrounding Italy's membership 
of the EU and the strong support for membership, from the political elite as well as the 
public, has also contributed to making EU a 'non-issue', making it difficult to develop 
interest in often very technical matters. 
In the last section the relationship with the Italian administration will be analysed. 
Sufficient, timely and accurate information is of paramount importance if 
parliamentarians are to contribute productively in the European legislative process. 
However, the delivery of such information has proved difficult, due to both the 
government and administration being not just unwilling but also unable to provide it. 
One consequence is that the European committees in both chambers have become 
adept at obtaining information through other means, while also being strongly 
supportive of further cooperation between national parliaments. In order to fully 
understand these developments it is necessary to understand the constitutional 
foundation of the parliament and how the Italian political system has developed since 
the Second World War. These topics are therefore examined in the first section. 
1. The First republic and its transformation 
During the Second World War, most fighting undertaken to free Italy from fascist rule 
took place in Northern Italy where Italian resistance groups aided allied troops in the 
fighting. Some resistance groups developed in workplaces 
but were mainly organised through the five parties of the Actionists, Socialists, 
Christian Democrats, Liberals and Communists, whose main unifying factor was their 
anti-fascism. While the military efforts of the resistance groups should not be 
underestimated, their main impact was, arguably, political. Most important was 
perhaps the development of a `national unity', defined mainly as anti-fascism and the 
establishment of an idealised notion of Italy (largely) freeing itself from German 
occupation (Clark, 1996, pp. 315-6). According to Martin Clark, the Communists 
benefited the most from this development. The Communists had also contributed the 
most to the actual fighting and managed, during the course of the Resistance, to 
legitimise the Parlito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party, PCI) to a point where 
it became unthinkable for the PCI to be excluded from government talks after the war. 
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The Resistance, however, was exclusively a northern experience, and contributed 
significantly to post-War antagonism between Northern and Southern Italians, a 
schism that still exists today and which has had implications even within the political 
institutions-especially the executive administration. 
Shortly after the war, on 2 June 1946, a referendum was held on whether Italy should 
remain a monarchy or become a republic. The Resistance was consistent in its support 
for the Republican cause, while the more conservative South voted mainly in favour of 
a Monarchy, again exhibiting the North-South divide within Italy. Overall, however, 
the outcome of the referendum was a rejection of the Monarchy. On the same day as 
the referendum, elections were held to the Constituent Assembly which was to settle 
the constitutional future of Italy. Of the 556 seats the Christian Democrats won 204, the 
Socialists 115 and the Communists 104. These three parties were to dominate Italian 
politics for the remainder of the 'First Republic', but their first task was to draft a new 
constitution for their country. 
Having just fought to rid Italy of a fascist regime, a democratic foundation for the new 
republic was important to the drafters of the new constitution. Democracy is thus 
explicitly mentioned in Article 1 where sovereignty is also vested with the people. 
Furthermore, Article 11 rejects war as a means of settling international disputes, whilst 
also permitting the limitation of Italian sovereignty if this is necessary to ensure 'peace 
and justice among the Nations' (Republic of Italy, 2002, Article 11). Thus, Italy's was 
the first constitution in the world to permit the relinquishing of sovereignty. Article 11 
has, furthermore, been used as a base for continued participation in the European 
integration process. While parliament has been consulted by the government and has 
debated the various European treaties, on the basis of Article 11, it has not been 
considered necessary to consult the Italian public on the acceptability, or otherwise, of 
the deepening integration process. However, direct involvement by Parliament in the 
integration process has also been limited. Antonio Cassese writes that 'the President of 
the [Italian] republic-with a few exceptions-and Parliament have played the role of 
secondary dramatis personae in foreign policy' (1980, p. 104). As in most other member 
states, the Italian Parliament has tended to treat European affairs as foreign policy, 
accepting executive dominance in this area, with little parliamentary oversight or 
involvement. 
Italian governments have historically been notorious for their inability to last, and are, 
Constitutionally at least, relatively weak. This is a factor some argue has contributed to 
= Interview 1-9. 
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Parliament's relative strength. ' One reason for the executive weakness is the 
Constitutional focus on the dispersion of power rather than an emphasis on policy- 
making, direction and guidance (Della Sala, 1998, p. 76). This focus is another outcome 
of deliberate constitutional engineering. On the whole, the Italian Constitution has 
very little to say about the Executive. The most important Article is number 94, which 
states that the Government must have the explicit confidence of both Houses and that a 
vote of no confidence is voted on by roll call. The last point is pivotal as, until 1988, 
most legislation was voted on by secret ballot that permitted factions within political 
parties to upset carefully negotiated compromises and indirectly causing government 
coalitions to fail. However, in a roll call vote such behaviour is not possible-a 
contributing factor explaining why votes of no confidence have played a minor part in 
bringing down governments. 
With the onset of the Cold War, it became impossible for the PCI (the largest 
Communist party in the Western world and recipient of aid from the Soviet Union) to 
participate in governments, and from 1948 it became the permanent opposition party. 
The Christian Democrat Party ended up, uniquely in a Western democracy, as the 
permanent party in government (although almost always in coalition with other 
parties). The lack of party rotation at government level meant that, despite frequent 
government changes, a certain level of stability still existed within the executive. Party 
factions merely played a game of 'musical chairs', with candidates for ministerial posts 
being limited to a relatively small number of senior politicians. `. 
The relatively weak executive had a strong 'sparring partner' in the Italian Parliament 
whose constitutional basis is found in Part II, Title I of the Constitution which declares 
that it is to consist of two chambers, the Camera dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) and 
the Senato (Senate). According to Article 70 of the Constitution, the two chambers 
collectively exercise the legislative function. This means that legislative proposals have 
to be passed in both chambers-in identical wording. Until the early 1990s, the Italian 
parliament was elected using a proportional system that repeatedly resulted in high 
levels of fragmentation within both Chambers. A new electoral system, under which 75 
per cent of parliamentarians are elected in single-member constituencies (in effect a 
First Past the Post system), was intended to reduce the number of parties, but has 
actually achieved the opposite due to electoral alliances being formed by very small 
3 Interview UK-12 
It was not uncommon for politicians to be returned to a particular office after having previously lost it. 
Giulio Andreotti, for example, was thus Prime Minister of seven governments over a 20-year period 
between 1972 and 1992 (February - June 1972, June 1972 - July 1973, July 1976 - March 1978, March 1978 - 
January 1979, January - August 1979, August 1989 - April 1991 and April 1991 - June 1992) (Hine, 1993, pp. 
345-6). 
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parties, causing a number of these to gain representation in parliament 5 The 
introduction of the new electoral system has therefore soon become associated 'more 
with confusion than with greater democracy' (Griffin, 1997, p. 150). 
Due to this high level of fragmentation, Parliament became, and remains, an important 
actor in the formation of governments. Despite the high number of governments 
formed during Italy's 'First Republic', parliament in fact exhibited a significant degree 
of stability, with most executive crises being extra-parliamentary: on only two 
occasions did a government resign because it lost a vote of confidence in parliament. 
As an institution, Parliament has thus been important in developing Italy's particular 
brand of democracy and has survived the political crises of the 1990s relatively 
unscathed-unlike both the executive and the political parties (Della Sala, 1998, p. 73). 
Indeed, several authors have commented on the level of continuity within the Italian 
parliament. Luca Verzichelli and Maurizio Cotta thus argue that 'there is a lot of 
continuity in the experience of parliamentarism in Italy, before, during and after the 
first republic' and that 'most of the new political actors are somehow linked to the same 
"path dependency" characterising Italian politics during the first republic' (2002, pp. 24- 
5, emphasis in original). Mark Donovan (2003, p. 20) reports unexpected 'continuity in 
parliament's consensual legislative style' while Paul Furlong (2000, p. 11) writes that 
'what many observers find surprising is how little change in parliamentary behaviour 
the new elites have brought about'. 
Parliament has been dismissed as a relatively weak player on its own (Pasquino, 1996, 
p. 152), but is nonetheless a strong legislator, a role it predominately carries out 
through parliamentary committees. The role of committees is outlined in Article 72, 
which states that all bills must be submitted to and considered by a committee, while 
also permitting Committees to approve certain legislation on behalf of the Houses. ' 
This procedure suited the First Republic very well, as it provided politicians with 
excellent opportunities to broker deals of particular advantage to their electorates. 
With close to 70 per cent of legislation passed by parliamentary committees (Koff and 
Koff, 2000, p. 120), spending money became significantly easier than restricting the 
government's budget. On the other hand, European legislation, over which parliament 
had no direct influence, was given little consideration as it provided few immediate 
benefits to local constituencies. 
5 For an analysis of the transformation of Italian political parties see James L. Newell (2000), especially 
Chapter six. 
6 Referral back to the Houses can take place if ten per cent of the members of the House or 20 per cent of a 
committee's membership request it. In the cases of constitutional and electoral matters, the enabling of 
legislation, ratification of international treaties and the approval of budgets and accounts legislation is, as 
a matter of procedure, referred back to the Houses. 
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While the Italian Parliament of the First Republic can be described as a strong 
institution in relation to the executive, it can also be argued that it was more an arena 
for the political parties than an independent actor. Nonetheless, the emergence of the 
Second Republic (which began to emerge in the late 1980s, and was fairly securely 
established by the election in 1996) saw the disappearance of the old political parties 
and the emergence of new, mainly regional, parties. While alternation in government 
has taken place in recent years, parliament looks and acts very much like it did during 
the First Republic. For instance, legislation is still primarily passed in committees, 
where negotiations tend to be much less confrontational than plenary meetings in 
either house. This pattern has survived from the First Republic, when legislating 
through committees permitted deals to be made between different parliamentary 
parties, even facilitating the co-opting of the Communist Party into clientilistic 
methods of governance. ' 
In the Second Republic, it may also appear that the political parties have become more 
disciplined, acting more like the unitary actors taken for granted in the Danish 
Folketing and the UK House of Commons. If parties act in a more unified fashion this 
strengthens the (majority-based) executive's position as it makes it more likely that 
their programme and legislation will be passed, thereby weakening Parliament in the 
inter-institutional relationship. While this process arguably began as early as the late 
1980s with the reduced use of the secret ballot, the effect on the executive-legislative 
relationship would have been somewhat reduced due to other crises. 
One area in which the parliament has begun to reassert itself is European affairs. In 
recent years parliament has begun to show an interest in how the Italian government 
conducts itself at the European level and what the implications of membership of the 
EU are. Parliament's influence over European legislation has been minimal (even 
indirect through the executive), while MPs' interest in European issues has also been 
negligible. However, the Italian parliament is gradually developing new powers and 
methods of influence as it increasingly scrutinises European-level activities of the 
executive (and the administration). 
As legislation has historically played such a significant role within the Parliament, it is 
no surprise that most parliamentarians place significant importance on the legge 
comunitaria, the annual law that implements European legislation into Italian law (see 
7 The 'clientilistic' or'spoils' system emerged when, to fund their party (and re-election), Italian politicians 
had to provide services to companies or interests, but these companies and interests had to'bribe' the 
politicians to get the contracts or jobs they needed for their continued existence. The entire procedure, 
while being conducted outside parliament, was still aided by the fact that the majority of legislation 
occurred through parliamentary committees. Moreover, it has been claimed that because companies were 
permitted to increase their price on government contracts which, together with additional benefits, was 
enough to cover the cost of bribes necessary to obtain the contracts, the entire economic burden of the 
corruption system was carried by the state budget (Pasquino, 2000, p. 83). 
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below). Thus, despite being generally responsible for 'the legal aspects of the European 
Union's activities and the implementation of EU legislation and decision', the Italian 
Parliament has no scrutiny reserve power, with a request to postpone a decision in the 
Council carrying only 'political, but no legal force' (European Parliament, 2000b). 
Parliament therefore possesses the potential to exert significant influence over 
European matters but has historically opted not to do so. This conundrum will now be 
explored. 
2. Parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
The Chamber of Deputies 
While equal in their legislative powers, the two Italian chambers have, until very 
recently, opted to treat European affairs very differently. In the Chamber of Deputies a 
committee on European affairs was established in 1971, a few years later than the 
Senatorial Giunta (standing committee). Reforms of the Committee were undertaken in 
1990,1996 and 1999. ° In 1996 it was decided that the Committee should become the 
Chamber's 14th select committee. Whereas the Giunta was only advisory, the 
committee in the Chamber of Deputies can conduct investigations and has the 
potential to interfere at the pre-decision stage, although here too this has to be done in 
conjunction with the specialised committees. In the year 2000 the committee also 
started examining the European Commission's work programme. However, as in the 
Senate, the European Committee in the Chamber of Deputies cooperates closely with 
other specialised committees, and although the European Committee examines the 
Commissions programme in its entirety, the other select committees examine the 
relevant parts falling within their remit' Furthermore, the remit of the European 
Committee only extends to the EU's first pillar, with the Foreign Affairs Committee 
being responsible for items falling under the second and third pillars. It can thus still 
be argued that the EU committee has very limited influence over the executive, relying 
on political pressure rather than institutional rules and regulations for influence. 
In the Chamber of Deputies, it appears that conversion to a select committee has not 
influenced the work of the 14th committee significantly, and it seems that not until the 
14th legislature has the committee undertaken a more substantial level of work. A 
member of staff in the Chamber of Deputies thus related how the 14th Committee 
during the 13th Parliament (1996 - 2001) examined seven proposals. During the first 15 
months of the current 14th legislature, however, nine proposals were examined, which, 
For the exact text of the Chamber's regulations on which the Committee is based, and how it has changed 
over the years, see the Chamber of Deputies' website: 
http: //www. camera. it/deputati/funzionamento/regolamento capoXXVIII artl26 testoafronte. asp 
Interview 1-4. 
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as proudly pointed out by both the civil servant and the President of the 14th 
Committee, is more than in the previous five years put together. " 
The obvious question is why these changes are taking place now. It is difficult to give 
definitive answers, but an increased awareness of European matters as well as a 
politically ambitious committee President (Giacomo Stucchi from Lega Nord) have been 
key ingredients. The European office within the Chamber of Deputies has been 
separated from a larger office dealing with international affairs in genera], thereby 
making European affairs more 'visible'. A division in opinion between civil servants 
and politicians seems to exist, however, in that civil servants appear more aware of the 
impact that European matters have on the ability of Italian MPs to act at the national 
level, and of the importance of including a European dimension in all domestic 
legislation. However, as all the civil servants interviewed for this project were 
employed within units dealing specifically with European affairs, this point of view 
may be somewhat biased, as civil servants in other departments may not feel the same 
need to include the European dimension in their work. " Because both the Giunta and 
the 14th Committee have been forced to cooperate with the select committees in their 
respective chambers, MPs of the select committees do not have the excuse of MPs in 
both the British and Danish Parliaments: that is, that the European committee will deal 
with European matters. In the Italian Parliament, formally at least, responsibility for 
European affairs has always been shared between the European and the other 
committees. Nonetheless, civil servants were more alert to the need for developing 
scrutiny procedures than were politicians, who all looked to the legge comunitaria as the 
'proper' way of involving Parliament in European legislation. 
An interest in European affairs thus seems to be gradually developing (within both 
chambers of the Italian Parliament), especially amongst the younger parliamentarians. 
The perception of Europe, especially the European Parliament, as 'a graveyard for 
elephants"' is slowly disappearing. The elephants may not necessarily be old in years, 
merely old in mind; that is, stuck in old ways of thinking and conducting policy. In 
Italy this means focusing solely on the local level and protecting local interests at the 
national level, without being able to see the importance of how the European and, 
indeed, global levels impact on what is achievable and obtainable locally. Traditional 
Italian politics as conducted during the first republic are thus slowly being 
transformed, with membership of the EU arguably a significant factor in this change. 
Interviews 1-5 and 13. 
The difficulty in obtaining interviews with staff from committees not directly involved with European 
affairs illustrates this point. Despite numerous approaches no such interviews were conducted. The 
reaction is thus very similar to that of politicians described below where prospective interviewees referred 
to the'experts' in the European committees. 
'2 Interviews 1-2 and 13. 
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While membership of the EU has provided Italian governments with ready-made 
excuses for implementing unwelcome measures (tough fiscal decisions necessary to 
become a founding member of the euro area being just one example), it may now also 
force parliamentarians to look farther afield than the path from their home town to 
Rome, and further into the future than the next election. 
The Senate 
The Senate has set up a Giunta (a standing, as opposed to a select, committee) on 
Europe during each parliament since 1968. However, close scrutiny of the Senate's 
'Regolamento' (Rules of Procedure) reveals that on February 6 2003 the Giunta was 
changed into a select committee. It was not until October of that year that the change 
actually took place, and it is therefore difficult to evaluate the implications. An 
immediately obvious change is the make-up of the new, 14th committee's membership. 
It is customary that Italian MPs are members of only one select committee within 
parliament. However, members of standing committees are usually also members of a 
select committee as such membership carries more prestige, hence the norm of dual 
committee membership for members of the Giunta. Unprecedented, the new European 
committee reflects the realisation that European and domestic legislation can no longer 
be separated and that a new European committee would require the expertise of the 
select committees. In an interview, Senator Andrea Manzella expressed a wish that two 
members from each of the other select committees would be co-opted to the new 
European committee, thus providing the expertise which each of the specialised 
committees possess, while also bringing knowledge of European affairs to the 
specialised committees. On the current committee, in the 14th legislature, this wish has 
been fulfilled. The European committee has 30 members, two from each of the other 13 
select committees, with the exceptions of Committees 1,2,3 and 5 (constitutional 
affairs, justice, foreign affairs and budget), all of which have contributed three 
members to the 14th committee. According to the committee itself, this ensures that 
MPs 'combine deep knowledge of European issues with good knowledge of matters 
within the terms of reference of the other committee they sit on' (Senato della 
Repubblica, 2004). The Italian Senate has thus institutionalised the integration of 
European and domestic affairs to an extent not seen in either the Danish or UK 
parliaments. When compared to most of its counterparts in Europe, the Italian 
parliament has a weak basis for scrutiny of its government on European affairs, yet it is 
perhaps also the parliament exhibiting the best understanding of the interrelationship 
between the two levels. 
Within Italy, multitudes of rules and regulations regarding the treatment of European 
affairs have been developed and adopted without much success. However, as the rules 
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for the new 14th committee within the Senate are purely intra-institutional and have 
been under development for a considerable period of time, they may well stand a 
better chance of being successfully applied than most other inter-institutional rules. 
The success of the new rules depends, to a large extent, on whether European matters 
continue to be accorded a low level of importance. This attitude has been especially 
evident in the Senate, a situation reflected in and emphasised by the limited prestige 
associated with membership of the Giunta. As a standing committee the Giunta was 
unable to pass legislation on its own, operated in a mainly consultative role, and has 
been described as having 'minimal impact on parliamentary activities' (Bindi Callusi 
and Grasse, 2001, p. 302). Primary responsibility for European matters rested with the 
select, specialised, committees. In the cases where European legislation was transferred 
by the government to parliament, the specialised select committees were the main 
recipients, and the 'First Committee' (on Constitutional affairs) was generally 
considered to be the committee with primary responsibility for European affairs. In the 
words of a Senatorial employee 'The Giunta doesn't have legislative competences, it 
advices and can approve resolutions and can make reports, call people to give 
evidence etc.. They can do that, but they don't have competence in the legislative 
area. "' Select committees could then write opinions on European initiatives, and only if 
they had not acted within a certain period could the Giunta adopt a resolution to 
submit its own report directly to the government. 
With the establishment of the new 14th committee, all domestic legislation is 
scrutinised for compliance with Community legislation, and reports thereon sent to the 
relevant committee within the Senate. " European legislation is also debated, and 
guidelines can be issued which the government 'may' follow (Senato della Repubblica, 
2004). The emphasis, therefore, is opposite to that in most other national parliaments. 
In both Denmark and the UK, resources are spent mostly on ensuring that European 
legislation is acceptable to national politicians. In Italy, more resources appear 
dedicated to ensuring that national legislation complies with European legislation than 
to scrutiny of European legislation and ascertaining whether it complies with domestic 
Italian wishes and needs. While it can be argued that the parliament is focusing its 
(finite) resources on the area in which it can assert the most influence, it is perhaps 
more accurate to conclude that the Senate is responsive to a political culture in which 
13 Interview 1-1. 
" As explained by its staff, the European office in the Chamber of Deputies also undertakes this task 
(especially interviewees I-11 and 12). It prepares a dossier on each and every piece of domestic legislation, 
setting out the European dimension on this (information includes issues such as European activities in the 
area and whether the domestic legislative proposal contradicts European legislation). Dossiers are 
provided to all the select committees as well as the 14th Committee, as are regular summaries of legislative 
proposals as well as other activities such as the Convention. It is this activity the new 14th committee in 
the Senate is attempting to emulate and which may contribute to improving information about and 
interest in European affairs. Parliamentary staff thus spends time and resources gathering information 
their colleagues in Denmark and the UK expect their governments and administrations to provide. 
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legislation is considered far more important than oversight, as well as asking few 
difficult questions of Italy's membership of the EU, which remain much less 
controversial than in either Denmark or the UK. " 
In the face of a historically low level of interest in European affairs, the Senate has 
increased its activities in this area in recent years. In a contribution to the Convention's 
Working Group on national parliaments (2002), Senator Filadelfio Basile (one of two 
secretaries of the European Committee in the Senate) mentions 'improvements' in 
procedures (transfer of documents from the government to parliament) in the 
immediate post-Amsterdam period. Between September 2000 and March 2001, Basile 
thus claims that the Giunta, in 'an unprecedented effort', considered approximately 70 
documents and sent reports to the Government on these-independently of the select 
committees. It seems that at this point in time at least two factors converged to make 
the Giunta more active: information appeared to be making its way from the 
Government to the Parliament while the Giunta's President, Senator Tino Bedin, also 
recognised the importance of following activities on European matters, and, 
importantly, seemed able to motivate his committee to submit reports to the 
government independently of the select committees. However, removing any one-let 
alone both-of these factors always threatened to cause the work of the Giunta to 
collapse, and indeed it did. Basile's above-mentioned contribution thus reveals that 
with the new legislature (and government) in the spring of 2001, 'the flow of EU 
documents from the Government can be considered as substantially reduced' (Basile, 
2002). While Basile mentions no further explanations for the more 'sporadic' nature of 
parliamentary examination of European legislation, it bears mentioning that in the new 
legislature Senator Mario Greco, with little experience in European affairs, was elected 
as new President of the Giunta. Although President Greco has worked hard to improve 
'' While it is the case that Italy has historically been in favour of European integration, it is also evident 
that a more EU-cautious line has emerged with the regionally based political parties (especially those 
based in Northern Italy) and Silvio Berlusconi's government. A Senatorial employee (interview I-1) 
explained the situation by stating that 
the government is less European and less European friendly than the opposition, even if, 
generally speaking, they are not against the Union, except a few particular cases like La 
Lega. The previous government was absolutely in favour of Europe, the present 
government is not so. Still, when we had our last important debate about Europe in the 
General Assembly, before Laeken, there was wide discussion, and the resolution approved 
was in favour of more integration anyway, and it was approved by the entire parliament, 
the government and the opposition. So, generally speaking, you could say that the 
parliament is more in favour of Europe than the government in some way, because of some 
ministers like Tremonti and Bossi-and the Lega of course. 
Umberto Bossi is leader of Lege Nord and was Minister (without portfolio) for Reform and Devolution June 
2001 - July 2004. Giulio Tremonti is a member of Prime Minister Berlusconis party Forza Italia and was 
Finance Minister June 2001 - July 2004. Although rhetoric, especially government rhetoric, has altered 
with the Berlusconi government, indicating an end to Italy's 'permissive consensus' on the EU, it is more 
difficult to find firm instances of a more critical approach to European cooperation. 
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his knowledge on European issues, " the committee's scrutiny activities inevitably 
slowed down considerably as a result of the change in Presidency. 
The committee's other main task, provision of information about the European 
dimension of domestic legislation, is arguably made difficult by the 'ghettoisation' of 
European affairs. Members from select committees (other than Community 
committees) thus often referred to the European committees when asked for an 
interview about how the Italian Parliament handles European legislation. These MPs 
did not feel able to contribute to this research, stating that European affairs were not 
within the remit of their committee. " 
While interest in EU affairs thus appear to be on the increase, this development seems 
limited to a relatively small number of parliamentarians with special interest or 
experience in the area-despite the above-mentioned formal sharing of responsibilities. 
The fact that Giorgio La Malfa (President of the Chamber of Deputies' Finance 
Committee in the 14th parliament and one of only two interviewees not directly 
involved with European affairs committees) had previously been an MEP is 
noteworthy. His understanding of the interplay between the national and European 
levels, and the impact of European integration on the work of his committee, was thus 
more informed (although also coloured by strong federalist views) than that of several 
of his colleagues. 
Although it can no longer be doubted that contact between European and specialised 
committees is important, the new structure for the Senatorial European Committee still 
faces the significant problem of double committee membership. Due to the nature of 
Italian legislation, with a great deal of it being passed in the select committees, 
members generally carry a heavy workload. It is therefore very likely that a dual 
membership will be seen as a significant burden which only few Senators with a strong 
interest in European affairs are willing to take on. This is perhaps the greatest 
challenge for those dealing with European affairs within both parliamentary chambers: 
to make those MPs mainly involved with national legislation aware of the restrictions 
European legislation places on their ability to manoeuvre at the national level-and of 
the importance of close contact between the European committee and other select 
committees. 
A further problem in this area is the limited number of staff available to the Giunta and 
Community activities in the Senate. In September 2002, two academic staff (analysts) 
16 Interview 1-3. 
" This was despite several approaches that included explanations of why their contributions would be of 
importance. 
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were available to the Senators with a further two medium-level staff. A number of 
secretaries also assisted with the collation and distribution of documents. The limited 
amount of support staff means that with the occurrence of 'extra' events like the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, other work is necessarily placed on the 
backburner. Indeed, as staff-members attempted to follow events at the Convention, 
scrutiny of European legislation was neglected. One employee in the Senate thus stated 
that 'we do what we can, because we are often in Brussels, and I was in Copenhagen 
for a preliminary meeting for the next COSAC. So w are really not here enough to 
regularly follow the Giunta, we can't make an impact'. " Although the European office 
within the Chamber of Deputies in September 2002 undertook more work than the 
Giunfa, it was in a better position staff-wise with three academics, 8 researchers and a 
number of secretaries. Still, a staff member here expressed the feeling that 'it is difficult 
to be everywhere at once, we have to choose which meeting to attend. "' 
While scrutiny procedures are limited, a growing understanding that Parliament must 
direct efforts at the pre-decision stage is developing. However, despite this 
development the main emphasis is still on legislating on European affairs. Federiga 
Bindi Calussi and Stefano B. Grassi (2001, p. 299) thus write that 'Parliament acts as a 
legislator and neglects control and scrutiny functions', while Furlong (1996, p. 44) 
states that 'legislation is Parliament's privileged point of access to the political system, 
one to which it has always given priority, over other functions such as scrutiny and 
redress'. Parliamentary legislative activity on European matters centres on the ! egge 
comunitaria, part of the 'Legge La Pergola' (after the politician who initiated it), which 
will now be examined. 
3. The legge comunitaria 
The legge comunitaria is based on Legge La Pergola, Law 9 March 1989, n. 86. This law has 
as its purpose to facilitate the implementation of European legislation and to eradicate 
conflicts between European and Italian law, as well as to inform Parliament of 
European developments (Article 1). The way in which Pärliament is involved in the 
process of implementation is detailed in Article 3(c), which lists the contents of the law, 
and dictates that Parliament authorises the government 'to implement, in a prescribed 
way, the directives or recommendations permitted by Article 4' (Legge La Pergola, 
Article 3, author's translation). It can thus be argued that one aim of the Legge 
comunifaria is to provide Parliament with a means of institutional check on the 
executive. In fulfilling this aim, the Parliament has been 'significantly unsuccessful' 
(Fabbrini and Dona, 2002, p. 2), due largely to lack of interest on behalf of 
14 Interview 1-3. 
19 Interview I-11. 
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parliamentarians. Article 4 outlines that directives to be implemented under Article 
3(c) must be presented in a list contained within the annual legge comunifaria. The 
relevant select committees within both Chambers must then provide an opinion on 
these directives, with the European Committees drawing up final statements to be 
presented in the Chambers of Parliament m As the legge comunitaria gathers together 
legislation in need of implementation, with parliamentarians limited to pronouncing 
on the way in which the implementation is carried out, the legge comunitaria is only 
partially an instrument for immediate implementation, but rather a device to 
programme and rationalise the various sets of implementing measures' (Bindi Callusi 
and Grasse, 2001, p. 306). 
An explicit purpose behind, although not mentioned in, the Legge La Pergola, was the 
need for Italy to reduce its implementation deficit. While Italy's record on 
implementation has improved, the process of gathering together, on an annual basis, 
legislation in need of transposition has also had consequences at the domestic 
level-especially in the administration. Flaminia Gallo and Birgit Hanny (2003, p. 276) 
thus describe the legge comunitaria as 'a vehicle for further improvements to the 
structures and procedures of Italian administration and political units dealing with 
European affairs'. They continue: 
[B]etween 1987 and 1997 there was no coherent adjustment of structures 
and procedures within the different administrative units involved in the 
national preparation and implementation of EC/EU policies. Rather, a 
complex patchwork of functions and competencies, of co-ordinating 
mechanisms and formalised information channels was put into practice... 
In the immediate post-Maastricht period, almost all Italian ministries had 
introduced special units dealing in some way with policies that were 
negotiated or regulated in EC policy cycles. 
However, even with this increased attention to European affairs within the 
administration, it has been argued that the success of the Community law has simply 
relocated the problem. According to Furlong (1996, p. 43), the first five annual 
Community laws ensured that 600 directives were dealt with, which is 'nearly as many 
as in the previous 30 years'. This increased rate in parliamentary work has thus merely 
shifted the burden-and the backlog-to the ministries responsible for the actual 
implementation. 
Being presented with one annual law permits the committees within Parliament to 
focus their attention on implementation of European affairs to a limited time of one - 
two months during the year, instead of having to address them on a continuous basis. 
M During the existence of the Giuuta in the Senate, it was only the First Committee (on constitutional 
affairs) and the European affairs committee who dealt with the legge commizitaria, whereas all relevant 
standing committees in the Chamber of Deputies are involved. 
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Politicians and civil servants interviewed for this project all spoke of this process as 
being advantageous. Furthermore, when asked about Italian parliamentary 
involvement in European affairs both politicians and civil servants often mentioned the 
legge comunitaria immediately. A difference between civil servants and 
parliamentarians could be detected, however, insofar as politicians often thought the 
annual law to be sufficient parliamentary involvement, whereas civil servants were 
more aware of how the limited involvement in the pre-decision stage restricted 
Parliament's influence over the decisions they later helped implement. To illustrate the 
point, Senator Manzella, a senior member of the Giunta, described the Legge comunitaria 
as 'a very efficient instrument of control because we have the power to make 
amendments to the European laws'. ` This statement is obviously not true, as it is only 
the implementation process the Giunta can influence. Parliamentary staff are aware of 
this difficulty, one Senatorial employee thus stated that: 
the real role should be in the creation of European law, not in the 
implementation of European law. Yes, the implementation is important, 
but not so important. On the contrary, the 90 per cent of our activities are 
on implementation, not on the creation [of law]. Because the creation is all 
in the government ß 
Another member of staff in the Senate similarly argued that: 
the Italian parliament is essentially a legislative body, and the so-called 
control function is not in the DNA of the Italian parliament... so if the most 
important function of the Giunfa should be that of controlling the 
government I think this tradition will be a strong obstacle. It will take a lot 
of time before a control system will start to happen and work. That is our 
problem and I don't know what we can do? 
It thus seems that, since the legge comunitaria conforms to the Italian political culture in 
which the Parliament legislates, it gives parliamentarians a feeling of participating in 
the European legislative process, albeit at the national level. The opportunity to 
legislate explicitly on European issues, coupled with a lack of scrutiny provisions and 
traditions, has created an environment where a further, and necessarily more technical, 
involvement in the pre-legislative stage has been difficult to develop. It can therefore 
be argued that the legge comunitaria has 'pacified' the Parliament, and thus, to a large 
extent, made it possible for the executive to develop and pursue its own strategies at 
the European level. 
The 'pacification' of Parliament is not necessarily the result of planned action on behalf 
of the executive. Parliamentarians on European committees in both chambers 
21 Interview 1-9. 
y Interview 1-5. 
23 Interview 1-3. 
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repeatedly complained of a lack of interest in European affairs, whether through 
scrutiny or legislative measures. " One of the few opportunities for Italian 
parliamentarians to obtain information about European affairs and their impact on 
Italy is therefore lost and the legge comunitaria sometimes treated in a perfunctory 
manner. Sondra Z. Koff and Stephen P. Koff (2000, p. 199) actually maim that 'if there is 
other pressing business, [the Community law] receives cursory treatment to get it out 
of the way'. One explanation for this unwillingness to engage, even in a mode familiar 
to the MPs (legislation), is that European legislation can often seem very technical. 
Italian Parliamentarians appear to spend little energy investigating the effects 
European legislation and its implementation within Italy, may have on Italians. The 
availability of resources is obviously an issue, but a lack of interest seems to be a 
significant and fundamental factor. 
Although the 'Legge La Pergola' requires the government to present Parliament with 
the legge comunitaria before January 31 in the year following the year for which the 
implementation procedures apply, this has rarely happened. For instance, in 2002, the 
legge comunitaria for 2001 was being examined by Parliament as it reconvened after the 
summer recess-in September and October 2002? This further limits the ability of 
parliamentarians to keep up to date with events at the European level, while also 
placing them under pressure to implement directives before they will be brought 
before the ECJ. 
A fundamental requirement for meaningful parliamentary engagement in the 
implementation process is adequate information from the government. However, this 
has consistently been lacking, a fact both politicians and parliamentary employees 
lament. The way in which information is gathered and presented to parliament will 
therefore be considered in the next section. 
4. Parliamentary relations with government and the administration 
The Italian executive is legally obliged to consult and inform parliament about 
European affairs. However, parliamentarians and parliamentary civil servants are 
often far from satisfied with the information provided by the government. requests for 
information from (especially) the Chamber of Deputies will often result in information 
being provided, but it is not forwarded on a regular, automatic basis. "' In fact, several 
24 Parliamentary staff (for instance interviewees 1-3 and 5) commented on this too, although they also 
reported increasing interest by specialist committees. 
25 A staff-member in the Chamber of Deputies showed awareness of this problem when commenting that 
'now we're examining it, and now we have September, so this is about last year.... It should be examined 
in February, that would be good, September is too late, it should be much earlier' (Interview I-3). 
25 As stated by, for instance, interviewees 1-3,5 and 10. 
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interviewees commented that the Italian parliament does not lack rules and regulations 
granting it access and rights to information, it is the implementation of these rules and 
regulation that has been problematic. In other words, the government has been unable 
and/or unwilling to enforce its own rules. Two problems thus arise: first, the 
executive's willingness to provide information; and, second, the executive's ability to 
provide parliament with information. A centrally placed parliamentary employee, who 
until recently worked on European affairs, described it succinctly as'a matter of choice, 
they don't like to keep the parliament informed, and from another point of view I think 
it's a matter of [a lack of] organisation'. ' 
A variety of views exist on the willingness of the executive to inform Parliament. To 
some extent, the executive does not see a need to inform parliament, with one official 
arguing that the current level of information is 'good enough'. The official went on to 
say that 'the Italian Parliament has all the tools it needs to control the Italian 
government-and does quite a good job at the moment'. ' On the other hand, this 
official also maintained that if a government wishes, it can relatively easily avoid 
parliamentary scrutiny and that parliaments will never really know the extent to which 
compromises at the European level are necessary, or whether they are simply 'smoke 
screens' erected to avoid the involvement of national parliaments. The official's 
preparedness to discuss such a scenario suggests that this is not an unusual occurrence, 
thereby seriously questioning the Italian Government's willingness to keep Parliament 
informed about its activities at the European level. 
MPs as well as parliamentary employees concur that the government lacks both the 
will and the ability to inform parliament, stating that government information was 
often non-existent or at best inadequate and seriously delayed. " According to a staff- 
member from the Chamber of Deputies two reasons account for this. Firstly, 
information can be seen as power, which the government is reluctant to relinquish. 
Secondly, the poor co-ordination within and between ministries exists because 'to give 
elaborate information means to study, to suffer, and to work a lot'. " 
The specific nature of the Italian administration is thus also important. Having largely 
resisted attempts at reforms it remains beset with problems, all of which are 
emphasised by its lack of integration `into the social, economic and political fabric of 
the country' (Koff and Koff, 2000, p. 162). Such integration has been difficult, partly 
2' Interview I-1. 
p Interview I-14 
Claimed by, for instance, interviewee I-1l. 
9 Interview I-11. 
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because the administration is mainly staffed by southerners. " According to Sabino 
Cassese (1999, p. 63) this has had the implication that the (senior) civil service 
mirrors the characteristics of Southern Italy which can be summed up as 
follows: (i) coming from regions characterized by unemployment, job 
security takes precedence over efficiency and service; (ii) coming from 
relatively non-industrialized areas (or where industry has not managed to 
establish firm roots in society and the economy), legalistic and formalistic 
attitudes tend to dominate, without reference to the objectives of public 
administration; the mentality is far from managerialist; there is a rejection 
of competition. 
Cassese further argues that the civil service has preferred 'the bureaucratic supervision 
of secondary administrative management' to an autonomous policy-making role (1999, 
p. 63). With such entrenched opposition to changes in the administration, the 
implications for parliament's ability to obtain information are very serious. In addition, 
the implications for Italy's ability to negotiate well at the European level may also be 
affected. To scrutinise and assess European legislation effectively, cooperation will be 
required across traditional lines of division. For such cooperation to be successful, it is 
of paramount importance that new methods of optimising the processing and dispersal 
of information are found. Membership of the EU may thus also contribute, indirectly at 
least; towards reform of the Italian civil service. 
A small measure of reform has, however, been undertaken as the administration too 
has separated out European affairs from international affairs, with a Department of 
European Affairs having been established. How much has changed as a result is 
questionable, as the ministry of foreign affairs still maintains a European section, 
which, according to a member of staff in the European Department, actually employs 
more staff than the Department of European Affairs. " The same employee described 
the relationship between the two units as 'co-operative--but with some competitive 
elements'. It is clear that a certain rivalry exists, a situation that does not make it easier 
for Parliament to obtain information from the government. With the European 
Department relying on other ministries to prepare reports and memoranda on 
particular issues and the minister in charge of the European Department being a 
minister without portfolio, the Department is facing a serious struggle to gain 
recognition and respect. 
For Parliament, the Department of European affairs presents a problem of who to ask 
for information. Parliamentarians must decide whether to go directly to the individual 
ministries or through the European Department-or indeed to the Ministry of Foreign 
m According to Koff and Koff (2000, p. 160) '70 per cent of public servants are southern in origin and of the 
highest ranking, the percentage rises to 90'. 
32 Interview 1-10. 
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Affairs. While the Minister of European affairs was commended for attending 
Parliament when requested to appear, he was also still regarded as 'weak'. " On the 
other hand, the division of labour between the European and Foreign Affairs 
committees within Parliament, resulting in the need for the Department of European 
Affairs to deal with four different committees on each issue, was described as 'leading 
to a lot of wasted time'. 
While parliamentarians complained of how the European Department was competing 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for competency, one civil servant described a 
similar competitive struggle between parliamentary committees: ' This may be the 
symptom of an emerging process of scrutiny, where systems and competences are still 
being developed and divided. As long as the participants are still feeling their way 
through the process this is to be expected, and, if administrative issues can be 
overcome, may actually contribute to the Parliament's European committees' joint task 
of scrutinising the Government. 
The lack of co-ordination within the administration is also evident in the way the 
government conducts its affairs at the European level. '° According to a parliamentary 
employee, the lack of co-ordination and preparation represents a serious weakness for 
Italy, and has meant that Italy has not always achieved its potential in EU negotiations. 
This employee also argues that: 
they go there, from the administration, not very prepared. Dossiers are not really 
prepared by the Italians. There is a general weakness in European affairs, not only in 
parliament, but also in government. We have a great interest in the main issues, the 
great issues, the Treaty of Nice, agricultural reform, but the day to day to work we are 
not used to follow, that is the reality. 3' 
Serious systemic problems within the executive and administration may therefore be 
hampering the government's work as well as parliament's scrutiny of it. Put 
differently, it can be said that Parliament has not been able to rely on the 
administration for information and support. Indeed, Calussi and Grassi (2001, p. 302) 
write that 'there is yet no formal, hierarchical inter-ministerial co-ordination on EU 
topics' and that Italy cannot 'count on an efficient bureaucracy'. Several civil servants 
" Interview 1-5. 
"Interview I-20. 
'5 Interview 1-10. 
3' Federiga Bindi also writes of problems with coordination and transfer of information within and 
between administrative units- Indeed, she claims that the Italian Permanent Representatives 'has often 
become the center not only for negotiations, but even for the definition of national positions' (Bindi, 2002, 
16). 
Interview 1-5. 
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and parliamentary staff (always off the record), as well as politicians (frequently off the 
record too), spoke of a 'lack of coordination [on European affairs] in government'. They 
implied that this restricted the ability of government to prepare appropriate 
information and thus implicitly hampering Parliament's ability to properly conduct its 
work on European affairs. One politician prepared to speak out openly was La Malfa, 
who claimed that information from the government was always too little and the 
quality of it 'debatable .3 
Strongly related to the lack of quality information is the lack of explanatory 
memoranda from the executive. Such memoranda are contentious within most 
member states. In Denmark the Folketing continuously attempts to pressure the 
government to improve these, and in the UK the House of Commons has worked hard 
to make the Government deliver its memoranda on time. In Italy, however, 
explanatory memoranda, even by the admission of the administration itself, are 
nonexistent. This point was brought up by several parliamentary employees, 39 and 
used as an argument to justify direct contact between the Italian Parliament and 
European institutions. It thus seems that the hope amongst members of Parliament and 
those working for the parliament was that if the European Commission was in charge 
of delivering new proposals directly to the national parliaments, national governments 
would 'only' be responsible for explaining the impact this legislation would have on 
the domestic situation, hopefully reducing the national administration's task to 
something manageable. 
The view that Parliament is short of information is somewhat contradicted by officials 
in the Italian civil service who argued-independently of one another-that parliament 
has enough information. " Furthermore, they stated that MPs and their staff have the 
possibility to obtain further assistance from the special departments within both 
Chambers that deal with European affairs, the European institutions and official EU 
web sites. 
Of the three case studies, the Italian parliament has shown the strongest support for 
direct contacts between national parliaments and European institutions. This may in 
large part be due to the inability of Parliament to obtain information from its own 
government. It is therefore interesting to note that when listing the main tasks of the 
European office within the Chamber of Deputies, a high-level member of staff ranked 
relations with similar offices in other countries as number one, with provision of 
36 
Interview I-8. 
In interviews 1-3 and 4, for instance. 
Interviews 1-10 and 14. 
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information to MPs about EU activities as number two. " It is also interesting to note 
that Italian MPs are keen participants at (and contributors to) COSAC, that the Italian 
parliament hosted the Assizes when this was held in Rome in 1990 (see Chapter eight 
for further details on both the Assizes and COSAC) and are generally strong 
supporters of parliamentary cooperation at the European level. 
Conclusion 
Compared to its British and Danish counterparts, the Italian parliament is the one most 
obviously guided by its political history in how it treats European affairs. The Italian 
Parliament has developed legislative procedures capable of accommodating all the 
political parties and their wishes, while also satisfying the need of parliamentarians to 
reward local interests for their 'sponsorship' of their (re)election. Based on 
constitutional rules, the parliament became a strong legislative force, although this has 
arguably been due mostly to a relatively weak executive. Because of the direct (and 
effective) involvement in legislation, the tasks of executive scrutiny and oversight were 
never well developed within parliament-a fact that is especially evident in European 
matters. 
Several factors have contributed to the limited emphasis on European scrutiny. One is 
the recognition of Italy's new and developing democracy that membership of the EU 
provided (Pasquino, 1996, p. 160). Although the Communists were initially opposed to 
membership, it gradually became a 'non-issue' (Bindi Callusi and Grasse, 2001, p. 297), 
with the vast majority of Italian politicians being in favour of membership. Italian 
politicians and citizens were thus, in contrast to both the UK and Denmark, in 
agreement over membership of the EU. Although the number of Italians who see EU 
membership as a good thing has fallen over the years, as has the number of people 
who believe Italy has benefited from membership, Italians have still recorded some of 
the most positive feelings towards the EU, traditionally well above the EU average. 42 
Secondly, while both parliamentarians and parliamentary staff involved in European 
affairs are aware that the Parliament's influence is limited at the post-decision stages, 
Italy's political culture has made it difficult to change legislation-focused practices that 
have been in existence for a long time. This is consistent with the third explanation, 
which is the lack of direct benefits to be obtained from the European level. As local 
C Interview I-11. 
42 Support for EU membership peaked at just above 80 per cent in 1988, and has since dropped to 54 per 
cent in 2004, while the percentage believing that Italy has benefited from membership has dropped from 
just over 70 per cent to 49 per cent (also in 1988 and 2004). The EU average for membership support and 
belief in membership as beneficial was approximately 65 and 55 per cent respectively in 1988, and 48 and 
47 per cent in 2004. Italian figures have thus come much loser to the European average, although 
especially so for the support measure (European Commission, 2004). 
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links and contacts are still vitally important for parliamentarians this is naturally 
where their efforts are concentrated. As a consequence, the EU is often perceived as 
being'a long way away' with little relevance to everyday life. 
The general treatment of Community matters within Italy can thus be described as 
very relaxed, even governed by a certain laissez faire attitude in Parliament, executive 
and administration. There are signs--including the establishment of a Department of 
European Affairs, an upgrading of the Giunta to a select committee and increased 
numbers of hearings on European matters in both Chambers-that this is slowly 
changing. Europeanisation is being felt in the Italian political system too. 
Despite having been a member of the Community right from the outset, Italy is also 
the country whose parliament has the weakest influence on Community legislation of 
the three examined. The procedures currently emerging are sending mixed signals. On 
the one hand, both European committees seem to be developing a more specialist 
attitude towards the handling of European affairs, becoming more independent and 
undertaking more scrutiny. Against this, the institutionally secured cooperation with 
other select committees, and the double committee membership in the Senate, ensures 
that specialists in other fields examine European issues as well. The move towards 
specialisation is a development witnessed by both the British and Danish parliaments, 
while only the Danish EUC has also begun sharing the responsibility of scrutiny of 
European legislation with other specialist committees. 
As in other parliaments, Italian MPs have to persuade their colleagues that European 
affairs are relevant to national-level politics, and this in the face of difficult working 
conditions. In the Senate problems include the double committee membership, while 
both Houses (but again especially the Senate) suffer from the difficulty in obtaining 
information on European matters from the Italian executive and administration. These 
are deep structural difficulties from which the Government also suffers, and which 
heave proven difficult to tackle. 
The continuing processes of integration and Europeanisation will, however, force 
changes on Italy-including the administration, as has already been seen with the shift 
of the implementation burden. These changes have the potential to bring more 
extensive change to the Italian parliament, as well as the rest of the political system, 
than have the last 20 years of electoral reforms and party restructuring. Finished dykes 
and embankments may yet be some way off, but tentative foundations have been laid 
for fuller parliamentary involvement in European affairs. 
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Chapter 6: United Kingdom 
Sovereignty can be impotent. A man in the desert is free and sovereign. He 
is beyond the reach of any alien authority, but he is powerless. To have 
value, sovereignty must be capable of being used. 
(Heseltine, 1989, p. 211) 
Perhaps the greatest political challenge facing Britain in recent history has been its 
membership of the EU. British participation in a political environment where 
compromises are the norm and national sovereignty may seem to diminish has not 
been easy, owing mainly to its long history of political and territorial independence 
and unity, together with an electoral system in which the 'winner takes all'. With its 
unique geo-political, constitutional and historical position, this 'awkward partner' 
(George, 1994) has been severely tested by the integration process during its 
membership. 
Because of how Britain's constitution is constructed, membership of the EU has 
impacted not just on policies and institutions, but also upon the British constitution 
itself. In contrast to both Italy and Denmark, Britain does not have a written, codified 
constitution. Various texts, conventions and institutions together provide the UK with 
a 'constitution', creating a very unique political environment for political actors to 
operate within. The core components and characteristics of Britain's political make-up 
are the Monarchy; parliamentary sovereignty' and cabinet rule; the rule of law; the use 
of First Past the Post (FPP) for general elections; a parliamentary institutional system 
that encourages a very adversarial political style and, increasingly, membership of the 
EU. 
The Monarch is officially head of State, with Her Majesty's Government and Her 
Majesty's Opposition facing each other in parliament. Despite being head of State, any 
remaining governing-related official functions for the Monarch, such as presenting the 
annual legislative programme in the Queen's speech and signing all laws before they 
enter into force, are largely symbolic. However, drawing up, debating and scrutinising 
legislation are tasks carried out by the Cabinet and both chambers of Parliament. 
Parliament itself dates back to 1707 and the Union of the Crowns (between England 
and Scotland) although it has roots in the English Parliament whose origins can be 
traced to the mid-13th Century. This long history makes it one of the oldest 
I It should be remembered, however, that 'parliamentary sovereignty developed out of the struggle over 
internal sovereignty between King and Parliament', although it has been an issue in debates on UK 
membership of the EU (Wallace, 1986, emphasis in original). 
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representative assemblies in the world, with the bi-cameral system developing during 
the 14th Century (The United Kingdom Parliament, 2003). Jointly, the two chambers 
(the House of Commons and the House of Lords) fulfill several functions: they make 
all British law, exact taxes, scrutinise the administration and government policy, 
examine European legislation, hear appeals (in the House of Lords) and debate the 
major issues of the day. 
Actual legislation forms an important element of the British constitution, thereby 
marking a significant difference with most other constitutions found in the Western 
world. Whereas most constitutions are protected from any 'rash' alterations by, for 
instance, a Supreme Court or the requirement that any changes be passed by a 
significant proportion of MPs in two successive parliaments, no such mechanisms exist 
in Britain. Indeed, 'constitutional laws may be changed or abolished as easily as any 
other laws' (Weir, 1994). 
Parliamentary debates constitute a very important feature of the UK political 
environment, and are often described as adversarial-especially those in the House of 
Commons. The FPP system, which ensures that a single-member constituency can be 
won with a plurality of the votes cast within that constituency, encourages a two-party 
system and thereby also a parliament in which one party is very likely to have a 
majority (see table below for relative party strengths). Due to strong whipping systems 
within the political parties, the passing of a government's legislative programme is 
virtually guaranteed. As a consequence, opposition parties have limited direct impact 
on legislation. 
Table 6.1-- Relative strengths of party representation (after 2005 election) 
Number of Number of 
representatives at Percentage representatives Percentage 
Party Westminster in the EP 
Labour 354 54.8 19 24.4 
Conservative 196 30.3 27 34.6 
Liberal Democrat 62 9.6 12 15.4 
UK Independence Party 0.0 11 14.1 
Green Party 0.0 2 2.6 
Scottish National Party 6 0.9 2 2.6 
Democratic Unionist Party 9 1.4 1 1.3 
Sinn Fein 5 0.8 1 1.3 
Plaid Cymru 3 0.5 1 1.3 
Ulster Unionist 1 0.2 1 1.3 
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Independents 2 0.3 1 1.3 
0.0 
Others 8 1.2 
Total 646 100.0 78 100.2 
The category 'Others' in the House of Commons consists of the following parties and 
individuals: Social Democratic and Labour (3), Respect (1) and the Speaker and three 
deputies. 
One issue the traditionally very coherent parliamentary political parties have been 
unable to agree on is membership of the EU. Membership has been controversial since 
it was originally proposed and continues to cause rifts within the two main UK parties, 
with neither Labour nor the Conservatives being able to boast a unified front on 
European integration' In contrast, the Liberal Democrats have consistently promoted 
pro-European policies, while the U. K. Independence Party (UKIP) is committed to 
withdrawing Britain from the EU. The scepticism voiced by some politicians' is also 
evident in the British population. Eurobarometer figures (2003) show that 31 per cent 
of those asked see British membership of the EU as a good thing, while 30 per cent 
believe the UK has benefited from membership. These figures are significantly below 
the EU averages of 55 and 50 per cent respectively (European Commission, 2003). ' 
The widespread scepticism regarding Community membership has in many ways 
contributed to the development of current scrutiny systems for legislation originating 
at the European level, although elements of the British constitution have also limited 
the effectiveness of these systems. This chapter will therefore examine how the British 
parliament, especially the parliamentary committee system, has developed over the 
years. It will also look specifically at the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC), ° its 
remit, level of success and, a matter of increasing importance, its relations with other 
committees within the House of Commons. In the final section, scrutiny of European 
legislation within the House of Lords will be considered with particular emphasis on 
how it differs from the Scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons and the Lords 
Committee's ability to influence the European debate and legislative outcomes. 
2 For a brief overview of British EU-membership in a political context see, for instance, Armstrong and 
Buhner (2003, p. 389) who argue that 'out of a highly contested situation the internal party factionalism on 
integration developed that has persisted in various forms to the present'. But see also Carter (Carter, 2001) 
for a description of how the UK currently appears to be undergoing a 'changed political climate' with 
regards to EU membership. 
3 One example is Robert Kilroy Silk from the UKIP, elected to the EP in the 2004 election, who expressed a 
wish to 'wreck the European parliament (Tempest, 2004). 
a Membership was considered a 'bad thing' by 19 per cent of those asked, with 40 per cent being of the 
opinion that membership has not benefited the UK. The EU averages for these figures were 10 and 28 per 
cent respectively. 
3 The ESC in the House of Commons should not be confused with the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) that operates at the European level and has no specific parliamentary attachment. 
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As will become evident, the British Parliament has been affected by Europeanisation 
too, with EU membership affecting the activities of British MPs. However, in some 
aspects the development of scrutiny procedures for European affairs differ from the 
developments in the Danish and Italian parliaments. The ESC was in some ways a 
forerunner for other select committees within Parliament and although it adheres to 
the structures and conventions of other committees, it is also the only committee that, 
as a matter of course, deals with its subject matter ex ante rather than ex post. To fully 
understand the importance of these differences, the development of committees will be 
the initial focus of this chapter, together with the related development of the ESC in the 
House of Commons. 
1. How Parliament has developed over time 
Despite a significant increase in public business` passing through Parliament, it was 
only in 1902 that changes were approved which prioritised government business, 
while the use of standing committees, on an ad hoc basis, was also introduced at this 
time (Norton, 1998b, p. 20). Despite the possibility of using committees in their scrutiny 
of government legislation, both the House of Commons and House of Lords have held 
on to their traditions of being debating chambers. Although debates in the House of 
Commons may have a long tradition, they are often seen as little more than formalised 
mud slinging matches with a certain amount of entertainment value. In contrast, 
debates in the House of Lords are generally considered more dignified affairs-and 
therefore potentially more constructive. Constructive debate on European legislation 
can be difficult to develop due to the often very technical nature of European 
legislation. Specialised, technical matters are likely to lead to dull debates in the house, 
and are therefore often better dealt with in committees. ' 
Because the executive has been given the legislative initiative, as well as considerable 
control over the parliamentary agenda, it can be argued that Parliament's ability to 
scrutinise and hold the government to account has been reduced. Indeed, Stuart Weir 
writes that '[t]he doctrine of "parliamentary sovereignty" cloaks the reality of executive 
supremacy' (1994, p. 18). Despite the development of executive power at the expense of 
parliamentary influence, institutional stability has remained important to MPs-even if 
changes may lead to improved scrutiny of the government. The development of 
committees has thus been slow, while modification of, for instance, the sitting hours in 
` Legislation initiated by the government as opposed to private members of Parliament. 
' However, even technical matters can become politicised, although the debate then tends to deviate from 
the original question. Examples of this can be seen in various referenda held on European issues 
throughout Europe, where specific debates, like the ratification of a treaty or participation in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) easily degenerate into arguments for and against the EU itself. 
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the House of Commons have also proved difficult (see for instance David Cameron 
MP, 2003; but also the appendices to House of Commons, 2002a). 
Historically, the scrutiny role has mainly been exercised in debates on the floors of 
both Houses, although in recent years there has been a move towards more work being 
undertaken in select committees. The system of departmental select committees 
developed between 1966 and 1979, despite reformers having called for select 
committees to shadow the work of government departments from the middle of the 
nineteenth century (House of Commons, 2003a, para. 41). Their introduction has been 
termed 'the most important parliamentary reform of the [20th] century' (Norton, 1998b, 
p. 34). Norton explains the development of select committees as a product of the wish, 
by some MPs, to influence public policy without necessarily bringing about the 
Government's downfall (p. 30), and lists parliamentary specialisation as the main 
consequence of the introduction of select committees (p. 31). This view appears to be 
supported by MPs themselves. For instance, in a debate on select committees in 1995, 
the following views were expressed: 
I am second to none in believing that the changes that we undertook nearly 
15 years ago in the Select Committee system have been the biggest 
improvement in increasing ministerial accountability to the House, 
probably even this century' (Higgins, 1995), 
and 
15 or 16 years ago we voted on setting up the departmental Select 
Committees. I do not know how many hon. Members voted against setting 
up those Committees, but I was one of them. As I have said before, I did 
that because I did not believe that they would produce reports that were 
good enough and I did not believe that they would have sufficient teeth. 
On balance, experience has proved me wrong. They have provided hon. 
Members with a good oversight of the work of Departments which was not 
available to them before (Rooker, 1995). 
Although committees have now become an important component of parliamentary 
activities, they still have not taken on the same importance (measured as either ability 
to influence legislation or the prestige membership carries) as committees within either 
the Danish or Italian parliaments. 
The European Scrutiny Committee 
In many ways the European Scrutiny Committee set a precedent for the establishment 
of other select committees within the House of Commons. An important element in the 
debate preceding British membership of the European Communities was the 
parliamentary interest in maintaining its influence over the Government's Community 
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policies, to which end the European committees were established. Two main issues 
contributed to this concern: the contentious nature of membership and the very old 
parliamentary tradition in the UK. Membership itself caused both inter- and intra- 
party conflicts, while parliamentary traditions were threatened by the loss of 
sovereignty. These points were also raised in Denmark and, to some extent, Ireland. In 
the words of Fitzmaurice 'the new member states [as of 1973], with long parliamentary 
traditions, with sensitivity to the democracy and sovereignty issues, with strong 
opposition to entry (within parties as well as between them), took more interest in safe- 
guarding the prerogatives of their national parliaments than had the founder members' 
(Fitzmaurice, 1979, p. 203). 
During a debate on EU secondary legislation in the House of Commons (21 December 
1972), the issue of remit for the future select committee on European affairs was 
debated, as was that of parliamentary sovereignty. MP Peter Shore thus argued that 
the 'task of the Select Committee is to find ways, if possible, of making the Ministers 
taking part in the institutions of the European Community responsible to this House'. 
For his part, J. Enoch Powell wished to 'ask this Select Committee to survey the whole 
field of the knowledge and control by the House of all proceedings of the European 
Community which may result in commitments of law or policy binding upon this 
House' (House of Commons, 1972-73, Parliamentary debates, Vol. 848, columns 1743 
and 1748). In response to these concerns James Prior, then Lord President of the 
Council and Leader of the House of Commons, stated that: 
I think there would be general agreement that our procedures for 
scrutinising proposals for European Community secondary legislation 
most urgently need to be studied; that is, while this proposed secondary 
legislation is still in the draft stage ... it is in relation to the draft stage that 
we think most of the work by this Committee will take place. I think that 
should be the Committee's first priority (House of Commons, 1972-73, 
Parliamentary debates, Vol. 848, column 1749). 
Prior furthermore argued that 
for the first time there will be an opportunity for draft regulations made by 
the Commission for recommendation to the Council of Ministers to be 
discussed by a Committee of this House. So the House will be able to make 
its views known before any decision is reached. That, I believe, in no way 
detracts from the sovereignty of Parliament. In fact, I believe that it adds 
considerably to its sovereignty, and certainly to the scrutiny powers of hon. 
Members (House of Commons, 1972-73, Parliamentary debates, Volume 
848, columns 1750-1). 
In the end both Houses of Parliament established separate committees on European 
affairs, each provided with a remit to 'scrutinize ways and means for Parliament to 
influence the legislation of the European Community'. The committees began work 
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between December 1973 and May 1974, well after Britain had joined the EU. The delay 
between membership commencing and the committees beginning work caused, 
especially in the House of Commons, a backlog of material to dealt with. 
The committee in the Commons was entrusted with the significant task of sifting 
through all legislative proposals from the European Commission,. When proposals 
were considered to be of political or legal importance the House was alerted-but the 
merits of legislative proposals were not to be commented upon. Despite this relatively 
limited remit, the committee was given the opportunity to involve Parliament in the 
pre-decision stage of the European legislative process, a situation referred to by Prior 
as contributing to Parliament's sovereignty, and one David Brew claims the House of 
Commons 'rarely enjoys in respect of domestic legislation' (Brew, 1979, p. 24). 
Over time, attempts have been made at extending the involvement of the House of 
Commons in European affairs, especially so with the appointment (in 1997) of a Select 
Committee on Modernisation that (also) considered the work of the ESC (House of 
Commons, 1998b). Amongst other recommendations it was suggested that the name of 
the then European Legislation Committee be changed to 'European Scrutiny 
Committee', that the number of Standing Committees be increased to four or five, and 
that a Parliamentary office be established in Brussels. With the implementation of 
many of these recommendations, Caitriona Carter claims that the new Labour 
government 'appears to have heralded a new approach to scrutiny' (Carter, 2001, p. 
438). The ESC is thus the first committee in the House of Commons to include the word 
'scrutiny' in its title, although scrutiny is essentially the task of all select committees 
within the House of Commons. 
Even after implementing these changes, it can be argued that the UK parliamentary 
scrutiny system is consistent with the treatment of domestic legislation. Indeed, Carter 
writes that, due to the strong notion of parliamentary sovereignty that exists in Britain, 
maintaining parliamentary control over Community affairs was 'in keeping with UK 
Constitutional tradition' (Carter, 2001, p. 440). However, it is also pointed out that the 
scrutiny powers accorded the ESC are significantly different to those held by other 
committees in the House of Commons, being ex ante, rather than ex post (Carter, 2001, 
p. 440), and thus-potentially-more influential. This potential is somewhat limited 
though, as the committee 'lacks the formal power to serve as anything more than a 
filter' (Millar, 1979, p. 195). Indeed, according to Anand Menon and Vincent Wright 
(1998, p. 54) 'the core executive has been granted a degree of freedom from 
Parliamentary scrutiny previously unknown within the British Parliamentary system'. 
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The inability to comment on the merit of European documents has reduced the impact 
of the ex ante scrutiny, thereby limiting the potential influence of the committee. Menon 
and Wright (1998, p. 64) argue that: 
the UK denounces the 'democratic deficit' at the heart of the EU, yet it is 
reluctant to enhance the power of either the European Parliament or the 
House of Commons. Its decision-making processes are clearly relatively 
more 'coherent' because it is unencumbered by troublesome parliamentary 
committees or sub-national governments. 
Being able to operate relatively unhindered by parliamentary activities has contributed 
to keeping disagreements (on European issues) within the main political parties 
manageable. If the ESC was able to expound on the merit of documents submitted to it, 
this would likely result in the ESC becoming highly politicised, as it would possibly 
attract MPs with strong (and opposite) opinions on the EU. Party whips would need to 
'keep an eye on' these members, and party leaderships would wish to 'plant' trusted 
people on the committee! Party leaderships, as well as the government, are therefore 
likely to prefer to avoid granting the ESC the ability to pronounce on the merit of EU 
documents. Consequently, progress through disagreement is not an option, as inter- 
party disagreements would likely be too damaging. 
2. Working methods of committees 
Governments are also able to work relatively unencumbered by the work carried out in 
select committees. Work in select committees is still mainly carried out on a selective 
basis: committees act autonomously, carefully guard their autonomy and are very 
independent of each other as well as of the government. Committee members thus 
choose topics on which they wish to write reports, and can hold hearings, call 
witnesses and take other evidence in the process. In many instances an inquiry is held 
ex post, that is, after a piece of legislation has been passed, and may well focus on the 
implications, or unintended consequences, of that legislation. Scrutiny within the 
House of Commons thus cannot be seen to follow-on a day-to-day basis-the pre- 
legislative work of government departments in an effort to influence or improve this 
legislation. In contrast, the ESC is able to follow European legislation in its pre-decision 
stages, placing it at a distinct advantage in terms of potential influence. 
However, since the 1990s it appears that a new focus on pre-legislative scrutiny has 
emerged in Britain (for an overview see Kelly et. al. (2003)). The House of Commons 
Select Committee on Modernisation (first appointed in June 1997) has published 
' Indeed, Jimmy Hood is suspicious that this takes place in other countries, citing the importance of 
European Committees as a reason why executives would want to place members on these committees 
(interview UK-10). 
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several reports for consultation as well as a reform programme. ' In its 'First Report' 
from February 2002, the need for improved scrutiny procedures is recognised in the 
following statement: ' the principal objective of modernisation must be to improve the 
scrutiny of public policy. The programme of work of the Modernisation Committee is 
intended to enable Members of the House to be more effective in discharging their role 
of scrutiny' (House of Commons, 2002b, para. 1), thus recognising a need for 
improvement in this area. Of the many recommendations contained within the report 
there are several directly related to the House of Commons' ability to scrutinise the 
executive. On the principal objectives of departmental committees, the Modernisation 
Committee thus recommends that each select committee should consider major policy 
initiatives, propose policy changes where the Committee considers them to be required 
and conduct pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills (House of Commons, 2002b, para. 34). 
These changes would require significant increases in resources available to select 
committees, an issue several of the report's other recommendations address. " With the 
aim of creating a stronger parliamentary focus on scrutiny, the report thus also 
recommends that 'all investigative select committees should be named "scrutiny 
committees"' (para. 37), and that a parliamentary career devoted to scrutiny be made 
more attractive by providing chairs of 'principal investigative committees' with an 
additional salary (para. 41). In the conclusion it was argued that 
select committees have served Parliament and the public well. They have 
enabled Members of Parliament to hold the Executive to account through 
more rigorous scrutiny than is possible on the floor of the House and they 
have brought before the public matters which otherwise might have 
remained concealed (House of Commons, 2002b, para. 59). 
Taken together, the recommendations, if enacted, could alter the entire focus of the 
House of Commons, significantly reducing some of the criticisms voiced about its 
current abilities (or lack thereof) to scrutinise the executive. The recommendations can 
be seen as a step towards more scrutiny being carried out ex ante, although they still 
leave select committees in a largely reactive role, with the main emphasis being on 
inducing government departments to produce bills in draft. As long as this is not a 
requirement and common practice, select committees will likely still find it difficult to 
achieve any significant influence over the development of public policy. Furthermore, 
MPs only have a certain amount of time available to them, and may thus find it too 
' For a full list of reports see the committees website: 
h": //www. parliamenLuk/parhamentary-pommittees/sek--ct committee_on modenvsation of the hou 
se of commons/seiect committee on_modernisation of the house of commons reports and_publicati 
ons. cfm 
" The allocation of parliamentary resources is not simply a matter of a committee's ability to purchase 
expert knowledge or undertake visits to other countries or locations. MPs also strive to become reelected, 
and therefore necessarily devote attention to their constituency and constituents. A senior member of the 
House of Commons thus laments that 'MPs spend more time in their constituencies trying to get elected 
than here, trying to ensure that the legislation they have been elected to try and deal with is properly 
examined'. This MP further argued that recent increases in parliamentary funding were mainly allocated 
to constituency work, therefore not helping counteract this development (interview UK-9). 
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demanding to attend more meetings in select committees. Any proposal to spend more 
time in committee is likely to be resisted, especially as debating time has also been 
increased, with Westminster Hall opened for debates not requiring voting. " 
Although the Modernisation report focuses mainly on improving scrutiny through 
select committees, its final recommendation is that 'all reports of select committees 
should be eligible for debate in Westminster Hall after the closure of the two month 
period within which Government is expected to publish its response, whether or not 
such a response has been tabled' (para. 57). This is a clear recognition that debates 
remain an important element of how the House of Commons functions. However, the 
only way in which debates in Westminster Hall can contribute to scrutiny is through 
bringing issues to public attention, thus indirectly putting political pressure on the 
government. While these debates may contribute to the continuation of traditional 
parliamentary debates, they have not developed parliamentary influence or power 
over the executive. 
The limited influence of select committees is further underlined by their composition. 
With the government founded on a majority in the House, it will also hold a majority 
of seats on the parliamentary committees, as seats are allocated on a proportional basis. 
The degree to which committees are likely to be critical of the government's policy is 
thus drawn into question, as is, consequently, the effectiveness of parliamentary 
scrutiny. Considering that the strong whipping system within British parliamentary 
parties tends to generate high levels of unity, the implications for effective scrutiny are 
obvious. British parliamentary political parties are generally characterised by a high 
level of cohesion that is crucial to a party's ability to hold on to power when in 
government, and of utmost importance to advancement within the party. Such unity, 
however, has been difficult to maintain on European issues, with the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in the House of Commons an obvious illustrative example. " 
Christopher Lord (Lord, 1992, p. 435), writing specifically on British membership of the 
EU, mentions the 'constant search' for 'obfuscating formulae to conceal divisions', and 
goes on to observe that party divisions are the 'main paranoia of British politics'. 
The voting system in the House of Commons usually requires members to pass 
through the voting lobby in person, making any party division clear for all to see. 
" Westminster Hall is a parallel chamber all MPs can attend. It debates matters referred from the House of 
Commons, and is situated in the Grand Committee Room, Westminster Hall. For more information see the 
Modernisation Committee's fourth report (House of Commons, 2000). Arrangements for Westminster 
Hall, previously sessional, were agreed by the House of Commons on 29 October 2002, taking effect from 1 
January 2003 (Sear, 2002). 
12 The government of John Major only narrowly survived the two votes required to ratify the Treaty of 
Maastricht in November 1992 and July 1993. Despite the latter of these being a vote of confidence, the 
Treaty was so divisive that a number of Conservative MPs voted against their own government on the 
issue, nearly bringing about its downfall. 
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Divisions amongst committee members from the same party would also be very 
obvious, as meetings in select committees are commonly open to the public, with 
reports and evidence taken for these reports available to interested parties. In essence, 
the strong emphasis on party-unity is another factor that limits Parliament's ability to 
scrutinise the government and its policies. 
European affairs may, however, be an exception to the pattern of strong party unity, as 
the EU provokes divisions within both the two main parties despite the constant search 
for 'obfuscating formulae'. Moreover, the ESC stands out by conducting ex ante, as 
opposed to ex post, scrutiny. The word 'scrutiny' has been included in the committee's 
name since 1998, thereby setting it further apart from the remaining select committees. 
Rules regulating the work of the ESC are laid down in Standing Order number 143 
which states that the committee is to examine European Union documents" and 'report 
its opinion on the legal and political importance of each such document and, where it 
considers it appropriate, to report also on the reasons for its opinion and on any 
matters of principle, policy or law which may be affected' (House of Commons, 2003b). 
To this end the Government deposits the required documents with Parliament, 
complementing these with explanatory memoranda on each legislative proposal. 
The committee can further demand that Ministers not give agreement to proposals still 
being examined by the House. The process of scrutiny can thus be described as paper- 
based, as opposed to, for instance, the Danish scrutiny system where oral evidence is 
taken from ministers immediately prior to Council meetings. The British system is 
thought by many of its participants to be superior to systems based on oral evidence, 
as the ESC is considered able to enter the debates at an earlier stage. " However, having 
the scrutiny process based on the delivery of official documents also has its drawbacks. 
This is especially so when a final decision at the European level draws close, and one 
text may be rapidly replaced by another, making it difficult for the ESC to stay current 
with the exact negotiation situation. Although the committee can invoke the scrutiny 
"Standing order number 143 goes on to define'European Union Documents' as: 
(i) any proposal under the Community Treaties for legislation by the Council or the Council acting 
jointly with the European Parliament; 
(ii) any document which is published for submission to the European Council, the Council or the 
European Central Bank; 
(iii) any proposal for a common strategy, a joint action or a common position under Title V of the 
Treaty on European Union which is prepared for submission to the council or the European 
council, 
(iv) any proposal for a common position, framework decision, decision or a convention under Title Vf 
of the Treaty on European Union which is prepared for submission to the Council; 
(v) any document (not falling within (ii), (iii) or (iv) above which is published by one Union 
institution for or with a view to submission to another Union institution and which does not 
relate exclusively to consideration of any proposal for legislation; 
(vi) any other document relating to European Union matters deposited in the House by a Minister of 
the Crown. 
14 As expressed in, for instance, interview UK-8. 
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reserve power, ' it may still find it very difficult to monitor the exact wording of 
agreements, even where these have previously found to be of legal or political 
importance. Moreover, the scrutiny reserve power offers no provision for holding 
Ministers to the recommendations of the Committee. While ministers may be called 
upon to give evidence and explain their actions, the merit of documents remains 
beyond the committee with MPs unable to enforce opinions and recommendations 
diverging from those of the government. 
To fulfill its role of scrutiny, the ESC has formulated three requirements that must be 
fulfilled before a document can be cleared: (i) the committee must be satisfied that it 
has enough information to process the document, (ii) it must decide whether it is 
politically or legally important, and (iii) it must decide whether it should be debated. 
These requirements pointedly avoid the questioning of a particular policy or a 
document's merit, which according to Jimmy Hood (chair of the European Legislation 
committee 1992 - 1998, and Chair of the ESC 1998 -), is a strength of the committee. 
Hood argues that: 
the power of our committee lies in that we do not make such a merit 
decision, we don I say it is a good or a bad directive, we make a judgement 
about whether it is legally and politically important, and therefore doesn't 
need further scrutiny by parliamentarians, and when we come to that 
position, we then refer it to people who will look at the merits for and 
against. " 
Put slightly differently, the committee is not in a position to withhold clearance of a 
document on the basis that it does not support its contents. " The biggest criticism of 
the ESC may thus be that it has little, if any, real impact on European legislation. While 
it can be argued that the committee brings important issues to the attention of the 
House and lets the House debate these issues prior to decisions being taken, both the 
quality and quantity of such debates must be questioned. This is especially so 
considering how documents are dealt with by the ESC. The scrutiny committee 
receives approximately 1100 documents in a year of which approximately 600 are 
" In a resolution adopted by the House of Commons on 17 November 1998 the scrutiny reserve power 
states that, except in special circumstances, 
No Minister of the Crown should give agreement in the Council or in the European Council 
to any proposal for European Community legislation or for a common strategy, joint action 
or common position under Title V or a common position, framework decision, decision or 
convention under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union 
(a) which is still subject of scrutiny (that is, on which the European Scrutiny committee has 
not completed its scrutiny or 
(b) which is awaiting consideration by the House (that is, which has been recommended by 
the European Scrutiny Committee for consideration pursuant to Standing Order No. 119 
(European Standing Committees) but in respect of which the House has not come to a 
Resolution (House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 2002b, reproduced on p. 49). 
is Interview UK-S. 
" Interview UK-10. 
is Interview UK-8. 
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considered of legal or political importance. In recent sessions this number of important 
documents has given rise to 35 recommendation for debate with the vast majority, 
around 30, being referred to debate in a standing committee, leaving only five for 
debate in the House. " Although all MPs can participate in all standing committee 
debates, the opportunity to participate in this form of scrutiny within the House of 
Commons is often not utilised, with many debates poorly attended. " Of the very 
limited number of documents recommended for debate on the floor of the House, 
many will be relegated to late evening debates and thus, frequently, receive a limited 
amount of attention by MPs and the media alike. 
Technically, then, the procedures adhered to by the ESC fulfill the requirements for 
scrutiny, at least under the present system of scrutiny within the House of Commons. 
The documents received by the committee are examined, investigated and judged 
according to the criterion of whether enough information has been received, whether 
the document is of political or legal importance, and whether it should be reported for 
debate. Even if a debate is held, and a minister has to appear before a standing 
committee to explain specific actions by the government, the committee can only 
declare itself unhappy with the government's actions or decisions. Furthermore, 
because the ESC is not involved in overseeing the implementation of European 
legislation, scrutiny of this aspect of European legislation falls to other select 
committees within the House of Commons-should they choose to investigate a topic 
relating to the EU. ' 
3. European affairs in other select committees 
Most select committees within the House of Commons do not write reports specifically 
on European matters. The only committee that routinely conducts inquiries into topics 
of a European character is the Foreign Affairs Committee whose remit extends to cover 
the European Union. The committee considers its 'role of supplying the House with the 
information it needs to act on European Union matters to be one of our most important 
tasks' (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2003, para. 6). This 
informational task does indeed appear to be the most important element in the 
committee's work on the EU, as reports on European matters consist mainly of 
evidence taken by the committee, with very few accompanying comments. 
' Interview UK-8. 
29 Views supporting this argument were expressed in interviews UK-6 and 8 as well as in the ESC's own 
report (2002b). However, while it may be difficult to attract ]VIPs to serve on committees, this has become 
less of a problem for the ESC. Committee members are also increasingly engaged in the work undertaken 
by the committee, reading their papers and asking questions of advisors (interview UK-6). 
n Despite not looking at the merit of proposed legislation, the committee is increasingly looking at 
potential implications (indicated by, for instance, interviewee UK-6). This is one way to further the 
influence of the ESC while staying within its formal remit, although one that is still under development. 
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Reports from other select committees will often include a European angle if relevant to 
the inquiry. One example from the more recent reports published by select committees 
is the Eighth Report of Session 2002-03 from the International Development 
Committee, which comments on the EU development fund (House of Commons 
International Development Committee, 2003, pp. 13-15). However, the treatment of the 
development fund constitutes only a small part of the overall report, with 
approximately one page from a total of 46 devoted to this topic. The report is thus a 
good example of how select committees will consider the European angle where 
relevant, but not often use a piece of legislation originating from the European level as 
its starting point for an investigation. The only committee to have done this is the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, which has published several reports 
based on European directives or policies. During the 2002-03 session, the committee's 
first, third and fourth reports thus dealt with the Common Fisheries Policy, the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the Water Framework Directive respectively, " while 
most other reports incorporated a European angle where relevant. Unusually, 
however, David Curry, chair of this committee from 2001 - 2003, has had direct 
experience of 'Europe' and its institutions as a Brussels-based journalist and member of 
the European Parliament prior to becoming a member of the House of Commons. 
Curry, therefore, has been well placed to recognise the importance of European matters 
to the committee he chaired, while also being able to draw on resources at the 
European level in the investigative tasks of the committee. 
Curry does not, however, wish to take instructions from the ESC regarding what topics 
his committee ought to investigate. He claims never to have received a request from 
the ESC to investigate a specific topic, and sees limited opportunities for collaboration 
with the ESC. When asked about further engagement with European affairs, he stated 
that 
I don't think we would become more involved because the European 
Scrutiny committee would delegate to us, we would do it because we 
wanted to deal with those issues, and we would do it entirely from our 
own initiative. We already meet twice a week, and we can't take any more 
work, people wouldn't turn up, there isn't enough room in the week to do 
that. We must cancel other things to take things over from the European 
Scrutiny Committee, and we will not do it. We cant meet three times a 
week, we just couldn't do it, it's a question of time. There might be little 
odds and ends like some science programme, which doesn't feature very 
often, so they can send things of to the Science [and Technology] 
Committee, but the CAP, or fisheries? It's an enormous chunk of European 
business there! We want to pick and choose what we think is important, 
22 
For texts of these reports see the committees website: 
http: / /www. parliamenLuk/parliamentary_pDmmittees/environment_foodand rural affairs. cfm 
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and I suspect we would always make sure we included the European 
perspective. ' 
Despite this unwillingness to take instructions from the ESC, Curry and other MPs still 
insist that adequate scrutiny cannot be undertaken by a single committee within each 
chamber in a national parliament. " The diversity of legislation emanating from the 
European level means that generalists are never going to be able to deal with 
everything in a qualified manner. Indeed, Curry argues that one committee will never 
be able to cope with the 'gargantuan' amounts of European legislation on its own. 
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, and permitting specialists to partake in 
the scrutiny of European affairs, the involvement of committees like the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee would become an important element in the overall 
scrutiny process. However, without further cooperation between the European 
Scrutiny Committee and other select committees the danger exists that topics may be 
overlooked (thereby missing an opportunity to exercise parliamentary influence) or 
even investigated in both the ESC and another select committee (which would be a 
waste of resources). Whether any further cooperation can be established depends on 
how select committees within the House of Commons develop in general, but also on 
the personalities on each committee. It is thus conceivable that if committee chairs were 
in agreement, cooperation could develop without the need for any formal alteration of 
rules. 
Curry is not alone in raising issues about the current scrutiny system. Michael Ancram 
(shadow Foreign Secretary 2001 - 2005) also insists that the scrutiny process within the 
House is a process 'which cannot cope with even five per cent of the flow of 
information'. Although advocating a general reform of the committee structure within 
the House of Commons, and wishing to make it better able to deal with the large 
volume of legislation originating at the European level, Ancram still claims that 'within 
the small area [the ESCI manages to deal with, it does the job parliament is supposed to 
do. My criticism is not of it, it is that it is too small and there is too much work for it to 
do to be effective across the board'. ' However, members of the ESC themselves 
disagree on how the committee should be developed. MP and member of the ESC 
Michael Connarty, in contrast to his chairman, would like to see a stronger emphasis 
on the substance of the documents dealt with by the committee, a 'qualitative 
assessment that is politically important'. " In contrast, Jimmy Hood, chair of the ESC, 
23 Interview UK-7. 
24 Interview UK-7. 
25 Interview UK-1. 
26 Interview UK-6. 
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argues that 'to be effective, we have to be selective', and that the British system of 
scrutiny is the best within the EU. " 
Two significant problems for the development of scrutiny thus exist within the House 
of Commons. Firstly, the autonomy of select committees inhibits cooperation on 
scrutiny. This prevents MPs with a more specialist knowledge in a particular area from 
assisting those knowledgeable on European affairs in the task of scrutinising European 
legislation, but also precludes a sharing of the workload imposed by the significant 
number of documents originating from the EU. To a large extent, this process is 
hampered by the limited knowledge of the impact European legislation has at the 
national level, and exemplified by the lack of willingness shown by chairs of select 
committees to discuss their committees' role in the scrutiny process. ' Moreover, it is 
only very recently that the ESC has begun to fully understand its potential importance, 
usefulness and powers. Off-the-record comments by several MPs suggest that the 
committee is keen to maintain its powers for itself, thereby further hampering 
cooperation with other select committees. 
Secondly, if the House of Commons wishes to develop the scrutiny process further, to 
a point where the House can be said to have a tangible influence on the Government's 
activities at the European level, significant changes in the interpretation of 'scrutiny' 
within the House, as well as a change in how select committees operate and cooperate, 
would be required. Not only would departmental select committees have to undertake 
European inquiries on a regular basis, they would have to alter operational procedures 
substantially in order to follow legislation through the department within their remit 
better. Such changes would radically alter the House of Commons and the working life 
of MPs (making them more specialised) while also altering the balance between 
constituency and scrutiny work. This would very likely meet with substantial 
resistance, as it would fundamentally alter the way an MP's role is perceived. 
Moreover, if the House of Commons were to embrace a more qualitative scrutiny of 
European legislation, it could also be argued that they would encroach on an area 
hitherto exclusive to the House of Lords. 
Z' Interview UK-10. 
. Several MPs approached for interviews declined for a variety of reasons. Several claimed to simply be 
too busy, while others did not feel they could contribute anything to an EU-related topic, referring instead 
to the scrutiny committee. One MP (the current speaker) did not wish to give an interview for the reason 
that the author is not a constituent of his. The highest number of refusals was received from MPs in the 
House of Commons, with Lords being more forthcoming with their time-while also exhibiting a better 
understanding that the fact their committee did not participate actively in the scrutiny of European affairs 
was of interest. 
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4. The European Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords 
Whereas the ESC in the House of Commons scrutinises every document submitted to 
it, the European Union Committee in the House of Lords is more selective. The ability 
to be more selective is based on the committee's terms of reference, which stipulate that 
it is to 'consider European Union documents and other matters relating to the EU'. 
How documents are considered is thus up to the committee itself, with no requirement 
to assess documents according to their political or legal importance. The freedom this 
has allowed the committee has meant that submitted documents are initially sifted by 
the chair of the committee who, in cooperation with the clerk of the select committee 
and the clerks of the sub-committees (who carry out the majority of the committee's 
work), " decide what documents will be passed on to the sub-committees for either 
information or further scrutiny. ' 
The sub-committees can elect to treat the information received by taking note of the 
documents, ask for more information, or, if they consider the matter important enough, 
conduct an inquiry on the issue. Although investigations are undertaken and reported 
on by the subcommittees, they are published in the name of the main committee and 
widely distributed. While reports are, officially, intended either purely for the 
information of the House of Lords or recommended for debate, they are also 
forwarded to relevant institutions within both Britain and the EU. Both the European 
Commission and the EP thus receive such reports as a matter of course. " 
The emphasis on detailed-and opinionated-reports, rather than broad coverage of 
all documents, is the main difference between the work of the European committees in 
the Lords and Commons. A second difference concerns the respective committees' 
memberships. According to Lord Brabazon (chair of the European Committee in the 
House of Lords 2001-2002) the committee involves approximately 70 members in its 
work, approximately ten percent of Lords members (or roughly 20 per cent of the 
active members depending on how 'active' is defined) This contrasts with the House 
of Commons where the ESC only draws on a small fraction of the Ml's in the House. 
The structure of membership, which permits members of the Lords to join one of the 
EU sub-committees without being a member of the EU select committee itself, means 
2' The number of sub-committees has varied over time. Currently seven exist, covering (A) Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Trade and International Relations; (B) the Internal Market; (C) Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Development Policy; (D) Environment and Agriculture; (E) Law and Institutions; (F) Home Affairs 
and (G) Social Policy and Consumer Affairs. 
$ Interview UK-4. 
31 Members of the European Union Committee often proudly relate favourable comments made by, for 
instance, members of the European Commission as an indication of both the quality of the work carried 
out by the committee and the wide readership its reports have (e. g. interview UK-4). 
32 Interview UK-4. 
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that a considerable proportion of the House's total resources' are taken up by 
European matters. " As the committee has commanded its share of resources for a 
significant number of years, it can only be concluded that most Lords are in favour of 
the allocation-despite the difficulties associated with measuring influence as 
stemming from the reports. 
It is thus clear that, although the European committees in the two Houses operate in 
different ways, many of the problems facing the ESC in the Commons also challenge 
the Lords. The 'ghettoisation' of European issues takes place in both chambers and, as 
in the Commons, there is very little contact between the European and other 
committees in the Lords. Committees in the Lords feel fully justified in dealing with 
European matters if the topic falls within their remit, in much the same way as their 
counterparts in the Commons, although here too the approach is to include a European 
angle, rather than take specific European legislation as the starting point for a report. 
While acknowledging the importance of the interrelationship with the European 
committee, Lord Peston, chair of the Economic Affairs Committee, asserted that 'if we 
joined the EMtJ my successor would clearly look at the ECB on a regular basis, and I 
would regard that as being within my committee, rather than with the European 
committee'. ' Equally, Lord Oxburgh, chair of the Science and Technology Select 
Committee, has no hesitation in addressing EU matters if relevant. He also believes 
that'we will necessarily have more and more to do with people in Brussels and people 
in European countries', although currently 'such contacts are not shaping up in any 
institutionalised way'. ' Both chambers can therefore be said to treat European affairs in 
isolation from domestic legislation, arguably depriving themselves of both specialised 
policy and more generalised EU-knowledge that might contribute to better scrutiny of 
the government. 
However, such scrutiny is of little use if the government does not feel obliged to follow 
any recommendation the EU committee may make. As in the Commons, the issue of 
impact on government policy is perhaps of most concern. The Lords too is a debating 
chamber, with less emphasis on committee work than in most other legislatures. In its 
own review of how European legislation is scrutinised in the Lords (2002), evidence 
suggesting both 'unquestionable' and 'ephemeral' influence is cited. Acknowledging 
" Resources are here taken to mean not only human resources, as in active members of the House 
participating in the committees' work, but also resources allocated to travel, expert assistance etc- Reports 
from the EU committee constitute a significant proportion of the total number of reports published by the 
House of Lords. In session 2001-02 the EU committee thus published 38 of the 80 reports published by the 
House of Lords, while the figure for session 2002-03 was 20 from a total of 42 (House of Lords, 2004). 
34 Leicester (1997, p. 3) suggests that'some two thirds of the resources available for committee work in the 
House of Lords are engaged in the European select committee and its sub-committees!. 
is Interview UK-14. 
36 Interview UK-13. 
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that influence is difficult to measure, the review then states that '[clontributing to a 
climate of opinion forming is a key way in which we can have an impact, by analysing 
issues and presenting a range of evidence combined with our own conclusions on it' 
(House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 2002, paras 136-140). More 
candidly, a parliamentary member of staff working for the Scrutiny committee opined 
that 'even if the government changed from A to B-and we've recommended changing 
from A to B-we can't prove it is because of the committee, it could be coincidence, it 
could be because it's Friday'. " For the Lords committee, developing its powers of 
scrutiny any further may, however, be problematic due to its unique constitutional 
position. Its current lack of democratic legitimacy` and the resultant political 
constraints makes it unlikely that, in its present form, it will be anything more than an 
advisory body. " 
Condusion 
Understanding the workings of the British Parliament is obviously important when 
attempting to understand how it scrutinises European affairs-but committees, 
especially in the House of Commons, have also looked to the ESC for inspiration, 
meaning that influence has flowed both ways. With a few important deviations, the 
British parliament handles European affairs according to long-standing parliamentary 
traditions. As in other member states, parliament has treated European affairs much 
like foreign affairs, delegating them to a single committee, rather than integrating them 
into the every-day work of all select committees. The ESC conforms to British 
parliamentary traditions in the sense that it cannot act on behalf of the House. The 
notion of the sovereign parliament is strictly upheld, hence the importance of referring 
issues to the House for debate. However, given the general lack of interest in these 
very infrequent debates, the impact of the committee must be questioned. 
In contrast to many other parliaments, where committees dealing with European 
affairs have tended to adhere to already established practices, the ESC has in many 
ways been a forerunner of committee development in the House of Commons. Not 
only was it established prior to the permanent establishment of select committees 
within the House of Commons, it is also the first-and so far the only-committee to 
include the word 'scrutiny' in its name. Moreover, it is the only committee to undertake 
" Interview UK-4. 
38 The Labour Party has initiated significant reforms of the House of Lords, beginning with the banishment 
of 600 hereditary peers. Proposed reforms have been controversial-in both the House of Lords and 
House of Commons. The initial document detailing suggestions is the Wakeham Report (2000), but see 
also the government's White Paper, reports from the Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform as well 
as consultation papers from the Department on Constitutional Reform, all available from the Department's 
website on: http: / /www. dca. gov. uk/constitution/holref/holrefindex. htm 
" Interviews UK-12 and 14. 
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ex ante, as opposed to ex post, scrutiny of government activities. Despite this pioneering 
role, the impact of the ESC remains limited, as its remit does not permit it to pronounce 
on the merit of documents submitted to it. Instead it is only able to decide whether 
documents have legal or political importance. Despite being involved in the legislative 
process prior to a final decision being taken, influence over European legislation, as 
well as over British participants in European-level decision-making processes, is 
minimal. This minimal impact is also due to the sheer number of documents submitted 
to the committee. One potential weapon in the ESC's armoury is the scrutiny reserve 
power. However, despite being able to impose the scrutiny reserve power, the 
committee still cannot hold the Government to account for executive actions at the 
European level. The ESC can ask ministers to appear before it and question them on 
their conduct, but ultimately has no way to sanction either disregard of the scrutiny 
reserve power or decisions the committee does not agree with. 
An important question is thus whether European matters would be better scrutinised 
as part of other select committees' workloads. During interviews with British 
politicians this idea was rejected. MPs from non-EU committees argued that their 
existing workload was already too heavy, and that they always had the option of 
looking at issues from a European angle when conducting investigations. Members of 
the ESC thought EU issues were best considered by MPs who had built up a 
considerable knowledge of EU affairs and procedures, seeing no need for the 
involvement of non-EU specialists. The issue of committees cooperating on European 
matters is especially pertinent considering the ESC's severe workload. The problematic 
situation regarding cooperation is well illustrated by the fact that one of the few 
reports on a European issue to capture the public's imagination (on the 'fridge 
mountains')" was not published by the ESC but by the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee (House of Commons Environment, 2002). 
However, under current rules the ex ante involvement would disappear if European 
legislation was considered solely in departmental select committees. From the 
perspective of improved scrutiny, the ideal position may be some form of cooperation 
between the ESC and departmental select committees. Such a move would depart 
significantly from traditional procedures that maintain strict independence of select 
committees. Furthermore, any cooperation between the ESC and other select 
committees would take time to develop, as trust between committees, fundamental to 
such relationships, currently appears to be absent. 
40 On January 12002, new rules for the disposal of CFC-containing foam from refrigerators came into force 
although, in Britain, equipment to deal with the new requirements was insufficient. This caused significant 
'mountains' of fridges to build up throughout Britain, at an estimated cost to taxpayers of £40 million. For 
further details see the report from the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee (House of Commons Environment, 2002). 
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Nonetheless, the greatest hindrance to influence on European legislation may, 
however, lie in the relatively late involvement of the two Houses through the ESC and 
the European Union Committee. It is often the case that by the time the Commission 
puts forward a legislative proposal, very little remains for negotiation (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999, see especially Chapter two; 2000). To maximise influence, early 
involvement is considered desirable by the chairs of both committees, but difficult to 
obtain under current rules and practices. Although the Government may fulfill treaty 
requirements in terms of providing parliament with documents, it means that the ESC 
relies heavily on explanatory notes from the Government, with few independent 
sources of information and analysis. This too hinders efficient scrutiny. If either 
chamber, but especially the House of Commons, were to influence European 
legislation in a more substantial manner, several changes would be required. Not only 
would the ESC have to follow proposed legislation over a much longer time-scale, 
beginning with the consultation processes undertaken by the Commission. It would 
also require the involvement of other select committees from the House as well as the 
development of procedures binding the Government to certain decisions. All these 
suggestions, however, run contrary to British parliamentary traditions and political 
culture. 
The ESC is an unusual committee within the House of Commons due to its ex ante 
involvement in the European legislative process. Extending this prerogative to the 
remaining select committees would be a significant departure from existing practices. 
Moreover, under its current remit, the ESC fulfils its role of scrutiny fairly adequately. 
By bringing issues 'to the attention of the House' its role is completed, and it then 
remains for the House to decide how to proceed. 
With the often very technical issues covered by the ESC, it is not difficult to see why 
European legislation has not captured the attention of the public. The very adversarial 
style of debates in the House of Commons does not lend itself to technical debates, a 
contributing factor in keeping European matters within a single select committee. The 
'ghettoisation' of European issues has contributed significantly to the limited 
knowledge amongst other MPs and the public in this area. A limited understanding of 
how membership of the Community has impacted on domestic legislation, and 
therefore on practices and procedures within Westminster itself, can also be attributed 
to the lack of cooperation between select committees as well as to the small number of 
debates on European issues within the House. However, even very technical issues can 
become politicised, as the issue of the fridge mountains proves. Such politicisation has 
not been in the interest of political party leaderships, and it would therefore be 
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interesting to investigate the extent to which European issues have been kept technical, 
thereby avoiding politicisation of unwelcome issues. 
It is evident that if MPs (and Parliament as an institution) are to gain further influence 
over the government on European issues, a substantial departure from existing 
traditions and practices is required. The greatest obstacle is likely to be the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty, a core component of the British constitution. At present, no 
single individual or committee can represent the British parliament: for a matter to be 
vested with parliamentary legitimacy, it has to be put before both Houses. Whether 
this concept of parliamentary sovereignty remains a realistic prospect merits further 
consideration. In this context William Wallace's (1986, p. 369) continuum of 
independence, dependence and interdependence may be useful. Maintaining strong 
parliamentary sovereignty (independence) would appear impractical if the British 
Parliament wishes to engage further with the substance of European legislation in a 
manner that has the potential to influence government policy and behaviour on 
European issues. 
Despite these reservations, it is obvious that membership of the EU has influenced 
activities in the British Parliament. Both scrutiny committees are well established and 
considered important components of the tool-set allowing parliamentarians to carry 
out their duties. Moreover, membership has forced a debate, even if within a limited 
circle, of what 'scrutiny' constitutes and whether the same rules apply for scrutinising 
European and domestic legislation. Although EU membership is beginning to impact 
on parliamentary work beyond EU committees in all of the case study parliaments, in 
Britain this influence goes beyond the topics dealt with in committees, potentially 
impacting on the basic workings of committees too. 
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Chapter 7: Political culture and scrutiny 
European integration leaves national identity and political culture by and 
large untouched, while Europeanisation involves mutation of national 
identity and political culture. ' 
(de Beus and Mak, 2003, p. 2) 
Scrutiny procedures have little meaning when examined in isolation, making it 
important to place them in context. Variance in social and cultural factors which help 
determine political behaviour and attitudes, or political culture, in turn determine the 
framework within which political institutions-including national 
parliaments-operate. National political cultures influence how scrutiny is carried out 
within national parliaments. Political cultures obviously differ from country to 
country, and can therefore be a useful concept to employ when attempting to explain 
the different approaches to parliamentary involvement in European matters. If scrutiny 
procedures are seen as a compromise between national political cultures and the 
pressures of Europeanisation they acquire more meaning. 
This chapter will therefore look at, firstly, the concept of political culture, establishing 
its explanatory value as well as its shortcomings-specifically how the concept is not 
particularly helpful when it comes to explaining change. The three case studies will 
then be examined in this context, assessing how scrutiny procedures have been 
adapted to accommodate change at the European level while still respecting the 
specifics of national political cultures. 
The 'political' in political culture is relatively easy to define, whereas the 'culture' 
aspect is more slippery and perhaps best expressed as 'a social process through which 
people reproduce together the conditions of intelligibility that enable them to make 
sense of their worlds' (Wedeen, 2002, p. 717). In the political context, that which 
enables people to make sense of their worlds often involves the specific political 
institutions and practices, including national parliaments, which have developed 
within their nation states. Scrutiny of European politics is thus reflective of norms 
embedded in specific political cultures-although because of its historic isolation 
within domestic political structures the culture surrounding European affairs might be 
more accurately described as a subculture. 
As European cooperation has developed, so too has its impact on the national level. 
Changes have thus been undertaken in national parliaments to improve scrutiny of 
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European legislation in recognition of the fact that the distinction between European 
and domestic legislation is becoming difficult to maintain. National political cultures 
thus do not prevent change (in general or specifically in parliamentary scrutiny 
procedures). Instead, by providing an overarching framework within which changes 
can take place, they direct these change in certain, country-specific directions, making 
it possible for national parliamentarians to 'make sense' of EU membership. 
In the three case studies, the process of change has been undertaken in very different 
ways. While all three parliaments have introduced changes to their scrutiny 
procedures, the speed and manner in which these changes were undertaken have 
varied significantly. Parliamentary scrutiny in Denmark, through the increased 
involvement of specialised committees, has evolved organically from the existing 
scrutiny system. While the essence of the original scrutiny system remains in place, it 
has developed into a closer system of cooperation with specialised committees, 
bringing the scrutiny of European legislation significantly closer to procedures 
employed for national legislation. In Britain, parliament has also been involved in 
European affairs since the UK joined the Community, and Europeanisation has 
changed the character of scrutiny here too. The ESC is thus the only committee in the 
House of Commons to include the word 'scrutiny' in its name, and ministers have 
found that they may be called to account for their actions at the European level. These 
features of the ESC set it apart from other select committees within the House of 
Commons, with European legislation in some ways treated very differently to 
legislation originating at the domestic level. Both the ESC and the European 
Committee in the House of Lords operate differently to other committees due to their 
ability to carry out ex ante scrutiny-but are also similar to other committees insofar as 
they have maintained their strong autonomy and do not cooperate on scrutiny with 
other committees. In contrast, the Italian Parliament is developing (and 
institutionalising) cooperation between European and other select committees, 
although it may also be some way off from having an answerable executive and an 
administration that delivers the documents required of it. 
MPs in the three countries have essentially responded in very different ways to both 
the initial challenge of being involved in European affairs and the subsequent, and 
perhaps even greater challenge, of Europeanisation. In the Danish Folketing the 
challenge of Europeanisation has perhaps caused the fewest problems, as adaptations 
to scrutiny procedures have involved more openness and involvement of 
parliamentarians, already prominent features of the Danish political culture. In both 
Italy and the UK, however, the process has been more challenging, with more 
fundamental underpinnings of national political cultures being tested. 
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1. The concept of political culture 
Political culture as a 'mediating' (not 'determining') variable in comparative politics 
began to develop with Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba's book on civic culture 
(1989 (1963)). In this work Almond and Verba describe political culture as 'political 
orientations-attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes 
toward the role of the self in the system' (1989 (1963), p. 12). When discussing the 
political culture of a society, Almond and Verba refer specifically to 'the political 
system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population' 
(1989 (1963), p. 13). Dennis Kavanagh also employs these concepts, describing political 
culture as 'a short-hand expression to denote the emotional and attitudinal 
environment within which the political system operates', later narrowing it down to 
'orientations towards political objects' (1972, pp. 10-11, emphasis in original). As further 
explanation, utilising the three concepts from Almond and Verba, Kavanagh 
(Kavanagh, 1972, p. 11) writes that 
Orientations are predispositions to political action and are determined by 
such factors as traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, emotions 
and symbols. We can break down these orientations into their component 
parts as follows: cognitions (knowledge and awareness of the political 
system); affect (emotional disposition to the system); and evaluation 
(judgement about the system). Political objects include such parts of the 
political system as the executive, legislature and judiciary, the political 
parties and pressure-groups, the individual's view of himself as a political 
actor, and his views of other citizens. 
David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon put it slightly differently, arguing that 
political culture is 'a short-hand expression for a "mind set" which has the effect of 
limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviours, problems, and 
solutions which are logically possible' (1979, p. 128). Because individuals make 
presumptions they are limited in the choices they will entertain and the political 
culture will therefore 'predispose individuals in certain directions' (1979, p. 133). 
However, these definitions expose the conceptual difficulty of political culture in 
explaining or predicting change. Because political culture predisposes or steers 
decisions in a certain direction, outcomes can be expected to always remain fairly 
similar. Political culture therefore does not explain how the desirability of particular 
outcomes may alter-with new ones replacing previous ones. As has been mentioned 
above, most national parliaments within the EU have historically treated European 
matters as foreign affairs, permitting a small group of MPs to become specialists in this 
area, in effect creating a European 'sub-culture' within national parliaments. 
Increasingly, however, European affairs are seen as a matter for all MPs to incorporate 
into their daily activities. 
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The process of integrating European affairs into the general activities of national 
parliaments also highlights the problem associated with causality when using political 
culture as an explanatory variable. As political culture is concerned with attitudes and 
orientations, it becomes a tool that contributes to our understanding of a particular 
decision at a particular time. It can help explain specific political episodes, but does not 
contribute significantly to an understanding of evolutionary developments that take 
place over time. Elkins and Simeon (1979, p. 141) describe this characteristic of political 
culture by including 'stability' in their list of system characteristics that may be better 
understood by employing the concept of political culture. The cause of changes in 
national political institutions or procedures resulting from membership of the EU can 
thus not be explained with reference to national political cultures. However, the 
specific nature of changes may be (partially at least) explained by the concept of 
political culture as attitudes and orientations towards political systems establish 
parameters within which these can develop. As a 'mediator' (see Kavanagh, 1983, p. 
59) between Europeanisation and specific demands placed on scrutiny procedures, 
political culture contributes to our understanding of the specific institutional constructs 
that have developed for the purposes of scrutiny within the EU member states. 
A further problem with political culture is that it has been used to explain 'anything 
and everything'. Indeed, Stephen Welch (1993, p. 159) writes that the concept 'is more 
widely used than ever, and has perhaps reached the stage of conceptual maturity, 
where debates over definition are no longer prominent, and it is routinely invoked as if 
there were no question as to its meaning or usefulness'. Kavanagh (1972, p. 55) was 
perhaps one of the first to voice his concern, stating that the political culture approach 
has been used to cover so many disparate phenomena that it is easily used as a 
residual factor'. ' 
One of the most recent criticisms of the historical use of political culture comes in an 
article by Lisa Wedeen (2002). Describing how earlier criticisms accused the approach 
of having 'tendencies toward cultural essentialism' and being 'either fundamentally 
tautological or empirically invalid', she also blames these theorists of 'having 
responded to genuine explanatory needs by reviving an outmoded and unhelpful 
understanding of the concept' (2002, p. 714). Partial explanations have been achieved 
through the acknowledgement and use of ethnographic research and the use of 
symbols although, mainly because of the work of Clifford Geertz, culture 'became not 
only what a group has-beliefs, values, or a symbolic system-but what a group is'. 
' Chapter six of Kavanagh's book 'Political Culture is thus entitled 'Problems and Shortcomings, and 
covers issues such as cause and effect, subcultures, management of micro-, meso-, and macro-levels 
(including observational standpoint) and links between values and behaviour (Kavanagh, 1972, pp. 55-69). 
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Moreover, '[m]ost political scientists continue to think of culture as connoting fixed 
group traits' (Wedeen, 2002, p. 716). In contrast to this approach, Wedeen would like to 
adopt a system of analysis in which culture is viewed as a set of practices of 'meaning- 
making' or 'meaning-creation', by which is meant 'a social process through which 
people reproduce together the conditions of intelligibility that enable them to make 
sense of their worlds' (Wedeen, 2002, p. 717). 
For national parliamentarians to make sense of their worlds it is increasingly necessary 
that they include the European dimension in their work. Although all EU national 
parliaments have a committee with the specific remit of following European matters, 
such 'ghettoisation of European affairs is becoming recognised as unsatisfactory due 
(partially) to the very technical nature of European legislation (which makes it 
necessary to draw on the expertise found in other select committees). As a 
consequence, national parliaments have been forced to adopt new practices of 
meaning-making and -creation. Scrutiny of European legislation is becoming integral 
to national parliamentarians if they wish to make full sense of their work. However, 
national political cultures are still distinct, as evident in the different ways national 
parliaments have chosen to scrutinise European legislation. For instance, what has 
made Italian MPs believe they influence European legislation when passing the legge 
comunilaria, and what has made them focus more on the pre-decision stage? What has 
caused-and maintains-the strict separation of work carried out by the European 
scrutiny committee in the House of Commons from work by this chamber's other 
committees? And why do Danish Ml's seem to readily accept, embrace even, wider 
parliamentary involvement in European affairs? 
Perhaps the most important question is whether convergence can be detected in how 
national parliaments scrutinise European affairs and whether this can be ascribed to 
the effects of Europeanisation. The opposite question, whether differences are due to 
different political cultures, therefore also needs to be asked. With Europeanisation 
impacting on governance, institutionalisation and discourse (Radaelli, 2004, pp. 10-4), 
critical elements of national political culture are affected. Specific systems of 
governance and political institutions contribute significantly to how a nation (or at 
least its political elite) defines itself, while national discourse helps to explain and make 
sense of activities within these political systems and institutions. However, generally 
held beliefs about national political institutions and systems also help determine the 
extent to which changes in institutions and procedures can take place. For example, the 
sovereignty of the British Parliament is such an important element of British political 
culture that it, presently, seems very unlikely that a single committee will ever be 
permitted to commit the entire House from which it is drawn in a manner similar to 
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that of the Danish EUC. National political cultures can thus be said to limit the extent 
to which Europeanisation impacts on the national level. 
Although the impact has been described as `fuzzy', Europeanisation has altered both 
state policy and machinery (Bulmer and Burch, 1998, pp. 602-3). Consequently, 
national parliamentarians have been challenged by membership of the Community, as 
have their political orientations and attitudes towards the political systems they 
operate within. In order to carry out their jobs adequately, it is no longer sufficient 
merely to concentrate on activities at the national level. MPs from national parliaments 
have therefore, at times reluctantly, re-evaluated their role within a wider European 
context. Having done so differently in different countries, it may be argued that 
national political cultures can affect how Europeanisation affects national institutions 
and procedures. Consequently, convergence in scrutiny procedures caused by 
Europeanisation should not be considered a certainty. 
Wedeen does not see culture as a set of fixed practices. Indeed, she writes that 'a 
dialectical understanding of culture allows us to view meaning-making activities as 
being both stable and changeable, not a single system and internally various and 
conflicted'. Although a requirement of intelligibility is established, this 'does not imply 
that linguistic or semiotic meanings are stable, but it does require at least enough 
stability so that what one actor learned still applies when another speaks' (Wedeen, 
2002, pp. 720 and 722). Brian Girvin has expressed a similar position when stating that 
a political culture is 'a shared pattern of beliefs within which there may be many 
subcultures but a common source of values which inform those beliefs'. Although the 
common values may alter, change 'need not endanger the long-term stability of a 
political system if a mechanism is available for internalizing change without 
endangering the maintenance of core values' (Girvin, 1990, p. 34). The implication of 
both the intelligibility requirement and long-term stability is that parliamentary 
scrutiny systems can be altered if changes are undertaken in a manner consistent with 
the overall national political culture. As will become evident in the case studies below, 
this is indeed what has tended to occur. 
2. The case studies 
Denmark 
It has been said that no (violent) revolution would ever take place in Denmark as the 
Danes would want to go home and 'sleep on it' before deciding what to do. Then, after 
a sound night's sleep, they would discuss the issues in an attempt to find a peaceful 
solution, rather than resort to the extremes of (for example) the French Revolution. 
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Indicative of this approach is Denmark's transition to constitutional democracy in 1849 
when the then King, Frederik VII, voluntarily signed Denmark's first constitution that 
limited his own influence and handed political power to the electorate. This event is 
one example of how political change in Denmark tends to take place by peaceful 
means through deliberation and discussion. Openness, the involvement of as many 
interested parties as possible and broad debates have become essential to the conduct 
of every-day politics as well. Larsen-Jensen describes the Danish political system as a 
very 'democratic democracy' where the distance from the top to the bottom of society 
is not that great? A highly-placed source within the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
also considers it 'natural' that the Folketing mandates Danish ministers (and civil 
servants) negotiating at the European level as 'we are a democracy that stretches quite 
far in the direction of folkestyre and need good control, also over foreign policy-and if 
not with all aspects of foreign policy, then at least European policy'. ` 
Direct participation by Danish citizens takes place at elections and referenda that see 
high levels of participation. Public participation in elections conducted using a 
proportional electoral system ensures that the Folketing closely reflects public opinion, 
although the system also tends to deliver somewhat fragmented parliaments. 
Fragmentation has been especially evident since the election in December 1973s when 
several new parties gained representation in the Folketing and has necessitated frequent 
(minority) coalition governments. ` It can thus be argued that virtue and necessity 
coincide. While it is necessary for Danish governments to cooperate widely in order to 
pass policy, this also fits well with the consultative political culture in Denmark. Work 
within the Folketing also reflects the need for anchoring policy in public opinion. By 
concentrating their work in committees that follow the work of individual ministries, 
Danish parliamentarians ensure that a broad range of opinions are heard and are able 
to influence policy-including foreign policy, traditionally considered the domain of 
the executive. 
2 Interview DK-16. 
The word 'folkestyre' is best translated by 'democracy'-but as in the ancient Greek interpretation of 
'government by the people' or 'people's democracy'. Direct democracy is, obviously, not practical, with 
public participation in politics mainly taking place through organised interests' involvement in the 
legislative process as relevant. 
`Interview DK-17. 
In the December 1973 election Danish voters expressed their frustration with the established political 
parties who never seemed to fulfil the promises made during election campaigns. Five new parties were 
elected to the Folketing, taking away 60 mandates (from a total of 179) from the established five parties, but 
not ousting any of these. 
The government is not required to obtain a vote of confidence in the Folketing; it merely has to ensure 
there is no majority against it. This negative investiture is found in Article 15, para 2 of the Danish 
constitution, which states that 'If the Parliament passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, the 
Prime Minister shall ask [the King] to dismiss the Ministry [of the Prime Minister], unless a general 
election is called' (Folketinget, 2001b). 
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Strong parliamentary involvement is also a necessary component when it comes to 
'making sense' of Denmark's involvement at the European level. The EUC's ability to 
mandate Danish ministers can thus be seen as an expression of the belief that strong 
control with European legislation is necessary and best undertaken by 
parliamentarians-except when fundamental changes at the European level take place 
in which case referenda are called for. Larsen-Jensen argues that the strong 
involvement of the EUC has meant a co-responsibility for European policy, while also 
ensuring that 'fundamental changes to Danish EU policy do not take place! However, 
the historic isolation of EU matters within the EUC has created a European sub-group 
within the Folketing while day-to-day politics contain little reference to EU affairs. This 
aspect of the relationship between the Danish public and their politicians is well 
illustrated by the various referenda held on EU issues in Denmark where support for 
European measures has been significantly higher amongst members of the Danish 
elite. ' A divide has developed between an elite culture, and a culture for the "common 
voter"' (Larsen and Ugelvik, 1997, p. 226). 
The Folketing is attempting to eradicate the internal divide by involving select 
committees more in the scrutiny of European affairs, a situation which has been 
strongly supported in theory, ' although there have also been problems in developing a 
horizontal layer of scrutiny within the Folketing. ' However, Europeanisation has 
impacted on parliamentary procedures to the extent that Danish parliamentarians not 
directly involved in the EUC are beginning to realise that they too need to be involved 
in European legislative activities, and that legislation originating at the European level 
significantly determines the room available for (legislative) manoeuvring at the 
national level. Closer involvement of select committees is thus developing and has 
required the allocation of further resources in the form of support staff dedicated to 
assisting select committees in their work on European affairs. Moreover, support from 
the administration has been crucial-but also possible due to what Pedersen describes 
as an'exceptionally' strong democratic culture within the Danish administration. " 
The overriding notion that (the people's) democracy should involve a strong element 
of scrutiny by parliamentary representatives has been a powerful factor in inducing 
7 Interview DK 16. 
` The first referenda on Community matters, whether to join or not, was held in 1972, with 63.2 per cent of 
those voting doing so in favour of membership. In subsequent referenda, support for the Single European 
Act (SEA), the Maastricht Treaty, the Maastricht Treaty with Edinburgh exemptions, the Amsterdam 
Treaty and membership of the euro has been 56.2,49.3,56.7,55.1 and 46.9 per cent respectively (Laursen, 
2001, p. 107). However, the various treaties and measures have consistently been supported by 
approximately 80 per cent of parliamentarians. 
9 Expressed by, for instance, interviewees DK-3 and 26. 
Reluctance is mainly based on the fact that the significant amount of work required does not result in the 
ability to mandate Danish ministers which remains the prerogative of the EUC in order to ensure overall 
coordination of the Folkefing's EU policy. 
11 Interview DK-23. 
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structural changes within the Folketing in response to Europeanisation. By further 
developing the parliamentary involvement in European affairs, engagement in the 
European integrative process (in a manner conforming with the values endemic to 
Danish political culture) has been achieved. Support for the strong parliamentary 
scrutiny is thus found amongst parliamentarians, in the administration and by those 
who have had to obtain mandates from the EUC. Although varying degrees of 
criticisms were expressed with regard to the Danish scrutiny system, there have been 
no suggestion from civil servants, ex-ministers (including ex-Prime Minister Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen) or speakers of the Folketing that the Folketing's involvement in EU 
affairs should be diminished. Danish political culture, as expressed through political 
institutions and procedures, has helped ensure that stability has been maintained. 
Altered institutional arrangements for scrutiny of the Danish government's activities at 
the European level have not threatened, and may indeed conform more closely with, 
Danish political culture. 
Italy 
Unified only in 1861, Italy has had a much shorter period than both Denmark and the 
UK in which to develop a national political culture. Since unification Mussolini's fascist 
rule, Italy's experience of the Second World War and the subsequent writing of a new 
constitution, have all contributed to a political environment where strong regional 
affiliations, an emphasis on single issues rather than broad political doctrine and a 
widespread lack of trust have developed. One of the few occurrences of Italians joining 
forces in order to achieve one particular outcome took place during Mussolini's reign. 
His attempt to politicise Italians failed, as the majority of Italians remained 
unsympathetic to fascism. However, Richard Griffin (1997, pp. 144) points out that 
'[t]he supreme paradox of Mussolini's attempt to make Italians was that it did finally 
have the effect of launching a powerful movement of national solidarity - one aimed at 
destroying fascism for ever'. 
Subsequent to the overthrow of fascism, a new constitution was drawn up. The new 
constitution explicitly mentioned a democratic foundation for the new republic in 
Article I, vesting sovereignty with the people (Republic of Italy, 2002). According to 
Senator Manzella, the Italian constitution was the first in the world to permit the 
relinquishing of sovereignty. " Article 11 thus renounces war as a way to settle 
`2 Interview 1-9. 
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international conflicts while also permitting the ceding of sovereignty, " and can be 
seen as yet another expression of political experiences gained during Italy's earlier 
history. However, the willingness to cede sovereignty may also have other origins. It 
may well be argued that limited identification with the Italian state and nation, and the 
seemingly stronger connection with the regional level, has meant that no real affinity is 
felt for the Italian nation or state. Umberto Melotti thus writes about Italian political 
culture that 'the first trait to single out is its concept of the nation, which is weak and 
even ambiguous'. Moreover, 'the national sentiment, according to the latest research, is 
far weaker than in any other European countries' (2000, pp. 7 and 8). 
The continued importance of regional affiliations is well demonstrated in the support 
for regionally based political parties such as Lega Nord (Northern League). Politicians 
with an interest in European affairs therefore have a significant task in bridging the 
gap between the local and European stages, a task that is made more difficult due to 
the Italian Parliament's focus on legislation rather than scrutiny and oversight. " 
According to a member of staff in the Chamber of Deputies 'there is a difficulty with 
imagining the effect of future legislation. " Although the domestic impact of European 
legislation being investigated by European committee staff (with dossiers distributed 
to all select committees), Italian parliamentarians generally appear remarkably 
unconcerned with European legislation. It can therefore be argued that Italian political 
culture is focused mainly on the national level, and that the importance of considering 
European legislation (prior to decisions being made at the European level) is not 
commonly recognised. 
Despite the Italian Parliament's relative institutional strength, several factors have 
contributed to a situation where Community matters are often not scrutinised in any 
significant way. Firstly, Italy's motivation for joining the European Community was 
political in nature rather than economic. Membership was seen as recognition of Italy's 
new and developing democracy (Pasquino, 1996, p. 160), and although the 
Communists were initially opposed to membership it gradually became a 'non-issue' 
(Bindi Callusi and Grasse, 2001, p. 297). Italian politicians and citizens were thus, in 
contrast to both the UK and Denmark, in agreement over membership of the EU, with 
neither inter- nor intra-party disagreements on the issue. Although the number of 
" Article 11 states that 'Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other 
peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality 
with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace 
and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international organisations having such 
ends' (Republic of Italy, 2002). 
It The importance placed on legislation within the Italian parliament is well illustrated by the chair of the 
EU committee in the Chamber of Deputies who declared that `I think the European Parliament must make 
law. Today the European Parliament cannot make law, so it is a strange parliament. A parliament makes 
law! ' (Interview I-13). 
15 Interview I-11. 
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Italians who see EU membership as a good thing has declined over the years, as has 
the number of Italians who believe Italy has benefited from membership, Italians have 
still recorded some of the most positive feelings towards the EU, traditionally well 
above the EU average (European Commission, 2003, p. 42). '° 
Secondly, a parliamentary tradition focusing on legislation, rather than oversight and 
scrutiny, has developed. Although both parliamentarians and parliamentary staff 
involved in European affairs are aware that the Parliament's influence post-decision is 
limited, the traditions embedded in Italian political culture are powerful, making it 
difficult to change attitudes developed over a long period. This ties in with the third 
explanation, which is the lack of direct (political) benefits to be obtained from the 
European level. As local links and contacts are vitally important for Italian politicians, 
this is naturally where their efforts are concentrated, with the consequence that EU 
seems 'a long way away' without much relevance to everyday political life. 
Italian Parliamentary involvement in Community affairs is, accordingly, mainly 
limited to the annual legge comunitaria (see Chapter five). Although this annual bill 
permits Parliament to legislate on European matters, it does not provide the 
Parliament with any influence over European legislation. The general treatment of 
Community matters within Italy can thus be described as very relaxed, even 
characterised by a certain laissez faire attitude in Parliament, the executive and the 
administration. The Italian parliament, despite having been a member of the 
Community right from the outset, is the weakest in terms of influence on Community 
legislation, of the three parliaments examined. This is despite signs (including the 
establishment of a department of European affairs, an upgrading of the Giunta to a 
select committee and increased numbers of hearings in both Chambers) that things are 
slowly changing. 
Owing, perhaps, to Italy's complex political history and many unpleasant memories 
and consequences of both the Fascist period and the First Republic, it has been argued 
that Italian political culture 'has been the subject of very few studies. The theme itself 
seems to have become a sort of taboo, perhaps because of the Fascist ideological 
exploitation of the Italian national idiosyncrasies' (Melotti, 2000, pp. 6-7). The 
predisposition to international cooperation (expressed through Article 11 of the 
constitution), a strong focus on the local level and a parliamentary unwillingness to 
engage in scrutiny are all factors that have influenced how Italian MPs have 
incorporated European matters into their daily work. However, it appears that 
15 Eurobarometer figures cover the years 1981 - present for the question of support for European Union 
membership and the years 1984 - present for the question of whether Italy has benefited from 
membership. 
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institutional practices (altered in response to Europeanisation) have been less of a 
hindrance to greater parliamentary involvement in European affairs than have general 
and cultural attitudes towards Europe. Both parliamentary chambers have exhibited 
(institutional) flexibility in the way they involve themselves in European affairs, an 
indication that, due to the relative youth of the Italian state and political system, there 
may be more of a willingness to change practices and institutional habits. " Indeed, 
with the Senate's new 14`h Committee on European affairs (see Chapter five) tying all 
of the select committees together by making dual membership a requirement, the 
Italian Senate is, in a clear departure from traditional procedures, the chamber with the 
strongest institutionalised cooperation on scrutiny of European affairs. However, it 
remains difficult to interest MPs in European work, a sign that Community issues still 
do not contribute significantly to the meaning-creation of politics at the national level. 
United Kingdom 
Europeanisation has also been a significant challenge in the UK where no written, 
codified constitution exists that may provide guidance in its relationship with the EU. 
Various texts, conventions and institutions together provide the UK with a 
'constitution', creating a very unique political environment for politicians to operate 
within. Although the UK has always been a country with extensive international links, 
the fact that it is an island has also contributed to British national culture and self- 
image. 
British identity, the factors that put flesh on the bones of 'Britishness', have historically 
(see Eatwell, 1997, pp. 52-3) been considered to consist of Protestantism, a belief in the 
superiority of the British Parliament (a symbol of liberty), demonisation of the 'other' 
(especially France), identification with moderate and pragmatic thinking and 
association with trade and prosperity. Almond and Verba (1989 (1963)) identified 
similar traits in the British society emphasising homogeneity, consensus and deference. 
However, Roger Eatwell (1997) argues that these identifiers have lost most of their 
relevance. British homogeneity has thus obviously decreased with the process of 
devolution, while the UK has also become more multi-ethnic. " Socialisation (of a less 
authoritarian and more inclusive variety) saw deference becoming a 'more marginal 
feature' (Eatwell, 1997, p. 64) of British culture. Meanwhile, inter-party divisions on 
issues such as fox hunting and the war on Iraq have shown that consensus is not 
" Discussing the regional level, Robert D. Putnam describes how politics have been transformed by the 
establishment of regional governments, teaching councillors the virtues of patience and practicality and 
reasonableness (Putnam, 1993, p. 38). 
is Although the proportion of ethnic minorities in terms of population may still be relatively small (7.9 per 
cent in the 2001 census), the existence (and electoral success) of the British National Party together with a focus on terrorism which is strongly related to Islam, helps give the impression that the proportion of 
ethnic minorities is greater and that it is causing problems for Britain and British identity. 
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necessarily a defining characteristic of British politics any longer-although 
membership of he EU is perhaps the best illustration of this point. 
What has remained as one of the most fundamental components of Britain's political 
culture is the sovereign Parliament. However, the notion that Parliament is 'the 
supreme, and indeed only, law-making body in the UK' (Pilkinton, 2001, p. 78) has 
been challenged by Britain's membership of the EU. The initial Treaty of Accession 
signed in 1972 was a 'massive' breach of constitutional convention, as the then 
government 'tacitly accepted as part of British law some forty-three volumes of 
European legislation ... that 
became binding upon the peoples of the United Kingdom, 
despite that law never having been scrutinised or debated by the British parliament' 
(Pilkinton, 2001, p. 78). It can be argued that because Parliament had to ratify the 
Accession Treaty, it has not ceded sovereignty unknowingly. Indeed, Andrew Geddes 
writes that 'by ratifying the accession Treaty that took Britain into the EC then it is 
possible to say that the British Parliament self-limited its sovereign authority because in 
some areas supranational institutions such as the council of Ministers and the 
Commission make laws' (Geddes, 2004, p. 39, emphasis added). Despite the self- 
limitation on its powers, the British parliament has remained a starting point for other 
characteristics of British politics such as respect for the rule of law and pragmatism. 
Respect for the rule of law is evident in the importance placed on debate within both 
the House of Commons and the House of Lords and-to a lesser extent-on scrutiny of 
legislation. The sovereignty of Parliament is reflected in the fact that no individual or 
committee can act on behalf of or commit a Chamber. As a consequence, debates have 
traditionally been considered the most important feature of parliamentary work, with 
committees only developing relatively late in the Parliament's history. " In this respect 
the UK Parliament therefore differs significantly from both the Danish and Italian 
parliaments where committees are relatively more influential. 
Since the 1990s, however, a new focus on pre-legislative scrutiny has emerged (for an 
overview see Kelly et. al (2003)). In this context the House of Commons' Select 
Committee on Modernisation (first appointed in June 1997) has thus published several 
reports for consultation as well as a reform programme. " In its 'First Report' from 
February 2002, the Modernisation committee published a list of 11 recommendations to 
select committees, one of which is 'to conduct pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills' 
79 Select Committees are, however, considered increasingly important, with debates in the Chamber 
described as 'I wont say useless, but on many cases it is little more than a cabaret or low drama. ... Most 
of the time what happens in the chamber is extremely perfunctory, and does not amount to anything like 
groper scrutiny' (Interview UK 7). 
For a full list of reports see the cDmmittee s website: 
http: //www. parliamenLuk/parliamentarycommittees/select committee on modernisation of the hau 
se of commons/selectcommittee_on modernisation of Nhe house of_commons reports and_publicati 
ons. cfm 
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(House of Commons, 2002b, para. 34). Pre-decision scrutiny of European legislation 
has taken place since the UK became a member of the EU. The powers of the ESC are 
thus, according to Carter, 'in keeping with UK Constitutional tradition', but, being ex 
ante, rather than ex post potentially more influential (2001, p. 440). This point has also 
been raised by Parliament itself. In a report on the legislative process in the House of 
Commons from the Chairmen's Panel, a hope is expressed that 'the present system - 
which contrasts so unfavourably with the arrangements for debating European 
legislation - will be replaced at the earliest opportunity' (House of Commons, 1998a, 
para 29). However, it has also been indicated that the European Scrutiny Committee 
'lacks the formal power to serve as anything more than a filter' (Millar, 1979, p. 195), 
thereby questioning the extent to which it can be considered more effective than other 
select committees within the House of Commons. 
While select committees are considering alterations to their procedures, they have done 
so for domestic reasons and are yet to establish methods for cooperation amongst 
themselves and with the ESC. To date, committees (including the ESC) have worked 
autonomously, with joint reports or committees being the exception rather than the 
rule. This approach to scrutiny appears particularly, and increasingly, anachronistic 
when it comes to dealing with European affairs. As the integration process has 
developed to cover more and more areas of policy traditionally considered domestic 
policy, select committees find themselves including a European angle when preparing 
reports. Furthermore, the ESC has found that it is increasingly important to establish 
the domestic impact of European legislation, something that is often difficult to do 
without the expertise found in select committees. As a result of the separation, the 
British Parliament too has developed a sub-culture of parliamentarians who are 
particularly knowledgeable on the EU developing. 
It is yet to be established whether European scrutiny is developing together with or 
separately from Parliament's scrutiny of domestic legislation. It seems certain, 
however, that changes to select committee procedures have been initiated from the 
domestic level, although the extent to which Europeanisation has had an impact on the 
particulars of suggested changes is difficult to assess. Scrutiny conducted ex ante in 
select committees certainly appears to have become more acceptable despite it being a 
significant departure from traditional culture within the British Parliament, making it 
difficult to ascertain how far select committees may be'permitted' to develop. 
As one of the enduring expressions of British political culture, the British Parliament is 
facing a significant challenge in European legislation. While the British administration 
has proven adept at gradually adapting to membership of the EU, the UK Parliament 
has had more difficulties. In order to adequately conduct scrutiny it may therefore 
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have to re-examine fundamental aspects of its operational environment. The interplay 
between Europeanisation and British political culture is difficult to assess with 
certainty as cause and effect are hard to establish with precision. What can be 
ascertained with confidence is that membership of the EU has forced the two European 
committees-in a novel development-to undertake pre-decision scrutiny. It has taken 
close to 30 years for select committees to consider and accept the benefits of this 
method of scrutiny. It thus appears that British political culture is more resistant to 
change than those of either Denmark or Italy, making Europeanisation a generally 
more daunting challenge for the British parliament and the UK in general. 
Conclusion 
National parliaments could (initially) allow themselves to think of Community affairs 
as foreign policy because of the Luxembourg Compromise: if a proposed policy was 
considered unsatisfactory-and important enough-it could be vetoed in the Council. 
As such, European legislation was considered distinct from domestic legislation. 
Despite this difference, scrutiny procedures developed from existing procedures for 
dealing with domestic legislation (the UK parliament being an exception). 
Parliamentary institutional structures for Community affairs were thus very similar to 
those for foreign affairs: specialised committees were established whose members 
became experts on the topic but did not involve parliament in any significant way 
beyond that. The consequence of this was the development of subcultures with 
specialists on EU affairs, leaving little need for the wider political culture to adapt to 
membership of the EU. As membership is increasingly felt across all policy areas, it has 
become recognised that members of EU committees need the expertise of other 
specialist MPs to assess the impact of European legislation. 
With the initial involvement by national parliaments in European legislation, the 
building blocks for greater involvement were laid. As a consequence, it became easier 
to expand the parliamentary role at a stage when politicians began to acknowledge the 
significant impact Community matters has on the framework within which domestic 
policy is carried out. The emerging broader parliamentary involvement has therefore 
challenged national political cultures and forced the development of scrutiny 
procedures. Plenary debates, a potential method for greater involvement of national 
parliamentarians and especially important in the UK, have occurred only rarely in all 
three case studies, with debates generally limited to significant issues such as 
ratification of new treaties. 
The inherent contradiction in Community legislation (is it domestic policy or is it 
foreign policy? ) is important to bear in mind. At present it is neither-or rather both. It 
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is domestic policy because it is being implemented at and affects the national level. 
European legislation is being transposed into national legislation, has direct effect in 
the EU member states, and can therefore be considered national legislation. 
Community legislation is not, however, negotiated or finally decided at the national 
level by nationally elected parliamentarians in national parliaments. It is still 
negotiated between government representatives at the European level, increasingly in 
cooperation with the European Parliament, and can therefore-also-be considered 
foreign policy. While all member state parliaments have realised this, it is also evident 
that their responses have varied. 
To date, developments in scrutiny procedures have been relatively country and time 
specific, although nowhere has the entire parliament been involved in scrutiny. 
European issues have generally been left to the care of a small sub-group of 
parliamentarians. As a consequence, sub-cultures have developed with specialised 
expertise on the EU and which parliamentarians, government representatives, civil 
servants and certain members of the national elite inhabit. European affairs have 
therefore not become an integral element of overarching political cultures. 
Wedeen's emphasis on meaning-creation thus becomes relevant, as EU membership is 
made meaningful by adapting to demands made on the country's domestic structures 
and procedures (including scrutiny procedures) in a manner that `makes sense' to 
national political actors-a process that, in effect, amounts to Europeanisation. A 
country's specific reasons and prerequisites for membership, as well as the 
consequences of membership (including parliamentary involvement in the procedures 
for European legislation), only make sense when incorporated into already existing 
practices and political cultures. Europeanisation affects political cultures, practices and 
institutions, but the limits imposed by national political cultures ensure that overall 
stability is maintained. Changes prompted by Europeanisation have at times been slow 
and reluctant, which may be because the wider political culture, not just the 
parliamentary environment, has been affected. It may well be that it has been more 
acceptable for parliaments to respond to changes in the national political environment 
rather than feel they are responding directly to events at the European level (events in 
the UK seem to illustrate this point). 
Although national parliaments have acted independently of one another when 
responding to Europeanisation (resulting in a wide range of scrutiny systems, see 
Chapter three), convergence can still be detected in the common trend towards the 
broad involvement of increasing numbers of parliamentarians in European affairs. 
Within the three parliaments studied, convergent developments have come from 
different directions. In Denmark and Italy greater involvement by select committees 
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has been driven by the European committees, while in the UK it has more been a case 
of committees other than the EU committees increasingly including a European angle 
in their work. This development has been most evident in the House of Lords, but is 
also taking place within the House of Commons. The overall trend therefore, in all 
three case studies, is for wider inclusion of parliamentarians in the consideration of 
European legislation-or at the very least an increasing awareness of how legislation 
from the European level impacts on domestic legislation. 
However, significant challenges for national political cultures in relation to the 
European level remain. As European integration is increasingly driven by decisions 
taken by QMV, it is no longer possible for individual national parliaments to veto 
decisions taken at the European level (assuming that parliaments have been invested 
with this power). As a result of the inability to ultimately control their national 
executives' actions at the European level, national parliaments have also had to 
develop a certain degree of inter-parliamentary cooperation. National parliaments 
have traditionally been very autonomous actors. Having to cooperate with other 
parliaments in order to carry out their work effectively has consequently presented 
(further) great challenges. As will become evident in the next chapter, the development 
of inter-parliamentary cooperation has been hampered by significant difficulties, 
producing little besides non-binding declarations, and with (usually small) steps 
towards further cooperation all driven by national parliaments themselves. 
The extent to which inter-parliamentary cooperation will succeed may well depend on 
how far national political cultures evolve in the direction of a 'permissive consensus' 
that allows longstanding parliamentary traditions to adjust to Europeanisation. In 
Italy, the willingness to cooperate at the international level is substantial, owing mainly 
to past political experiences and ideological motives behind Community membership. 
In the Danish Folkeling inter-parliamentary cooperation is similarly considered in a 
positive light if it can further aid the process of parliamentary scrutiny of European 
legislation. In Britain, however, European-level cooperation is considered more 
problematic, mainly due to the sharp divisions between committees within the House 
of Commons, and the inability of any one parliamentary committee to commit the 
entire House from which it is drawn. However, it can still be argued that the EU is 
increasingly given meaning and made understandable in similar ways throughout 
national parliaments even if differences in national political cultures clearly still exist 
and continue to impact on scrutiny procedures as well as parliaments' willingness to 
undertake collective activities. 
One reason why parliamentarians may have different views on their parliament's role 
in European affairs is the shift from European integration to Europeanisation. As was 
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indicated in Chapter one the two concepts are related but separate, as 'European 
integration leaves national identity and political culture by and large untouched, while 
Europeanisation involves mutation of national identity and political culture. ' (de Beus 
and Mak, 2003, p. 2). Citizens in EU member states may also begin to feel the effects of 
Europeanisation if parliamentarians, as a part of their daily work, increasingly engage 
in dialogue about Europe as part of everyday political discourse. Because the European 
dimension is becoming more important as a determinant of domestic policy, 
Europeanisation can only be expected to increasingly impact on citizens as well. 
Membership of the EU has placed national political cultures under pressure. As 
European legislation and activities influence parliamentary activities at the domestic 
level, national parliaments may appear to have fewer ways in which to justify their 
existence. However, the new European level of political activity can still not be 
considered a polity in its own right, and is therefore reliant on indirect legitimacy, 
essentially provided by national parliaments through their support for their 
executives' activities at the European level. To provide such legitimacy, national 
parliaments must involve themselves in European legislation as effectively as they can. 
Due to the vibrancy of decision-making structures at the European level, national 
parliaments have increasingly become aware that they must cooperate, amongst 
themselves and with the EP, in order to influence European decisions better. Such 
inter-parliamentary cooperation has posed yet further challenges to parliaments, and 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Inter-parliamentary co-operation within Europe 
We must now come to the balance sheet of the 'European experiment. ' The 
most visible aspect is the survival of the nations. 
(Hoffmann, 1966, p. 889) 
In recent years national parliaments have gained an ever-greater prominence in the 
discussion of Europe's future. National-level support for decisions made in the Council 
are necessary for these decisions to be legitimate (for a discussion on international 
parliamentary cooperation in general see Slaughter, 2004, Chapter three). The lack of 
national-level support contributes to the 'double democratic deficit' (Lodge, 1996a, p. 
190) and has supported the notion that the democratic deficit cannot be eradicated by 
parliamentarisation at the European level alone. It has become recognised that national 
level actors, especially national parliaments, must become involved in European 
matters-at both the national and European levels. 
The Maastricht Treaty thus (in attached Declarations 13 and 14) 'encourages greater 
involvement of national parliament in the activities of the European Union' and 
provides for the possibility of holding Assizes. ' Furthermore, the Nice treaty, in its 
outline of what the 2003 IGC would consider, specifically mentions the role of national 
parliaments, as did the 2001 Laeken Declaration. While only one Assize has ever been 
held, it can be argued that the role it was intended to fulfill has instead been borne out 
through the participation of national parliamentarians in the Convention on the Future 
of Europe. 
The third stage of Norton's outline of national parliamentary involvement at the 
European level is currently taking place (see Norton, 1996b). This stage sees national 
parliaments as integral to addressing the democratic deficit' However, simply because 
there is agreement on the fact that national parliaments are important to European 
democracy does not equate to agreement on the most appropriate way(s) for national 
parliaments to contribute to the development of Europe. Table 8.1 is adapted from a 
submission Norton made to House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union 
The Assize was a conference where the participants were members from the EP and EU member state 
parliaments. 
The first stage is (by Norton) characterised as having no parliamentary involvement-and no desire on 
behalf of national parliaments to be involved in European affairs, while the second stage sees adaptation 
and strengthening of parliamentary procedures to accommodate European affairs. Paradoxically the first 
stage coincides with the time where MEPs were seconded from national parliaments, whereas the second 
stage, in many cases prompted by the SEA, only begins to develop after this direct link has been broken. 
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(House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 2001, p. 15), outlining the 
main options that have been or are being discussed by national parliaments. 
Table 8.1: Involvement by national parliaments in European affairs 
Advisory Formal Powers 
Individually Better supply of information Mandating Ministers 
Scrutiny committees 
Offices in Brussels 
Scrutiny reserve 
Nominating members of Commission 
Collectively Greater role of Assizes 
Greater role of COSAC 
Conference of speakers 
Consultation process 
Powers for Assizes 
Powers for COSAC 
Second chamber 
Joint committees with EP 
In theory, the main options for national parliaments are thus to act individually or 
collectively, in either an advisory or formal capacity. However, in reality, not all of 
these options are open to all parliaments and indeed may not be suitable. Using the 
above table as a starting-point, this chapter investigates the collective options for 
national parliaments that have been explored by national parliamentarians in the past 
or are currently under consideration. This includes the Assize (which was held in 1990 
and has never been repeated) and the Conference of Speakers of European 
Parliaments, although the main focus of the chapter will be on the Conventions and 
(especially) the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of 
Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC). 
COSAC has traditionally been considered a `talking shop', with no ability to take 
decisions or contribute significantly to debates on European integration. While 
decisions are still not binding on anybody, the very focused debate on the role of 
national parliaments in the European integration process that has taken place since 
2000 has forced national parliamentarians to consider their own role with regard to 
scrutiny of European legislation. Moreover, debates on specialised COSAC meetings 
could mean a significant leap for inter-parliamentary cooperation. Not only do 
specialised COSAC meetings provide MPs with an opportunity to discuss policy in a 
European context, they also demonstrate to European governments that national 
parliaments have become an integral part of the European legislative process. This 
involvement was further underlined by national parliamentary involvement in the 
Conventions (and thereby in preparatory work for the 2003 IGC), making it 
inconceivable that national parliamentarians would be excluded from similar treaty- 
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writing or -amending work in the future. However, as the Assize was one of the first 
forums in which national parliamentarians met, this is where the chapter will start. 
I. The Assize 
The Assize was originally proposed by the then French President Francois Mitterrand, 
who argued that national parliaments should become more involved in the 
development of Europe and its governing institutions. Held over the last four days of 
November 1990 and hosted by the Italian Camera dei Deputati, the Assize had as its 
theme the future of the Community; the implications, for the Community and the 
Member States, of the proposals concerning Economic and Monetary Union and 
Political Union and, more particularly, the role of the national parliaments and of the 
European Parliament' (European Parliament, 2000c). 
The context for the Assize is important to fully understand the results-as well as why 
it was held and how it was conducted. In the late 1980s, significant parts of Europe 
(especially to the Community's south and east) were in turmoil, the European 
Economic Area had been conceptualised and Austria had applied for membership of 
the Community (Westlake, 1996, p. 171). 'Eurosclerosis, as experienced in the 1970s 
and early 1980s was a thing of the past, and the Community was developing at a 
significant pace, with the IGCs preceding the Maastricht Treaty due to commence in 
December 1990. Europe seemed on the move, and the potential impact on national 
parliaments was significant. National parliamentarians realised that the involvement of 
parliaments, national as well as the European Parliament, was necessary to legitimise 
deepened integration, but were also uncertain about how to respond to these 
developments. Their uncertainties were evident in the convening of the conference as 
well as the concluding documents. 
Formally the title of the Assize was 'Conference of the Parliaments of the European 
Community', with the actual convening of the conference left ambiguous. The 
ambiguity was wholly intentional, with most parliaments believing the conference to 
be "'self-convened" by all the parliaments collectively' (Corbett, 1998, p. 297). Details 
for the event were discussed at COSAC, although the majority of preparations were 
carried out by Presidents of the participating parliaments (Corbett, 2002). Mitterrand's 
proposal to discuss the Community's future, based on his interest in involving national 
parliaments in the development of the Community and its institutions, initially met 
with scepticism on the part of the EP. However, the EP soon realised that 'if it wished 
to lessen any "threat" from national parliaments, it would be best advised to take in its 
charge the organisation of the Assises'(Corbett, 2002). It thus proceeded to shape the 
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conference in a fashion suitable to its own agenda, seeing it as 'a joint parliamentary 
preparation for the IGCs [resulting in the TEU]' (Corbett, 1998, p. 296). 
Delegates to the conference were members of European parliaments (173 in total) and 
the EP (85). At the outset of the conference, delegations from each parliament were 
seated together, the EP's delegation sitting in the centre of the chamber with its 
delegates grouped according to political affiliation. However, in the first session of the 
Assize, a vote was passed for all delegates to sit according to political affiliation, a 
move some delegates found contrary to their interests as national representatives and 
an attempt by the EP to 'hijack' the event. While the EP successfully produced a forum 
where its ways of conducting business were dominant, national delegations (especially 
the British and French) were 'less enamoured with the experience and the outcome of 
the Assises' (Westlake, 1996, p. 171). This feeling may have been furthered by the fact 
that the political groupings held meetings around the sittings of the Assize where 
facilities were provided by the secretariats of the political groups in the EP. 
Furthermore, 'the core of MEPs within each grouping, having the best international 
contacts and, frequently, the best linguistic skills, were often among the key actors in 
such meetings' (Corbett, 2002). Each of the participating parliaments (but not all 
chambers) delivered written submissions, with the EP's submission being its proposed 
amendments to the TEU. The final declaration, although adopted by a majority of the 
delegates (150 to 13), was remarkably similar to the EP's submission, 'echoing all of the 
European parliament's main proposals for treaty revision' (Corbett et al., 2000, p. 300): 
The declaration endorsed the objective of remodeling the community into a 
European Union on a federal basis and backed a single currency governed 
by an autonomous central banking system, taking the view that this 
required stronger instruments of economic and social cohesion. It 
supported the incorporation of the [European Political Cooperation] in to 
the Community structures and the inclusion of European citizenship and 
fundamental rights in the Treaties. It backed extension in Community 
competences in the social and cultural fields, and also endorsed the EP 's 
institutional requests concerning co-decision on legislation, appointment 
and term of office of the Commission, right of initiative, scrutiny powers 
and assent procedure for Treaty modification. It called for the EP and the 
national parliaments to prepare a constitution, with the Commission 
becoming the executive and Parliament and Council exercising legislative 
and budgetary functions. 
Provisions for further Assizes were written into the TEU, but the experiment has never 
been repeated. Although not all participants were satisfied with the Assize, it at least 
brought an understanding that interparliamentary relations could be useful and would 
have to be developed further if parliaments were to participate actively in the shaping 
of European integration. It was also realised, however, that the Assize might not be the 
best forum for such co-operation. One chamber, the British House of Commons, 
declared its preference for `a series of bilateral contacts between the European 
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Parliament and each national parliament and the further development of national 
parliaments' pre-legislative role' (cited in Westlake, 1996, p. 172). This well illustrates 
how national parliaments still considered European affairs as foreign policy and 
therefore not a matter for parliaments as institutions. National parliamentarians did 
not appear, at this stage, to be prepared to engage in European matters on a party- 
political basis, instead preferring an institutions-based approach. The preference for 
national and institutional representation was satisfied with COSAC, another forum for 
inter-parliamentary cooperation, which had already begun to operate and permitted 
national parliaments to regain the initiative in inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
2. COSAC 
The Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the 
European Union (usually known by its French acronym COSAC), is a bi-annual event 
that, since 1989, has been hosted by the parliament whose country holds the EU 
Presidency. Delegations from national parliaments consist of members of 
parliamentary committees dealing with Community issues together with civil servants 
responsible for Community affairs. The EP delegation usually includes at least one of 
the two Vice-Presidents responsible for relations with national parliaments. 
Although a wide range of issues is discussed, COSAC's main aim remains as stated in 
the 1996 Dublin conclusion (2000d): 'National Parliaments have their own role to play 
[within the European Union] to strengthen democracy and improve the efficiency of 
the Union. COSAC, through its work, will give a high priority to the pursuit of these 
aims'. The move to write COSAC into the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 was seen as 
strengthening national parliaments whose role in and contribution to the Union 
thereby would become better recognised. 
The task of COSAC is two-fold, with representatives from participating parliaments 
having agreed to a) intensify the exchange of information; and b) meet twice a year to 
discuss issues of common concern (European Parliament, 2000a). Over time, the 
agenda of COSAC meetings has developed to focus mainly on institutional questions 
and matters relating to particular policy areas. However, as COSAC has traditionally 
been perceived as a forum for the exchange of information, no binding decisions are 
taken. Concluding 'contributions' are addressed to EU institutions, but 'shall in no way 
bind national parliaments or prejudge their positions' (COSAC, 2003c). 
In a process that began at the Lisbon COSAC meeting in May 2000, the conference has 
refocused its attention on the role of national parliaments in the European context. The 
Lisbon debate on interparliamentary co-operation was relatively short, consisting 
165 
mainly of the Portuguese rapporteur presenting results from a questionnaire circulated 
to national parliaments and the EP prior to the Conference. In the results MEPs 
predictably confirmed that their links with national level politics were stronger 
through their political parties than through institutional contacts such as committees of 
scrutiny. The fact that national political parties elect candidates for the EP was revealed 
as an important factor in interparliamentary relations, with party links one of the most 
important means of contact between the two levels of parliament' In the report, the 
rapport cur also reiterated that national parliaments are vital to the European integration 
process, and the possibility of COSAC emerging as the embryo of a new European 
parliamentary chamber was (again) aired. The important issue of relations between 
national parliaments and the EP was thus raised. COSAC meetings have aided this 
relationship by serving as a formal forum where MPs and MEPs-who have a complex 
relationship which at times has been more acrimonious than co-operative-can meet to 
discuss their different contributions to the European integration process. 
Both MPs and MEPs consider the meeting of the two levels important. While MPs 
mainly emphasise what they can learn from other national parliaments, MEPs tend to 
place more importance on the mutual benefits of networking, learning about respective 
as well as mutual concerns, and working collectively as parliaments, not as opponents 
from different levels of governance. ` COSAC has been described as a good opportunity 
for sharing of information, although the inability to take binding decisions, and the 
only recently revoked requirement for unanimity has also attracted a certain amount of 
ridicule with some MEPs and MPs describing it as a 'talking shop' of little consequence. 
Parliamentarians differ somewhat with regard to how they envisage COSAC's future 
development. MEPs see the exchange of information as an appropriate function for 
COSAC, with no need for further decision-making bodies at the European level, ' 
whereas many national-level parliamentarians would like to see COSAC develop and 
strengthen further. Italian politicians and civil servants have thus floated the idea of 
developing COSAC into an institution in which national parliamentarians met to 
ensure the principle of subsidiarity was upheld in European legislation. ' Danish MPs 
have also discussed this idea, but have been more supportive of the development of 
new, specialised, COSAC's, each with a remit roughly corresponding to that of select 
committees within national parliaments. ' Specialised COSAC meetings were seen as 
3 The last paragraph of the conclusion from the Lisbon COSAC stated that '(i]n the absence of a public 
European domain, MEPs are elected from national parties, although they represent all the interests of 
European citizens. MEPs and national deputies are therefore not competitors, but rather partners, acting 
only at different levels of representation' (COSAC, 2000b). 
` Interview B-2. 
For instance interviews B-2,5 and 6. 
` For instance interviews 1-4,13 and 14. 
7 For instance interviews DK-1,13,16 and 30. 
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having the potential to inform national parliamentarians not involved in European 
committees about European-level activities within their policy area, while also 
permitting debates on how other parliaments are handling scrutiny of these issues. The 
overall effect might be a reduction of the perceived difference between European and 
domestic legislation and, consequently, an improvement in national-level scrutiny. 
The concept of COSAC as a second-or as some see it, a third-European chamber has 
also been discussed at COSAC meetings. ' Debate on transforming COSAC into a 
legislative chamber was a significant feature of discussion on the role of national 
parliaments in European affairs that continued at the October 2000 Versailles COSAC. 
Again the debate was based on a questionnaire circulated prior to the conference. In 
the main, delegates were opposed to the idea of developing COSAC into a second 
chamber, citing issues such as increased complexity in decision-making procedures 
and operational issues (one argument was that delegates to such a chamber would 
primarily be concerned with domestic issues, especially at times of national elections 
which do not all occur at the same time). It was also pointed out that a second chamber 
was not necessarily the best method for achieving increased contact between national 
parliaments. Instead, the challenge was to 'reach a better interconnection between the 
European Parliament and the national parliaments in order to make European 
construction more democratic'. Furthermore, it was argued that national parliaments 
'must express the aspirations and concerns of peoples. For that purpose, and to help 
European citizens to better understand what is at stake, it is essential that [national 
parliaments] have easier access to the decisions that are taken' (Mr Antonio Nazare- 
Pereira (Portugal) COSAC, 2000a, p. 49). The final text adopted by the Versailles 
COSAC contained two elements specifically relating to national parliaments in the 
European arena: firstly, it mentioned the 'useful' procedure used in negotiating the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and, secondly, outlined three issues for inclusion in the 
IGC then underway. ' However, the final contribution also recalled that 'no provision of 
this protocol can jeopardise the competences and prerogatives of each national 
Parliament as provided by its national constitutional arrangements' (COSAC, 2000c), 
thereby limiting its potential impact. 
By the time of the Versailles COSAC meeting, the role of national parliaments was not 
just a matter for inter-parliamentary discussion, but had become an important 
component of the European agenda. The COSAC meeting held in Copenhagen in 
* Opponents of a second chamber often talk of it as a third chamber, arguing that the Council and the EP, 
in effect, make up two legislative chambers at the European level. The term 'second chamber' will, 
however, refer to a second chamber consisting of parliamentarians. 
' The three issues covered early transmission of documents and proposals from the Commission to 
national parliaments; an increased period for consideration of issues to be applied under title V of the 
TEU; and a minimum period of time between final reading of a text by COREPER and the Council 
decision. 
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October 2002 reflected this development, being devoted solely to discussion on the role 
of national parliaments. At this meeting a multi-pronged reform programme for 
COSAC was begun (COSAC, 2002c). The reform programme included a move away 
from unanimity when adopting the final contribution of COSAC meetings and the 
establishment of a common secretariat for COSAC, while also mooting closer co- 
operation with EU institutions. A working group was established to further consider 
eight issues of significance to COSAC: 
0a code of conduct; 
" new voting rules; 
" establishment of a secretariat; 
" further interparliamentary cooperation and networking; 
" COSAC's work on subsidiarity and proportionality; 
"a new name; 
" cooperation between various bodies at the European and national levels and 
" cooperation between EUs institutions (COSAC, 2002a). 
Although COSAC for a long time had the option of setting up working groups, they 
have only been used infrequently. It was thus significant in itself that a working group 
was trusted with the examination of the issues detailed above. At previous COSAC 
meetings concerns had been voiced about the establishment of working groups, mainly 
expressing fears that such a move would institutionalise COSAC in an undesirable 
manner. At the Copenhagen meeting, such fears had largely been replaced by a feeling 
that to take inter-parliamentary cooperation further, the establishment of a secretariat 
and sectoral COSACs might be necessary. Furthermore, it was thought that initial 
discussions on how to develop COSAC were best undertaken in a smaller working 
group, rather than in the full plenary of a COSAC meeting. 
COSAC is one of the few collective forums where national parliamentarians can 
discuss their own role in the European integration process. However, as it cannot make 
any firm and binding recommendations to anybody, COSAC is still hampered in its 
7D Author's own notes from COSAC meetings. The results of the working group's deliberations were 
discussed at the COSAC meeting held in Athens, May 2003. New rules of procedure were adopted 
allowing for contributions to be passed with a 75 per cent majority of votes cast (which must also 
constitute at least half of all votes, with each voting delegation having two votes) (COSAC, 2003c, Art. 10.5 
and 10.6). Furthermore, it was decided to establish a common Brussels-based secretariat before the end of 
2003 (COSAC, 2003d). A further element in the reform of COSAC was the publication of the 'Copenhagen 
Parliamentary Guidelines' in the Official Journal of the Union, C Series, on 2 July 2003. These guidelines 
were presented as entirely voluntary, but set out 'instructive minimum standards' for relations between 
governments and parliaments on Community issues (COSAC, 2003b). Included in the guidelines were 
desirable standards on the quantity and quality of information, the timing of information exchange and 
the opportunities for national parliaments to influence Community policy. Gisela Stuart (chair of Working 
Group 4 at the Convention on the Future of Europe), tabled an amendment to the Convention's draft 
treaty, wanting to include the Copenhagen guidelines in the text. The issue had not been debated in the 
working group, and did not gain the necessary support. 
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effectiveness. The most significant outcome of COSAC conferences may therefore be an 
increased understanding of the work members of different national parliament 
perform on European matters, as well as of problems common to them all. Such 
understanding is, however, as much a result of informal discussions and contacts as 
formal discussions during conference debates. While the above developments may 
seem small and relatively insignificant, the establishment of a secretariat still 
represents a substantial deepening of co-operation between national parliaments. 
Moreover, the development of desirable minimum standards for relations between 
parliaments and government has shown that collective activities can affect events at 
the national level. Over a prolonged period, COSAC has thus prompted 
parliamentarians from national parliaments to consider procedures regulating their 
own involvement in European affairs. 
The involvement in COSAC has, however, been limited to politicians directly involved 
with European committees, and has thus reinforced the false, and increasingly 
impossible, separation of European and domestic affairs. While members of standing 
committees other than European committees do conduct meetings at the European 
level, such contacts have not been institutionalised to the same extent as has that of 
European committees through COSAC. COSAC delegates, however, have recognised 
the problem, and 'task d' of the Copenhagen working group therefore included an 
examination of how sectoral select committees might develop meetings similar to 
COSAC meetings. The report from the working group highlights that meetings 
between select committees already take place, but that it would be 'possible to achieve 
even better results and form a more general view of the efforts of the parliaments if this 
cooperation were coordinated with the work in COSAC. COSAC could support such a 
development by making itself available as a supporting structure for the sectoral 
standing committees of the parliaments' (COSAC, 2002b). 
While members of select committees have been reluctant to include the European 
dimension in their work (and the increased workload this would bring), European 
committees in national parliaments are slowly accepting that, to scrutinise European 
legislation properly, they need the cooperation of other select committees in their 
parliaments. However, there are also country- and sector-specific differences. The areas 
most influenced by European cooperation, such as agriculture or environmental 
affairs, are thus the areas that show the most activity with regard to co-operation and 
meetings at the European level. David Curry, chair of the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Committee in the House of Commons 2001-3, thus indicated that it 
would be useful to him if the chair and deputy chair of committees with a similar remit 
met to discuss topics of mutual concern. He also, however, emphasised that the 
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number of participants would have to be limited and discussion kept to general issues, 
with no binding decisions to be taken. " 
Politicians involved in areas less directly influenced by decisions taken at the European 
level, such as social matters, see less of a need for contact with other committees 
working with a similar remit. Members of these committees also express more 
concerns about the time such activities will require and the need to avoid further 
institutions at the European level. This opinion was, for instance, expressed by Tove 
Videbwk (chair of the Social Affairs Committee in the Danish Folketing 2001 - 2005), 
who believed one annual meeting at the European level to be more than sufficient for 
discussing affairs covered by her committee's remit. Videba'k was also concerned that 
European-level activities would take up too much time compared to domestic work. " 
Although national parliamentarians accept that inter-parliamentarian cooperation may 
be of benefit to their work at the national level, their comments also reveal that the 
distinction between national and European affairs remains strong. Participants at 
current COSAC meetings may have benefited in their own work from the COSAC 
meetings and therefore be able to see the potential benefits in sectoral COSAC-like 
meetings. However, they may also find it difficult to persuade their colleagues in 
national parliaments to undertake the work required in making such meetings work. 
A further area in which COSAC has been active in recent years are the Conventions 
convened to draw up the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Convention on the 
Future of Europe. COSAC has consistently supported the work of both the 
Conventions, as well as the way in which national parliamentarians have been 
involved. Conclusions from various COSAC meetings are evidence of this, with the 
Rome meeting in 2003 being no exception. In this conclusion the first point states that 
COSAC '[w]elcomes the results of the Convention and recognises the historical 
importance of the Convention as a method enabling parliaments to contribute to the 
definition of the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe before approval by 
the IGC and ratification by National Parliaments. ' It goes on to state that the text 
produced by the Convention 'represents a fundamental step forward for the European 
construction and should be the basis for the IGC conclusions', but also calls for 'a loser 
coordination between parliaments in the European debate' (COSAC, 2003a). While 
COSAC thus sees a role for itself within the European architecture, it also recognises 
that national parliaments must continue to work individually at the national level, as 
well as in other forums such as the Conventions, which will be examined in the next 
section. 
11 Interview UK-7. 
12 interview DK-30. 
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3. The Conventions 
Apart from the Assize, the first opportunity for members of national parliaments to 
participate directly in decision-making procedures at the European level was at the 
Convention convened to draw up the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. " Although this Charter was not initially granted legal status, it quickly became 
an important document in European legal practice, with the ECJ referring to it 
repeatedly in its first years of existence (Menendez, 2002). 
At the time of the first Convention, the involvement of MPs at the European level was 
very much an experiment. The Charter was not expected to be granted legal status and 
the participation of national parliamentarians thus did not intervene in 
intergovernmental work. It was still, however, the first time parliaments, including the 
European Parliament, were directly involved in a process to draw up text which could, 
conceivably, end up as part of the Community treaties. While it was becoming 
increasingly difficult for European governments to exclude the EP from matters of 
significant importance, a Danish official claimed that many questioned the fact that 
national parliaments were included. " According to this source, some argued that 
national parliaments were represented by national governments and thus did not need 
to be directly represented. However, the same source also pointed out that national 
parliaments are often more used to criticising than to proactive and positive 
engagement. The Convention was thus a chance for national parliaments to become 
directly involved and therefore also, ultimately, co-responsible for the outcome. 
The second Convention on the Future of Europe also involved national 
parliamentarians, giving them co-ownership of the final result. However, at the IGC 
following the second Convention (described as a 'second round', see below) no 
parliamentarians, from either the national or European level, were present. Instead, 
government representatives, behind closed doors, renegotiated the openly agreed 
document, which the Convention delivered, causing scepticism to develop about the 
sincerity with which they supported the openness of the Convention method. Such 
impressions were not helped when Giuliano Amato, vice-chairman of the second 
Convention, stated that 'I told myself that they [national governments] are only this 
positive because they know there is a second round [an IGC], they're not convinced 
supporters', while Ifligo Mendez de Vigo, the EP's observer at the 2003 IGC fumed that 
they [national governments] are going to destroy our work' (Nielsen, 2003, author's 
translation). Government representatives may not have re-opened a majority of the 
" This Convention held its constituent meeting in December 1999 and adopted its draft text in October 
2000. 
14 Interview DK-17. 
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articles in the Convention text, but the relative importance of the topics renegotiated 
during the IGC left little doubt as to who the final decision-takers were. " 
The situation at the Convention on the Future of Europe was significantly different to 
the first Convention. Because the second Convention 'only' delivered 
recommendations to the IGC following the Convention, MPs were still not active in an 
area previously the domain of national governments-but they were actively involved 
in deliberating on and making proposals for the future direction of the European 
integration process. Because of the potential impact of the second Convention, it was 
perhaps even more important for national parliaments to be represented here than at 
the first. Not only had they become an important part of the European agenda, they 
were also beginning to realise that, as pointed out by the Danish government 
representative, the relationships and divisions of power between institutions can rarely 
be read directly from the text of a treaty. Instead, they develop over time (a good 
example of this is the development of the EP's powers), making it important for 
national parliaments to be part of this process. " By participating in both Conventions, 
but perhaps especially the second, national parliamentarians achieved a significant 
step in this direction. Being able to influence the draft treaty directly, and having to 
ratify the final outcome of the 2003 IGC, gave MPs the opportunity to assemble an 
overview (institutionally at least) of the process, something they have often found 
difficult to achieve with previous treaty negotiations-or indeed European legislation. 
At the second Convention, national parliamentarians again made up a plurality of the 
participants, " although this time they were also part of the agenda, with Working 
Group IV (chaired by British MP Gisela Stuart) dealing specifically with the role of 
national parliaments. Other working groups dealing with the topic of national 
parliaments were Working Group I (examining the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity) and Working Group X (on freedom, security and justice). " Especially 
Working Group I had overlapping issues with Working Group IV, to the extent that 
they held a joint meeting discussing these. Moreover, their contributions to the final 
draft treaty (protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, and on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
respectively) were also examined together in the plenary session taking place on 17 
On institutional matters participants in the IGC especially debated the structure of the Council, with its 
formation, the rotation of the presidency, its size and how votes were weighted were the thorniest issues. 
A Minister of Foreign Affairs also caused much discussion, while contentious areas of policy were mainly 
those of defence and the finances and budget of the EU. 
16 Interview DK-17. 
" The 102 members consisted of 15 representatives of heads of state or government from member states, 13 
heads of state or government from applicant states, 30 representatives from parliaments in member states, 
26 representatives from parliaments in applicant states, 16 representatives from the European Parliament 
and two representatives from the European Commission. 
is See Francesco Rizzuto (2003) for a more detailed description of how these two working groups dealt 
with the issue of national parliaments. 
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and 18 March 2003 in order to give delegates a better overview of the issues, as they are 
so closely related (The European Convention Secretariat, 2003b). 
In the mandate set out for Working Group IV by its Chair, three areas were identified 
for the group's attention (The European Convention Working Group IV, 2002b, p. 6): 
i) the consideration of existing scrutiny and consultation mechanisms of national 
parliaments at national level, with a view to drawing attention to those systems 
which work best 
ü} examination of those aspects of legislative procedures and working practices at 
European level which may create difficulties for national parliaments attempting 
to carry out effective scrutiny of their governments' activities 
iii) reflection on the role we believe national parliaments could/should play [and] 
identification and evaluation of the different means by which we enable 
parliaments to fulfill this role in the future by examining the proposals made by 
Convention members and others for formal and/or informal involvement of 
national parliament at European level. 
Although the group took evidence on the performance of scrutiny systems within 
several of the member states, the topic of which systems work better did not contribute 
significantly to the final report (see The European Convention Working Group IV, 
2002a, section III). However, information gained through submissions on national-level 
scrutiny systems gave rise to the highest number of recommendations (10 from a total 
of 19, spread over 4 sections). Despite the list of recommendations, it is still stated in 
the final report that 'it would not be appropriate to prescribe at European level how the 
scrutiny should be organised' (The European Convention Working Group IV, 2002a, p. 
3). This statement reflects a general unwillingness on behalf of national 
parliamentarians to be tied by decisions (when these relate to their own activities) 
taken at the European level. The importance attached to being independent actors at 
the national level was similar to that expressed at COSAC meetings, reaffirming 
national parliaments as both national and independent actors. 
During the Convention on fundamental rights it was claimed that the behaviour of 
MPs fell into three categories: they either showed no interest in the work of the 
Convention, shielded behind their government representatives whom they believed to 
represent their views anyway, or spent so much time talking at meetings that 
everybody became fed up with them. " While it has been suggested that parliamentary 
and government representatives from the same countries often followed the same line 
19 Interview DK-17. 
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of argument in the second Convention too, 20 MPs still distinguished themselves from 
other representatives by having regular meetings on their own, while also meeting 
with the Presidium as a separate group. Indeed, Norman claims that the political 
'families' were used 'as a conduit for transferring know-how and back-up resources 
from the well organised and well endowed European parliamentarians to their like- 
minded but less well resourced colleagues from the national capitals' and that 
'Giscard's consensus was based on a coalition of parliamentarians' (2003, pp. 325 and 
338). 
However, interparliamentary cooperation at the European level is still considered to be 
useful and COSAC was mentioned in Working Group IV's final report as a vehicle for 
further exchange of information and experience. The possibility of expanding COSAC's 
role to sectoral select committees from national parliaments was also mentioned, but 
the Working Group stopped short of recommending that COSAC be developed into a 
forum where national parliamentarians could scrutinise European legislation or apply 
the principle of subsidiarity. Indeed, Working Group IV 'found it difficult to see how 
the creation of any new institution could assist the process of simplification [of 
decision-making and institutional structures at the European level] (The European 
Convention Working Group IV, 2002a, p. 7). 
National parliaments are mentioned several times in the draft treaty, but are discussed 
most directly in the protocols on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and 
the role of national parliaments. In the protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality, 
national parliaments are given the right to submit reasoned opinions on whether a 
piece of legislation complies with these principles. In cases where the Commission has 
to review its position, it must provide the reasoning behind maintaining, amending or 
withdrawing its proposal. However, even if the Constitutional Treaty becomes ratified, 
national parliaments will still not be permitted direct access to the ECJ to test whether a 
piece of legislation conforms with the principle of subsidiarity. Article 7 of the protocol 
on subsidiarity and proportionality gives member states the right to do this, in 
accordance with rules in Article 111-270, or as 'notified by them in accordance with their 
legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber of it' (The European 
Convention Secretariat, 2003a, p. 231). National rules thus determine whether a 
member state, in effect the executive, is to take a case to the ECJ and parliaments still 
operate individually at the national level. While national parliaments can coordinate 
activities in an effort to obtain enough votes to force the Commission to review its 
position (see Article 6 of the protocol for the exact rules), there is still no direct or 
collective way for MPs to express their concerns at the European level. 
23 Interview 1-14. 
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The emphasis on national parliaments as individual actors is also evident in the 
protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union where it is stated 
that 'the way in which individual national Parliaments scrutinise their own 
governments in relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular 
constitutional organisation and practice of each Member State' (The European 
Convention Secretariat, 2003a, p. 226). The protocol outlines how national parliaments 
are to receive legislative proposals and other information directly from European 
institutions, while also setting down a period of six weeks between a legislative 
proposal being made available and the date when it is placed on the Council agenda. 
However, national parliaments are already able to find this information on the internet 
and are increasingly aware that it is often too late for them to alter anything 
meaningful in the text at the post-initiative stage. Furthermore, many MPs point out 
that the most useful information is not necessarily the legislative text itself, but the 
accompanying explanatory notes from the national executives. 
For parliamentarians to have a meaningful influence on European legislation they 
must involve themselves in the pre-initiative stage. To date, most parliaments have 
been reluctant to involve themselves at this early stage as their primary role has been 
to scrutinise their governments' behaviour at the European level, not involvement in 
the drafting of European legislation. Ideas on what constitutes appropriate 
involvement at the European level for national parliaments may thus have to develop 
beyond mere scrutiny of executive activities if national parliaments are to legitimise 
European legislation in a meaningful way. 
While the draft treaty has significantly improved the visibility of national parliaments 
in the European context, it can also be argued that by denying them a direct voice at 
the European level, and by refusing to lay down rules or minimum requirements for 
procedures at the national level, the draft treaty has done little to clarify the position 
and role of national parliaments within Europe. There is nothing new in the fact that 
national parliaments should operate, and do operate most efficiently, at the national 
level. Indeed, this is what the majority of national parliamentarians themselves have 
been saying for several years. 
Because of the emphasis on activity at the national level it would be improper for the 
European level to impose rules or standards on parliamentary behaviour at the 
national level. Although this too is a well-recognised fact, it does leave national 
parliaments with the problem of how, individually, to place their mark on European 
legislation through their governments. Because national parliamentarians see 
themselves as national operators, many have been opposed to the idea of a second 
parliamentary chamber at the European level, although such an institution has been 
175 
proposed as a possible solution to the dilemma of national parliaments not being 
effective at the European level. 
4. A second chamber? 
Perhaps the first to mention a second parliamentary chamber was Michael Heseltine 
(1989). Heseltine's justification for a second parliament at the European level was two- 
fold. Firstly, he perceived a need for reconciling national and European interests and, 
secondly, saw it as a democratic way of doing so. He took the American Senate and 
German Bundesrat as models on which the second parliament could be based, asserting 
that '[t]he direct involvement of national parliaments in the democratizing of the 
community can be effected by creating an upper House of the European Parliament 
from within the membership of our national parliaments' (Heseltine, 1989, p. 35, emphasis in 
original). 
More recently the idea of a second parliament has been floated repeatedly by heads of 
state or government. The aim of a second chamber would be to bring Europe closer to 
European citizens, and improve the legitimacy of decisions taken at the European 
level. A second chamber was thus mentioned both by Joschka Fischer' in a speech at 
the Humboldt University, May 2000, while British Prime Minister Tony Blair also 
spoke of a second chamber in a speech to the Polish Stock Exchange in October 2000. In 
his speech Fischer (2000) stated that 'nation-states are realities that cannot simply be 
erased, and the more globalization and Europeanization create superstructures and 
anonymous actors remote from the citizens, the more people will cling on to the 
nation-states that give them comfort and security'. Blair, too, acknowledges that 'the 
primary sources of democratic accountability in Europe are the directly elected and 
representative institutions of the nations of Europe - national parliaments and 
governments', and that '[w]e need to get the political foundations of the European 
Union right. The foundations are rooted in the democratic nation state' (2000). 
While executives have tended to favour the notion of a second chamber, 
parliamentarians have been much more opposed to the idea. A second chamber has 
been discussed at COSAC meetings, the Speakers' Conference (see below) and the 
second Convention. The Spanish Chair of the 2002 Speaker's Conference thus, in the 
summary issued after the conference, stated that '[i]n spite of the fact that some of the 
Presidents do not totally reject the possibility of a second Chamber in the European 
Parliament, most of the participants prefer to avoid complicating the European Union 
institutional structure' (Conference of Speakers of the European Parliaments, 2002). 
21 German Foreign Minister, although on this occasion speaking in a personal capacity, and not as a 
representative of the German state or government. 
176 
One significant objection is thus that a further institution at the European level will 
cause more confusion and complicate decision-taking procedures more than it will 
contribute legitimacy. 
David Martin (vice-president of the European Parliament with responsibility for 
relations with national parliaments 1989-2004) has outlined three main issues with the 
idea of a second chamber. ' Martin argues, firstly, that the idea of a second chamber is 
based on a misconception. Even if comprised of national parliamentarians, the fact that 
it operates at the European level will mean that it ceases to be national and instead 
becomes European in nature. One way to overcome this problem, according to Martin, 
is to bring the EU to the national parliaments rather than the other way round. He 
argues that national parliaments are more focused on at the national level, with better 
press coverage for instance. Especially the improved press coverage at the national 
level could help develop knowledge of European affairs amongst European citizens. 
Martin's second and third points concern practical issues a second chamber would 
face. An indirect problem is that there would be no stable majority as national 
elections, all held at different times, would interfere with the flow of work. Martin sees 
this as a serious problem if a second chamber was to be given any real power. The 
third point is to do with competence: what, exactly, would a second chamber do? If it 
was to be a direct participant in the legislative process it would further complicate an 
already complex process. Moreover, ensuring that the principle of subsidiarity is 
properly applied does not seem to require a separate institution unless dealing with 
details of legislation rather then general principles. A further possibility is for a second 
chamber to operate post-legislation, but Martin argues that this is the role of the ECJ. 
Martin's analysis thus raises the issue of whether decisions by a second chamber are to 
be binding. If national parliamentarians working in a second chamber find that 
Community legislation does not, for instance, comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity, what would they be able to do about it? If the second chamber is given 
recourse to the ECJ, then legally binding documents would have to be the basis for the 
work of the chamber, something to which most proponents of the idea seem opposed. 
Moreover, appeals to the ECJ would impact significantly on the legislative process, 
making it both more cumbersome as well as significantly less transparent. Citizen 
reaction would have to be gauged, especially in relation to whether it would improve 
their understanding of the Community, its legislative processes and actual legislation. 
On the whole the issue of a second parliamentary chamber at the European level raises 
more questions than it answers, the idea was rejected by the House of Lords in its 
report on the issue (2001), and it is no great surprise that such an institution has not 
been introduced into the European decision-making process by the Convention. 
22 Interview B-9. 
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5. Other initiatives 
Conference of Speakers of the European Parliaments 
The conference of speakers is perhaps the oldest form of formalised contact between 
national parliaments, as they have held regular, annual meetings since 1975. According 
to Article 1 of the guidelines for the Conference, members are speakers of the national 
parliaments in the EU member countries and the President of the European 
Parliament, who all participate in meetings on an equal basis (Conference of Speakers 
of the European Parliaments, 2001b). As with COSAC, the Conference of Speakers is a 
forum for 'exchange of opinions, information and experiences, as well as for the 
promotion of research activities and common action, among the Speakers, on topics 
related to the role of Parliaments and the organisation of parliamentary functions, also 
with respect to the forms and tools of interparliamentary co-operation' (Conference of 
Speakers of the European Parliaments, 2001b, Article 2). 
However, as the mandates of the speakers of the European parliaments vary, Article 1 
also protects the 'autonomy and constitutional position of each participating Speaker'. 
To ensure that this principle is not violated, no formal conclusions are issued from the 
meetings. Instead, the chair issues a 'Chairman's Summary' based on the discussions 
held during the meeting. Although it is generally respected that no declarations or 
statements can be issued, certain speakers find it necessary to reiterate the fact that 
they are unable to do so. Accordingly, at the 2001 meeting held in Sweden, the deputy 
speaker from the British House of Commons, Sir Alan Haselhurst, made the 'traditional 
disclaimer that as an individual parliamentarian he could not speak for Parliament' 
(Conference of Speakers of the European Parliaments, 2001c, p. 15, author's emphasis). 
With the increased interest in the role of national parliaments in European decision- 
making, this topic has naturally also been discussed at the Speakers' conferences, 
especially since 2000. From this point in time it has been repeatedly underlined that 
national parliaments are important in the European architecture, and that cooperation 
between them must be strengthened (Conference of Speakers of the European 
Parliaments, 2000,2001a, 2002). Although the speakers see a purpose for their own 
meetings, a report prepared by Ivar Hansen (former speaker of the Danish Folketing) 
states that '[o]n the European scene, COSAC is the most important forum for co- 
operation between the national parliaments' (Hansen, 2002a, p. 13). The relationship 
between the Conference of Speakers and COSAC is, indeed, very close, with the 
Conference of Speakers having founded COSAC in 1989. 
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The benefits obtained from having the Speakers' Conference are similar to those of 
COSAC, although not all participants willingly set aside the time required for 
participation. A British MP, speaking off the record but with extensive experience of 
the Conference, thus stated that 'if it was up to us there wouldn't be any meetings at 
all', but also continued to say that 'we just find it valuable from the point of view of 
personal contact'. ' The latter viewpoint is echoed by Ivar Hansen (2002b) who 
experienced a 'constant exchange of new ideas and a coordination between parliaments 
about certain aspects of parliamentary work'. He further felt that good contacts 
between parliamentary administrations contributed significantly to the exchange of 
experience and knowledge. Although no formal decisions are taken, the debates and 
personal relations no doubt contribute to discussions at the national level where 
speakers may be able to influence how their parliament addresses European issues. 
This is obviously more difficult in parliaments where the speaker's role is separated 
from that of leader of the legislature, as is the case in the UK, and in such cases the 
influence may be more limited, unless committees dealing with European affairs take a 
more direct interest in the work of the Speaker's Conference. 
Other meetings and contacts 
According to Hansen's report to the Speakers' Conference, several standing committees 
from national parliaments already hold regular meetings. This includes committees on 
development and aid, defence and the environment (2002a, pp. 15-6). An official from 
the European Parliamen' also mentioned round-table meetings, as well as meetings 
between select committees-in effect specialised COSACs. National parliamentarians 
admit to being invited to these meetings, but frequently, and usually off the record, 
state that the time required could be better spent at the national level. Although many 
parliamentarians believe that committee work benefits from contact with other 
parliaments, the reluctance to become involved in European affairs remains strong. 
Erling Olsen, former speaker of the Folketing, believes that the limited participation by 
Danish parliamentarians in the first Convention can be explained by the fact that such 
work, in the main conducted abroad, goes unnoticed in the MP's constituency. Thus, 'if 
a person [MP] is to use a lot of energy on foreign affairs, it demands a very solid 
foundation in their constituency'. r' This implies that even if MPs understand the 
importance of the European dimension, their voters often do not. MPs are therefore 
forced to consider the electoral impact when choosing where to utilise their resources, 
rather than merely what they consider to be important. The problem of 
parliamentarians' reluctant participation in joint meetings is further compounded by 
23 Interview UK-9. 
24 Interview B-7. 
25 Interview DK-22. 
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practical issues as outlined by the EP official: because the European Parliament has 
constant access to simultaneous translation this is most frequently where joint 
meetings are held, giving the impression that the EP is 'pushy'. ' Memories of the 
Assize easily come to mind, and national parliamentarians' feelings of limited 
influence on procedures and the organisation of meetings may thus actually prevent 
them from taking place. 
6. Conclusion 
When considering the development of national parliaments' collective activities, a clear 
progressive development over time is evident. Inter-parliamentary cooperation has 
evolved gradually, with national parliaments increasingly taking charge of and 
pushing co-operation in directions they consider most useful. The Assize, whose 
organisation as well as final output was strongly guided by the EP, is a good example 
of inter-parliamentary cooperation that has little to offer national parliaments. 
Although relations between the EP and national parliaments are improving, national 
parliaments are still only discovering their potential when it comes to engagement in 
European policy. On the other hand, European legislation is the sole focus for the EP, 
leaving national parliaments with agendas (including institutional) that differ 
significantly to that of the EP. 
To develop inter-parliamentary cooperation (which the Assize at least established 
could be useful) COSAC was established. In this forum national parliamentarians are 
more fully in control of the agenda and the institutional arrangements and although 
development of COSAC has been slow, it has now reached a point where a common 
secretariat has been established with further, specialised, COSACs under discussion. 
For national parliaments to arrange and host several COSAC meetings would be a 
difficult undertaking, especially so with the requirement of simultaneous translation 
into all EU languages. Such practical issues may help overcome the aversion of 
national parliamentarians to conduct meetings in the EP. However, the first step is to 
persuade members of select committees that it is important they too examine European 
legislation. In order to achieve this, European scrutiny committees would have to 
surrender their monopoly on scrutiny of European legislation. Furthermore, it must 
become commonly accepted that European affairs are no longer foreign affairs, but that 
many areas of 'domestic' affairs are heavily influenced by what takes place at the 
European level. The work of COSAC, the Speakers' Conference and the Conventions 
has contributed to the linking of the two levels within national parliaments, while also 
making it generally accepted that national parliaments have a role in the European 
decision-making process-even if this is indirectly through their executives. 
Interview &7. 
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During the two Conventions, national parliaments were participants in the process of 
these events, while in the Second Convention (on the Future of the Union) they were 
also part of the agenda. Working Group IV considered both scrutiny at the national 
level and European procedures that may impede scrutiny by national parliaments, 
while also reflecting on the role national parliaments could or should play within 
Europe. 
How, precisely, the involvement of national parliaments develops remains uncertain 
and, although considered an important issue at the Convention, relatively little was 
done to clarify the situation. All inter-parliamentary cooperation emphasises the fact 
that conclusions from meetings are non-binding on participants and that national 
parliaments remain independent and autonomous actors. The lack of binding collective 
decisions at the European level makes it unlikely that national parliaments will work in 
anything but an advisory capacity at this level. However, following the relative success 
of the second Convention and its preparatory work of the IGC completed June 2004, it 
seems inconceivable that national parliaments would be excluded from any future 
treaty (re)negotiations. National parliaments have thereby succeeded in carving out a 
distinct role for themselves at the European level, although treaties will likely he 
finalised at IGCs where parliamentary representatives have no direct role. 
Because national parliaments are independent actors unwilling to become bound by 
common decisions from a forum such as COSAC, it has been difficult to discuss 
specific policies at these gatherings. Not only do national parliaments hold different 
attitudes towards policy issues, they also, institutionally, address them in different 
manners. National differences and emphasis on independence led to, especially, 
COSAC being labelled a 'talking shop', with participants debating topics such as 
'Enlargement and Employment' or 'the EU's priorities in the area of freedom, security 
and justice, including the preparation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights'. While 
these issues are of obvious importance to national-level politicians, they are also too 
unwieldy for anything more than general debate. However, as both the Speaker's 
Conference and COSAC have undertaken work with a more institutional direction and 
discussed the role for national parliaments at the European level, the road for more 
specialised debates (if not necessarily legislative work) has been paved. 
While nobody disagrees that national parliaments must be involved with European 
affairs, the nature of this involvement remains an issue-especially activities at the 
European level. Scrutiny undertaken within national parliaments at the national level 
are purely a matter for parliaments themselves to determine, a situation that reflects 
their status as independent and autonomous institutions, while also allowing 
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individual political cultures to influence the scrutiny procedures. While individual 
scrutiny activities can present problems for the individual parliaments, these are of a 
somewhat technical nature that can be overcome by the alteration of rules and 
structures within national parliaments. 
However, collective activities present problems of a different nature, mainly to do with 
the nature of national parliaments rather than that of the EU. Institutionally, national 
parliaments have a particular-national-focus, with national parliamentarians 
expected to defend and protect the interests of their-nationally based-constituents. 
Operating at the European level in anything but a non-binding manner would 
therefore be impossible, as the activities of national-level actors would be 
compromised by binding decisions at the European level, even if these were taken by 
unanimity. Moreover, in parliaments such as the British, no individual (or committee) 
can commit either of the Houses, let alone the entire Parliament, to a decision taken 
outside the British Parliament. 
While national parliaments of the EU may benefit from common discussions of topics 
of concern to all of them, the benefits achieved are therefore likely to be most acutely 
felt at the national level. National governments may negotiate on behalf of the member 
state at the European level, but parliamentarians legitimise these decisions by 
supporting them in the national parliaments. Nevertheless, procedures for scrutiny 
may develop as a result of discussions with other parliamentarians, and awareness that 
scrutiny of European legislation is an important task to be undertaken may also 
develop as a result of collective actions. The inter-relationship between the collective 
and individual levels is thus important, and better knowledge of this may contribute to 
an improved understanding of scrutiny at the national level. 
Currently, much more information is available about what is formally possible (such as 
the Rules of Procedure for COSAC or formal instructions on how European 
committees in national parliaments work), than about what actually takes place. This is 
the case for both collective and individual parliamentary activities, which itself begs a 
number of questions. For instance, why has COSAC developed the way it has? Why 
has a further Assize never been held? And how, exactly, has interparliamentary 
cooperation fed into activities at the national level? More research is needed to fully 
understand inter-parliamentary cooperation-but especially the interplay between 
collective and individual actions. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
As the European Union has developed, so has the role of national parliaments within 
it. Initially expected t 
o do little more than ratify treaties that national governments had negotiated, 
parliaments have become increasingly involved in EU decision-making through 
scrutiny procedures of varying complexity. Most academic work on European 
integration has largely ignored national parliaments, and although they are included in 
the Constitutional Treaty, no previous EU treaty mentions national parliaments. This 
contrasts with the European Parliament, which has been given specific (and 
expanding) roles in each treaty ratified since the EU was founded. Integration theorists, 
even writers on multi-level governance, view national parliaments mainly as 
supporters of national governments and their policies on the EU. When national 
governments could veto decisions in the Council, national parliaments could still, 
formally, be considered sovereign. However, as the integration process has deepened 
and the impact of European legislation has become more widely felt at the domestic 
level, national parliaments have found that their room to manoeuvre has shrunk. 
National parliaments have become part of a multi-level system of governance and can 
no longer, singularly, determine the parameters within which they operate. 
The aim of this thesis has been to develop a better understanding of how national 
parliaments are involved with European legislation. Central to the problem of how 
national parliaments engage with European affairs is the contradiction of national 
parliaments dealing with European legislation. However, the increased involvement in 
EU decision-making by national parliaments, at both the national and the European 
levels, reflects the fact that, while legislation may originate at different levels, both are 
being implemented at the national level, making it important that the views of national 
parliamentarians are taken into account during the decision-making process. 
The three main findings of the thesis all link to how membership of the EU is causing 
changes at the national level. Firstly, it has been established that Europeanisation has 
caused changes within national parliaments. These changes are detectable in both 
governance, institutionalisation and discourse. Secondly, parliamentary developments 
have occurred within the framework of each parliament's own national political 
culture. Existing rules for dealing with national legislation have most frequently been 
adopted for EU legislation and national differences in how scrutiny procedures have 
developed can therefore be traced to different parliamentary approaches to domestic 
legislation. A certain level of convergence can, however, be detected. This has, to some 
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extent, been due to the third finding, that inter-parliamentary cooperation has been of 
some importance to national procedures, although the exact extent to which national 
parliamentarians let other parliamentary procedures guide them is difficult to gauge. 
It can, however, be firmly concluded that adjusting to the new international system of 
governance has not been easy for national parliaments. Many parliamentarians are still 
finding it difficult to grasp the importance and impact (domestically) of European 
cooperation. Typically, small groups of parliamentarians within national parliaments 
(usually the members of committees charged with examining European matters) have 
developed a significant knowledge of European affairs and the implications of 
European legislation at the domestic level. In contrast, parliamentarians who are not 
members of European committees (a significant majority) often have no involvement 
with European affairs on a regular basis and do not automatically consider the 
European dimension in their daily work. Increasingly, this situation has become 
untenable. EU specialists are unable to provide the expertise on all areas covered by 
European integration and increasingly need expertise from other committees within 
national parliaments to perform their scrutiny adequately. For a coherent 
parliamentary stance to develop on EU matters, it therefore seems to make institutional 
sense to maintain EU committees as coordinating bodies-even in parliaments that do 
not mandate their ministers. 
Despite the variety of political cultures and systems within which the national 
parliaments of the EU operate, it can be argued that they have followed a similar 
developmental path in terms of their involvement with European affairs. The first 
section of this concluding chapter will therefore examine the connection between 
national-level scrutiny and Europeanisation. In an attempt to bridge a seeming 
contradiction, it argues that although there is an international element to national 
scrutiny of European cooperation, support for stricter scrutiny has mainly developed 
from the national level. The second section will look specifically at developments at the 
national level, followed, in the third section, by a closer look at the convergent 
movements that can be detected in the evolving scrutiny procedures. 
1. Europeanisation 
Academic debate on Europeanisation' has developed to the extent that 
Europeanisation has become a phenomenon to be explained (explanandum) rather 
Defined in the introduction as: 
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than the explanation itself (explanans) (Radaelli, 2004, p. 8). Employing 
Europeanisation as an explanandum, this research becomes a 'bottom-up' study. Again 
drawing on work by Radaelli (2004, p. 8), a bottom-up study can be defined as research 
where 
the starting point is a system of interaction at the domestic level. By using 
time and temporal causal sequences, a bottom-up approach checks if, 
when, and how the EU provides change in any of the main components of 
the system of interaction. Finally, "bottom-uppers" try to measure the 
consequences of all this in terms of change at the domestic level. 
Scrutiny systems within national parliaments have been altered as a direct 
consequence of EU membership. These changes have significantly affected interactions 
between national parliaments, executives and administrations, all of which can be 
considered 'main components' of national systems of governance. Although there is a 
developing element of international cooperation in parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs, the main thrust has occurred at the national level, with national parliaments 
developing their internal procedures and structures to integrate and scrutinise 
European legislation more effectively. It can therefore be argued that the 'story' of 
parliamentary scrutiny begins and finishes at the national level, although 
Europeanisation has influenced these changes which can be measured in a 'before and 
after' fashion, as well as in a comparative manner. Both types of comparisons are 
important, as 'snapshots' of individual parliamentary scrutiny capabilities do not 
promote our overall understanding of the role of national parliaments within the 
European governance structure. 
When used as an explanatory tool in the analysis of national parliamentary adaptation 
of scrutiny procedures, Europeanisation covers all three of Radaelli's types of 'deep 
interrogations': Europeanisation as governance, institutionalisation and discourse 
(2004, pp. 10-14). As has become evident in the three case studies, membership of the 
EU has caused changes (albeit to varying degrees) to governance in all three member 
states; institutions have altered and discourse has both expanded and (partially) 
reconstructed. 
It can be argued that membership of the EU has altered governance within the member 
states, but also that increased national parliamentary involvement in European affairs 
in turn has impacted upon governance at both the national and European levels. 
Membership initially reduced the role of national parliaments, thereby shifting the 
Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political 
structures and public policies. 
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inter-institutional balance, redistributing power and influence between national 
parliaments and their executives and administrations. As the involvement of national 
parliaments in European affairs develops, this balance is continuously being addressed 
as well. National parliaments have ceded power to the European level on a permanent 
basis, and, using the definitions of power and influence from the introductory chapter, ' 
will only be able to regain a certain level of influence over European decisions! As the 
three case studies have clearly shown, the extent to which national parliaments pursue 
this influence varies considerably, with the Danish Folketing at one end of the 
continuum and the Italian Parliament at the other. 
A question raised by Radaelli (2004, p. 11) is whether Europeanisation produces `good 
and legitimate' governance in Europe. Almost by definition, greater scrutiny of 
European affairs by national parliaments can only lead to more legitimate governance 
within Europe. It should be recognised, however, that legitimacy and efficiency might 
work in opposite directions. While national parliamentarians may improve the 
legitimacy of European legislation by engaging in EU decision-making, the efficiency 
with which legislation is being produced may suffer to the extent that decision-making 
becomes slow and difficult, potentially reducing the benefits of legitimacy originally 
conferred by parliamentary involvement. 
National parliamentarians are generally considered to be closer to European citizens 
and therefore also more aware of and sensitive to the wishes and interests of the 
citizens. While it is important that decisions taken by executives at the European level 
are supported by national parliaments, in the eyes of member state citizens such 
decisions may appear more legitimate if they have been scrutinised by 
parliamentarians at the national level. Any increase in legitimacy may be due to the 
perception that national-level political institutions are more legitimate than those at the 
European level, but may also result from expectations that national parliamentarians 
examine European legislation from a national perspective-and therefore protect 
national interests. 
As scrutiny procedures have evolved to include more national parliamentarians from 
outside European committees, they have developed to include a specialised aspect 
(through MPs from other select committees) that complements the European expertise. 
Europeanisation has thus caused institutional adaptation throughout EU member state 
2 Influence was defined as policy-shaping, whereas power was described as policy-setting. Using these 
definitions it is possible to have influence without power, while power may bring influence as well. 
3 It may be argued that the Danish scrutiny committee exercises power over the domestic aspect of 
European decision. However, as the committee operates on the basis of a political agreement and does not 
formally have the legal right to mandate the executive, it is, technically, more correct to describe its 
activities as influencing decisions, rather than exercising power over these. Moreover, as the mandates it 
provides can be voted down at the European level, there is no guarantee that the committees preferred 
options are achieved, thereby limiting it to attempts at influencing the final outcome. 
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parliaments as, at the domestic level, scrutiny procedures have been reassessed and 
European committees established or strengthened, while parliamentary cooperation at 
the international level-especially through COSAC-has also been developed. 
Arguably, parliaments can therefore be described as fulfilling the second condition in 
Börzel and Risse's argument that 
Europeanization must be "inconvenient", i. e., there must be some degree of 
"misfit" or incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and 
institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and 
institutions, on the other. This degree of fit or misfit constitutes 
adaptational pressures, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
expecting change. The second condition is that there are some facilitating 
factors - be it actors, be it institutions - responding to the adaptational 
pressures (Börzel and Risse, 2000, p. 1). 
While national parliaments have altered procedures and re-assessed their activities in 
relation to the European level, this has not necessarily been a response to adaptational 
pressure from the European level. Indeed, pressure from domestic audiences and 
actors, based on requirements other than perceived misfits between the national and 
European levels, may in many cases have been more significant than pressure from the 
European level. 
However, the notion of pressure from the European level warrants further reflection. 
Although European-level actors have long argued that national parliamentary 
involvement would benefit the legitimacy of European legislation, agreement on the 
nature of such involvement has been illusive. New institutions at the European level 
have been deemed undesirable, while European-level actors have also been hesitant to 
dictate solutions for the national level (as evident in the proceedings of Working Group 
IV at the Convention on the Future of the Union). Beyond guarantees regarding 
delivery of documents and time for national parliaments to examine them, few 
initiatives have been discussed, and fewer still come to fruition. 
The EP has realised that national parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation is a 
necessary step if the EU (and therefore also the EP as an institution) is to gain greater 
legitimacy. Its response has been to invite national parliaments to multi-lateral 
meetings of specialised committees, while also taking a strong interest in COSAC. 
However, it has never made suggestions for scrutiny procedures at the national level. 
National parliaments have determined their own systems for scrutiny of European 
affairs. While national parliaments still differ significantly with respect to their levels of 
ambition and individual procedures, increased attention to the EU and European 
legislation has, at the very least, had the consequence of inducing most national 
parliamentarians to consider the appropriate level of their involvement. 
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Even within national parliaments, several distinct types of participants in such debates 
can be identified. The most obvious line of division is perhaps that between supporters 
and opponents of further European integration. Less visible, but likely to prove more 
important, is the distinction between MPs frequently involved with European affairs 
and those who only rarely engage with the European dimension. Comprehension of 
the multi-level system of governance that national parliaments increasingly operate in 
is becoming ever more important for parliamentarians to carry out their work 
effectively. More of a continuum than a dichotomy, the latter distinction has 
parliamentarians active in European scrutiny committees at one end and MPs serving 
on committees with a remit not much affected by EU legislation (such as social affairs) 
at the other. ' In between these two are MPs serving on committees whose remits, to 
varying degrees, are affected by European legislation. 
All these participants bring their own sets of ideas and language to debates and 
interactions on parliamentary involvement in European affairs and the appropriate 
methods of scrutiny, thus becoming purveyors of Radaelli's third understanding of 
Europeanisation: that of discourse. According to Radaelli, discourse is both 'a set of 
ideas and an interactive process' (2004, p. 14, emphasis in original), with the former 
being the process of making sense of and judging reality, while the latter covers policy 
formulation and communication with the public. In the three case studies, 
Europeanisation as discourse can therefore be interpreted as debate on how national 
parliaments are to be involved with European affairs and how they can incorporate the 
need for scrutiny of European legislation into already existing national political 
cultures. All participants in this debate can utilise (selective) elements in their 
communications with the public, claiming, for instance, that European legislation is 
being subjected to greater scrutiny, and therefore kept under better (domestic) 
democratic control, or improved for the benefit of all Europeans. 
National parliaments, through their internal discourse, may also communicate more 
about the EU to their voters. Where this takes place, it can be argued that 
'Europeanisation is a process through which the EU gains its own autonomous 
meaning and self-validation within the logics, cognitive frames, and norms of 
behaviour of domestic actors' (Radaelli, 2004, p. 13). In other words, the fact that 
national parliaments engage in debates on the most appropriate level of involvement 
in European affairs to some extent legitimises the EU and the legislation it produces. 
However, the projected legitimacy is not dependent on a specific output (such as the 
achievement of a particular result at a Council meeting). The mere fact that parliaments 
In the UK House of Commons, the point furthest away from the ESC would be not serving on a select 
committee at all, and in no other way being involved with work at the European level as, for instance, a 
Speaker of the House involved in the Speakers' Conference. 
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discuss how to involve themselves more at the European level, individually as well as 
collectively, confers a degree of legitimacy to the European level of cooperation. 
In national parliaments' debates on scrutiny procedures, it is therefore possible to find 
all three of Radaelli's aspects of Europeanisation. National-level discourse assesses the 
situation, and establishes parameters for responses that are acceptable to both 
politicians and the public. These responses often require alterations of existing 
procedures, if not the institutional setting, and will in turn affect governance. Over 
time, the adaptations required in both institutions and governance take place at the 
national as well as European levels. Scrutiny procedures impact directly on inter- 
institutional relations at the national level-and indirectly on governance at the 
European level through the European Council. Moreover, events like the Convention 
on the Future of Europe, where national parliamentarians were involved to such a 
degree that their exclusion from any future Conventions would be inconceivable, are 
evidence that national parliamentarians are involved in the negotiation of the 
fundamental agreements on which future European integration is to be built. The circle 
has thus been dosed: national actors are involved in negotiating the conditions under 
which European cooperation will take place, cooperation which in turn influences 
discourses, institutions and governance at the domestic level, again feeding back into 
structures and debates at the European level. 
2. National parliaments in the EU 
The second major finding of this thesis is that national parliaments have largely 
adopted (and adapted) procedures for scrutiny of domestic legislation for scrutiny of 
European legislation. This process has taken into account specific domestic political 
cultures and requirements. Despite this finding, it is also largely true that national 
parliamentary participation in the European legislative process has passed through 
three stages (as described by Norton). During the first stage 'parliaments were 
accorded no formal role in the process of supranational law making, and they had little 
inclination to seek such a role. ... A policy inimical to the national interest could be 
killed off in the Council of ministers. There appeared little reason for national 
parliaments to get involved' (1996a, p. 177)' During this initial stage, European affairs 
were considered foreign policy and therefore a matter for the executive, with national 
interests amply protected through the right of veto. Furthermore, even in the countries 
most skeptical of European cooperation (notably Denmark and the United Kingdom) 
the emphasis was on economics, with the promise of an 'ever closer Union' yet to 
s Of the three case studies both the Danish Folketing and the British Parliament can be considered as 
exceptions to this statement, due to their emphasis on parliamentary scrutiny from the outset of 
Community membership. 
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develop into the Maastricht Treaty. Economic cooperation was thus looked upon with 
approval but it avoided closer national parliamentary scrutiny by being dressed up as 
foreign policy. 
Despite the right of national veto on most important issues, the Community was not a 
static entity during the early years of cooperation. ' Changes in European structures and 
activities meant that national parliaments became aware of the importance of involving 
themselves in Community issues and attempted to adapt. While the European-level 
changes encompassed growth in size as well as scope for the Community (thereby 
extending its operations into many new fields of cooperation), for national parliaments 
the main impetus for change was the SEA and the White Paper preceding it. These 
documents made it clear that European Cooperation was no longer simply about a 
free(er) internal market and that even the undertaking of an internal market would 
impinge seriously on what had previously been exclusively domestic policy-and 
therefore the domain of national parliaments. 
The move towards a single market brought with it a considerable increase in the 
number of legislative acts originating from Brussels, a significant factor contributing to 
a raised awareness amongst national parliamentarians of European issues. Moreover, 
altered decision-making procedures at the European level (mainly involving a 
significant increase in the use of qualified majority voting) meant that national interests 
could no longer be protected as previously. These developments further marginalised 
national parliaments in the European legislative process, a connection that was 
weakened even more as the direct link between national parliaments and the European 
level was severed when direct elections to the EP began in 1979. MEPs were now 
directly elected and no longer seconded from national parliaments, with an ever- 
diminishing number of MEPs holding a 'double mandate'. During this same period the 
EP's influence grew significantly-granted, ironically, by national parliaments 
ratifying consecutive treaties. 
However, the power accorded the EP did not match that ceded by national 
parliaments, a process that contributed to the democratic deficit. In the words of Juliet 
Lodge 
neither [national parliaments nor the EP] can exercise effective control over 
either what national governments do in the EU or what the EU executive 
6 J. H. H. Weiler (1999, p. 16) has argued that 'from a legal-normative point of view, the community 
developed in that first phase with an inexorable dynamism of enhanced supranationalism. European legal 
integration moved powerfully ahead. From a political-decisional-procedural point of view, the very same 
period was characterized by a counter-development towards intergovernmentalism and away from 
European integration'. Weiler (Weiler, 1999, p. 96) further states that both processes were necessary, with 
each 'conditioning' and'explaining' the other. 
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does. National governments were responsible for this situation and 
deliberately engineered a situation whereby national parliaments were 
denied effective controls over national executives. This made it easier for 
national governments, working within the council, to escape national as 
well as European parliamentary scrutiny and control. Thus, allegations that 
the European Parliament was engaged in an exercise to increase its powers 
at national parliaments' expense were based on a false premise: national 
governments, not the European Parliament, were the beneficiaries of 
parliamentary weakness at both national and EU level (1996a, p. 188). 
The Council's ability to evade the control of both national parliaments and the EP is 
described by Lodge (1996a, p. 190) as a 'double democratic deficit', which became 
recognised at both the national and European levels, and seen as requiring addressing 
at both levels. Although, technically, it is possible to democratise the European level by 
granting the EP additional legislative power (which has happened with every new 
treaty since the establishment of European cooperation), this solution on its own is 
politically untenable. In attempting to overcome the democratic deficit it has been 
necessary simultaneously to Europeanise the national level, a process that has taken 
place through national parliaments becoming increasingly engaged in scrutiny of 
European legislation. 
National parliaments adapting to the changes occurring at the European level are 
described by Norton as the second stage in the developing relationship between 
national parliaments and Europe: 
The national parliaments could not rely solely on the European Parliament 
to scrutinise EC documents and hold the Commission and Council of 
Ministers to account.... The result has been that, in the field of EC affairs, 
national parliaments have exhibited, from the mid-1980s onwards, three 
distinct characteristics: (i) greater specialisation, (ii) greater activity, and 
(iii) some attempts to integrate MEPs into their activities (Norton, 1996a, p. 
179). 
Moreover, according to Neunreither (1994, p. 303) 'national parliaments 
underestimated very much, for a long time, the impact of the EC's evolution on their 
own political functions. ... Only with considerable delay did parliaments start to think 
about specific internal structures which could help them to fulfill their role'. The 
continued lack of influence led Norton (1996a, p. 182) to declare that 'national 
parliaments not only remain marginalised within EC/EU law-making but are 
increasingly marginalised'. Much earlier, Michael Niblock (1971, p. 34) had similarly 
concluded that 'the initiative lies elsewhere than with the national Parliaments which 
have no obvious part to play except to be compliant in the face of diminishing 
authority'. 
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National parliamentarians have taken somewhat longer to recognise their diminishing 
authority, but have created or strengthened committees specifically dealing with 
European issues. Despite this 'awakening', it is obvious that not all parliaments in the 
EU member states have developed similar levels of power and influence. As was 
shown in Chapter three, the ability to influence domestic legislation does not always 
equate to influence over European legislation (see summary in Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1: Types of actors in a two-level game 
Strong national player Weak national player 
Strong European player DK, SF EP 
Modestly strong European 
player 
D, S F, UK 
Weak European player A, 1, NL B, E, GR, IR, LUX, P 
Table adapted from: (Maurer and Wessels, ZUUla, p. 51U). 
The three case studies have provided an understanding of how European scrutiny has 
developed. Moreover, the analysis clearly shows that attempts to hold national 
executives accountable have varied substantially in both effort and effectiveness. 
Individual national contexts and political cultures have determined the seriousness 
with which scrutiny of executive activities at the European level have been 
approached-and often also the methods utilised. 
While it may have been natural for national parliaments and the EP to become allies in 
the process of scrutinising Community legislation and keeping the European-level 
executive accountable, instead animosity developed between the two levels. This 
animosity was in part due to the increased independence the EP gained in 1979 when 
direct elections were introduced, but was also caused by subsequent increases in the 
EP's powers and influence that were felt to be at the cost of national parliaments. The 
treaties granting increased powers to the EP were all negotiated without the direct 
participation of national parliaments (or indeed the EP). Treaties have historically been 
a result of compromises agreed by national executives, with government 
representatives doing the negotiating. Presented with the final result ex post facto, 
national parliaments have found themselves in a 'take it or leave it' position where 
they stood the risk of jeopardising the European integration process if they rejected the 
treaty, an option few parliaments have even contemplated. This has especially been the 
case if a government negotiating on behalf of a nation holds a majority in parliament! 
7 There have been a few exceptions to this scenario. The Danish government could not build a 
parliamentary majority supporting the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) when this treaty went 
through the ratification process in 1986. This was somewhat inconsequential, as a referendum had already 
been planned, in the event carrying the ratification. Problems were also experienced in the German and 
British Parliaments in the early 1990s when the TEU went through the process of ratification. 
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Direct parliamentary involvement at the European level is, however, a relatively new 
phenomenon. It was only seriously undertaken with the two Conventions on Human 
Rights and the Future of Europe. The second Convention did not result in a new treaty, 
but in a draft treaty that was recommended to the IGC that followed the Convention. 
However, the involvement of national parliaments has set a precedent, making it 
unlikely that future treaties will be negotiated without initial, preparatory involvement 
of national parliaments. As discussed below, the participation of national parliaments 
in the two Conventions (together with the developments of COSAC described in 
Chapter eight) can be seen as part of a trend towards more parliamentary cross-border 
cooperation. In the words of Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004, p. 3) 
[i]nternational parliamentary organizations have been traditionally well 
meaning though ineffective, but today national parliamentarians are 
meeting to adopt and publicize common positions on the death penalty, 
human rights, and environmental issues. They support one another in 
legislative initiatives and offer training programs and technical assistance. 
Within the EU, the involvement of national parliaments in the final stage of treaty 
negotiating remains unlikely, as does any other direct representation of national 
parliaments at the European level. National parliaments thus remain marginal players 
in decision-making at the European level, at the most participating indirectly through 
attempting to influence their executives. Holding the executive to account is a task 
frequently listed in an overview of parliamentary duties. However, as outlined in 
Chapter three, it is an activity several parliaments within the EU still do not perform 
effectively with regard to European legislation. National parliaments thus still display 
significant differences in their treatment of domestic and European legislation. This is 
despite the fact that the current, and third, stage described by Norton (1996a, p. 182) is 
one where national parliaments are considered as integral to addressing the 
democratic deficit within the EU. Member state parliaments are all at, or well on their 
way towards, this third stage-even if they are all doing it in their own way. Their 
movement in this direction reflects the recognition that granting the EP powers akin to 
those held by national parliaments will not sufficiently alleviate the democratic deficit 
within the EU, since the nature of European co-operation is such that parliamentary 
legitimacy must be obtained at both the European and national levels. 
As has been demonstrated in the case studies, national parliaments have been forced to 
develop new areas of activity as a direct consequence of EU membership. Whereas 
foreign affairs have traditionally been handled by a small number of MPs in a 
committee dedicated specifically to that topic, an increasing number of 
parliamentarians, especially through work in select committees, now dedicate time to 
EU legislation as a matter of course. EU membership has consequently contributed to a 
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gradual parliamentary shift in orientation from the purely domestic to the inclusion of 
transnational issues. In two of the case studies, Denmark and Italy, this recognition has 
resulted in stronger cooperation between EU committees and other select committees 
within parliament, whereas in the British Parliament no such cooperation exists. In the 
latter case individual committees may choose to include a European angle in their 
reports, but have not done so at the instigation of the ESC (House of Commons) or the 
EU Select Committee (House of Lords). 
Overall, however, parliamentarians are engaging more with European issues, with the 
consequence that parliaments and their work have come to reflect increasing 
globalisation. For national parliamentarians the full effect of this development is yet to 
be realised. Many parliamentarians still remain unaware of it (especially in the UK and 
Italian parliaments), while others have been unable to fulfill their ambitions for 
scrutiny (again mainly the case in the UK and Italy). " To some extent, the continued 
existence of political subcultures heavily involved with European affairs has prevented 
a broader awareness of how important it is for all parliamentarians to engage in 
scrutiny of European legislation. These subcultures, however, have become more 
aware of-and increasingly vocal about-the need to involve parliament on a wider 
scale 
3. Convergence 
It is obvious that responses to Europeanisation have varied significantly and that 
variations above all reflect differences in national political cultures. Even where it is 
recognised that influence can only be achieved through government representatives in 
the Council, some parliaments (such as the Danish, Finnish and Swedish) wish to 
influence EU legislation, while other parliaments (for example those of Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) have more modest ambitions, simply wishing to remain informed 
about European activities and, if necessary, express an opinion thereon. 
However, discernable patterns of convergent movements have still occurred, with the 
first being recognition of the impact European legislation has on domestic legislation. 
Scrutiny procedures thus, at a minimum, involve more awareness of and information 
' It should also be noted that for some, even the most comprehensive system of scrutiny is not good 
enough. A Danish parliamentarian thus conceded that, under the current system with the Council as the 
main decision-taker, it would be difficult to improve much on the existing procedures and involvement of 
national parliamentarians. However, this politician also stated: 'I cannot image what reforms would be 
required before I would feel like a real participant in a democratic process' (interview DK-11). 
The best example of parliamentarians recognising the need for greater parliamentary involvement is 
perhaps the institutional structure of the new 14h, Committee in the Italian Senate, where committee 
members are also members of another select committee within the Senate. This particular institutional 
structure ensures a combination of specialised and EU knowledge-büt still runs the risk of ghettoising 
European affairs. 
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about government activities at the European level. Of the three case studies the least 
involved is the Italian parliament. Focusing mainly on passing the legge comunitaria 
that ensures the implementation of European legislation, both chambers have found 
pre-decision involvement difficult. Scrutiny of executive activities is not an activity the 
Italian parliament performs well-a fact that has made it difficult to engage Italian 
MPs in scrutiny of European issues. The British parliament has developed a deeper 
involvement than has the Italian. This is especially so in the House of Lords which has 
the ability to write in-depth reports on legislative proposals originating at the 
European level, whereas the House of Commons is limited to deciding whether 
proposals are of political or legal importance. Both chambers are consequently kept 
informed about European matters and may also impose the scrutiny reserve power if 
an issue is considered important enough. However, direct influence by either chamber 
over European legislation is still not possible. As the EUC in the Danish Folketing 
delivers negotiating mandates to ministers representing Denmark in the Council, it has 
the highest level of ambition to fulfill. The Danish system is often criticised for only 
involving the Folketing at this very late stage of the decision-making process. However, 
supporters of the system claim that the EUC's influence is evident at much earlier 
stages of the decision-making process because of the awareness amongst Danish civil 
servants of the final requirement that decisions must be agreed to by the EUC. 
Knowledge about scrutiny procedures in other EU parliaments has increased as 
interparliamentary contacts have developed through multilateral meetings or 
parliamentary delegations visiting each other. Italian parliamentarians thus perceive 
the British system of scrutiny as desirable and ambitious (providing timely information 
on and analysis of all European legislation). Moreover, although many British MPs 
consider the Danish mandating system unworkable and too involved, a certain 
admiration for its thoroughness and strong parliamentary involvement can also be 
detected. A limited degree of 'trickle down' effect can thus be found as national 
parliaments learn from each other. 
Contributing to the convergence is an underlying shift in the perception of how the EU 
is to be understood. EU affairs have traditionally been treated as foreign affairs by 
national parliamentarians, thereby relinquishing control and permitting executives to 
act largely unrestricted in this area. As European integration has broadened to include 
an expanding range of issues, and as domestic legislation is increasingly affected by 
decisions taken at the European level, the perception of EU affairs as foreign affairs has 
changed. In all three case studies the differentiation between EU and foreign policy has 
led to greater scrutiny of European topics. Over time, this development may likely 
cause greater divisions within national parliaments as European legislation is subjected 
to inter- and intra-party disagreements usually only applied to domestic legislation. 
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On the other hand, because European legislation becomes subjected to greater scrutiny, 
it may also become invested with greater legitimacy. While it is still not possible to 
claim that EU legislation is thought of as similar to domestic legislation, a 
differentiation has been established between it and foreign policy, with European 
affairs attracting increasing attention and resources within national parliaments. As 
globalisation develops and the world becomes increasingly 'networked' (Slaughter, 
2004), the requirement that national parliamentarians add an international dimension 
in their work will only become more pressing. 
Foreign policy has traditionally been less divisive within national parliaments than 
domestic policy, a situation reflected in national parliamentary treatment of European 
matters which in many instances has been based on broad parliamentary agreements. 
However, as the interest in and scrutiny of European affairs increases, the differences 
between European and foreign policy are likely to become increasingly well 
understood. Moreover, it is likely that traditional political cleavages will come to apply 
to European as well as domestic issues. For the three case studies, the implications 
could-potentially-be significant. In Italy, the historic broad and often unquestioning 
support for European matters may gradually disappear as Italy, for instance, becomes 
a net contributor to the European budget. The EP's rejection of the candidacy of the 
Italian nominee Rocco Butiliogne for the European commission in 2004 over his 
perceived anti-gay and anti-feminist views illustrates both points: the emergence of the 
traditional secular-confessional cleavage in EU politics and fresh doubts about the 
European project in Italy more generally. Traditional broad agreements on EU affairs 
in the Danish Folketing may also dissolve as EU affairs are subjected to domestic 
political cleavages with select committees increasingly involved in the scrutiny 
process. A shift of this nature seems least likely to take place in the British parliament 
where EU affairs remain very isolated within the parliamentary structure and daily 
activities. However, resisting such a shift altogether is difficult when treaties must be 
ratified, especially when such ratification involves the consultation of the public 
through a referendum. 
A further convergent movement is that of closer involvement of select committees in 
scrutiny procedures. However, pressure to involve departmental select committees 
more closely in the scrutiny of European legislation has come from different directions 
in the three case studies. Whereas the European committees in the Danish and Italian 
parliaments are insistent that other select committees need to develop their activities 
on European matters, the British ESC has been more intent on keeping its scrutiny 
powers to itself. Nonetheless, other committees within both chambers of the UK 
parliament have included a European angle where it has been considered relevant. 
While this trend is strongest in the House of Lords, it can also be observed in the 
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House of Commons and is a development both chambers will have to consider in 
future reviews of scrutiny of European legislation. 
Because of the (current) stark separation between committees within both houses of the 
British Parliament, scrutiny of European affairs has the potential to become a matter of 
contention. The potential for disagreements remains greater within the House of Lords 
because of its ability to write reports questioning the merit of European legislation. 
Within the House of Commons the remit of the ESC is significantly different to that of 
other select committees (its work being ex ante rather than ex post), to the extent that 
potential conflicts may be, if not avoided, then at least possible to overcome. However, 
the ESC may begin to assess European proposals in a more qualitative manner, 
inquiring as to the potential impact of European legislation at the domestic level, a 
move that, in effect, would anticipate the work of other select committees, thereby 
increasing the scope for conflict. 
How British parliamentarians perceive EU matters is likely to dictate how the UK 
Parliament approaches scrutiny of European affairs. If EU legislation is thought of as 
being both separate from and distinct to domestic legislation, it is likely to remain 
isolated within parliamentary activities. However, if a connection between the two 
levels of legislation is acknowledged, a more holistic manner of examining European 
legislation may eventually develop. More thorough scrutiny would require 
cooperation between select committees and the ESC in the Commons. 
As national parliaments increasingly involve themselves with European affairs, the 
nature of their information requirements alters. Not only do they need the actual 
legislative proposals from Europe, they also need to be aware of their governments' 
concerns and analysis surrounding the legislative proposal. However, while such 
technical information is necessary, it may in fact be of limited relevance for the 
purposes of influencing the legislation, as real influence is difficult to achieve 
subsequent to the Commission proposing European legislation. If national 
parliamentarians are to achieve a measure of influence over European legislation, their 
awareness of upcoming legislation is crucial. Such a shift in focus would require yet 
further adjustments both internally within parliaments and in their relationships with 
national executives-an area in need of much further research. " 
A progressive development can thus be detected in national parliaments' involvement 
in European affairs, beginning with a distinction being made between EU and foreign 
" information-sharing and discussions of these topics take place at events such as COSAC meetings and 
the Speakers' Conference but, as discussed in Chapter eight, it is difficult to ascertain how useful 
participants find these meetings. 
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affairs, with the former increasingly treated more in line with domestic legislation. An 
acknowledgement of the difference has most frequently led to a higher level of scrutiny 
of EU affairs, often involving committees other than those involved solely with 
European scrutiny. Consequently, the possibility that European affairs become part of 
everyday parliamentary life, with parliamentarians outside scrutiny committees also 
examining European legislation and its national-level impact, has developed. To do so 
adequately, parliamentarians require new levels of information made available to them 
by administrations and governments, procedures that forge new relationships. 
National parliaments differ with respect to how far they have travelled down this 
developmental path, but all have moved in the same direction. 
4. Conclusions 
The traditional role of national parliaments has been challenged. From being 
institutions where legislation is determined, EU member state parliaments have been 
reduced to participant-observers in a decision-making process over which they are 
unable to exercise full control or power. The influence national parliaments potentially 
have over European decision-making has become easier to wield with the growing 
recognition of their importance within that process. However, as has been shown in the 
case studies, the willingness of national parliamentarians to exercise this influence has 
varied. In part this may be due to the nature of the new demands being made of 
national parliaments. Increasingly national parliamentarians are required to 
incorporate an international dimension into their work in national 
parliaments-institutions whose natural operational environment remains the national 
level (as is evident, for instance, from their strong reluctance to permit binding 
decisions to be taken in inter-parliamentary forums). 
This thesis has provided insights into parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs while 
also making it possible to present a number of general conclusions as well as the three 
main findings already outlined. 
Firstly, if national parliaments are to engage successfully with European decision- 
making (let alone decisions at the global level), several requirements must be fulfilled. 
One is the development of an overview of European legislative activities. A 
comprehensive overview is necessary, not only to influence events in the most 
constructive and effective way, but also in order to scrutinise government conduct 
during the decision-making process adequately. " The nature of national parliaments, 
with the occurrence of regular elections, makes such institutional memory significantly 
more difficult to develop than in national administrations. Developing a more 
11 The term 'adequately' being defined by national practices and political cultures. 
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substantial parliamentary bureaucracy to counter the government's administration is 
clearly not the answer as it is outside the role of national parliaments to develop 
alternative policies to those of their governments. The importance of trust and respect 
between national parliaments and national administrations therefore becomes 
paramount. 
Secondly, a further concern is the skill-set national parliamentarians themselves will be 
required to develop. For many, a second or third language will be necessary in order to 
follow European legislation adequately-especially during the later stages where 
changes may take place relatively quickly and translations of the relevant texts may 
not always be available. Moreover, a more comprehensive understanding of European 
decision-making procedures is required in order to maximise the influence of national 
parliaments. National parliamentarians must also develop an understanding of when 
their efforts are most effective-and therefore most efficient in terms of resources 
applied. 
However, achieving parliamentary engagement in scrutiny of European affairs faces a 
significant obstacle as the electoral rewards for conducting efficient scrutiny of 
European legislation remain very limited. Although politicians are increasingly aware 
that, in order to conduct their jobs properly, they must include the European 
dimension in their work, this realisation has not yet 'spilled over' to become general 
knowledge amongst voters. " It can thus be argued that the (significant) energy and 
resources required to undertake thorough scrutiny have not been well spent if it does 
not result in re-election. Politicians, at both the European and national levels, thus face 
the task of educating European citizens about how European legislation impacts upon 
the domestic level, and why it is important for national parliamentarians to engage 
with European issues. This, in effect, amounts to Europeanisation, with domestic 
discourse increasingly influenced by European-level activities. 
Thirdly, the mere fact that parliaments discuss how to involve themselves more at the 
European level, individually as well as collectively, confers a degree of legitimacy to 
the European level of cooperation. Moreover, engaging with European citizens in 
order to convey this development is becoming an important function for national 
parliamentarians. As the EU's legitimacy has become accepted by national 
parliamentarians, through them increasingly incorporating European affairs into their 
daily work, the reasons and methods behind such incorporation must be explained 
beyond parliamentary committees in order for wider acceptance and understanding of 
multi-level governance to develop. 
'2 If all parliamentarians included a European dimension in their work this concern would, obviously, be 
irrelevant. 
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Fourthly, with globalisation, parliamentary scrutiny of executives will have to alter. 
From mainly operating and focusing on the national level, national parliaments will 
have to become more substantially engaged in international affairs-even if their 
activities in this area may be limited to assessing the domestic impact of international 
activities. Already this is taking place within the EU. What lessons can be learnt and 
applied at the global level is beyond the scope of this thesis but certainly warrants 
further research. 
One possible consequence of globalisation hinted at by Europeanisation is that the 
distinction between foreign and domestic affairs may become progressively blurred. 
While it is already impossible for EU member states to conduct trade policy without 
consideration of EU activities, they, and the EU, are simultaneously required to comply 
with WTO rules, creating a multi-layered system of governance for national 
parliaments to operate within. The demands this places on national parliamentarians 
are significant. Not only do they have to recognise the limitations on their powers in 
this multi-layered system, they must also come to understand how it functions in order 
to maximise their ability to influence decisions taken within it. Developing an 
overview of activities and their implications at that national level then becomes 
crucial-as well as more complicated. The challenges for MPs should not be 
underestimated and will likely take time to implement, while also requiring 
continuous adjustments. 
Fifthly, as mentioned above, it is likely that with an increased interest in and scrutiny 
of European affairs, traditional political cleavages will come to apply to European 
issues as well. This development may not be so important, perhaps, in member states 
with a more positive attitude towards membership of the EU. However, in EU-skeptic 
countries, where the legitimacy conveyed on EU affairs by regular involvement may be 
resented, broad agreements on EU policy may disappear and scrutiny may develop in 
a more critical direction. 
In conclusion it can be argued that national parliaments have always been involved in 
European affairs and that their level of participation has increased in recent years. 
Parliamentarians have requested and invited these changes themselves, but have also 
been prompted by the European level, specifically via entries in the treaties 
encouraging participation, invitations to EP committee meetings and statements by 
heads of states about the importance of national parliaments to the European project. 
All parliaments within the EU have thus established or strengthened EU committees 
and scrutiny procedures. However, the precise undertaking of these changes and their 
effects have varied enormously from one parliament to the next. 
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Nonetheless, all national parliaments have been important as legitimisers of European 
cooperation through their ratification of the treaties on which European cooperation is 
based upon. Moreover, as European activities have broadened in scope and deepened 
in intensity, the role of national parliaments has become increasingly important. Not 
only have they become participants in procedures leading up to treaty negotiations 
(the Convention on the Future of Europe), they have also been recognised as important 
actors in European decision-making processes-even if such participation takes place 
indirectly through their national executive representatives in the Council. By 
participating more in European decision-making, national parliaments lend credibility 
to both European institutions and EU legislative output. Parliamentary discussions of 
appropriate methods for involvement send the signal that such activities are 
worthwhile, again contributing to the legitimacy of the EU and legislation originating 
from it. 
A specific challenge to national parliaments-although it too is indispensable to 
democracy within the EU-is the European Parliament. While democracy has been a 
requirement placed on member states from the outset of European cooperation, it has 
now become firmly established that the EU itself must also be democratic. As a 
consequence, the EP has gained powers and influence with each treaty revision, 
becoming an essential participant in the European legislative process. 
The perceived need for democracy at the European level is symptomatic of broader 
concerns about subjecting policy-making within international organisations, which 
have been strengthened in response to globalisation, to some kind of democratic 
control (Keohane, 2002; Slaughter, 2004). As globalisation develops, permitting an 
increasingly efficient transmission of raw materials, finished goods and (especially) 
know-how and economic resources across borders, regulation of these movements has 
become necessary, with the EU being one response. States have become more limited 
in both their political and economic options by globalisation and increasingly deprived 
of certain means of self-government. In the European integration process, member 
states have willingly relinquished part of their ability to act independently and 
autonomously, with national parliaments authorising the transfer of decisions from 
member states (where they have power over the legislative process) to the European 
level (where they may only influence decision-making). 
States apply and sign up to become members of these voluntary agreements in the full 
knowledge that membership imposes limits on their sovereignty (autonomy). 
Consequently, the concepts of sovereignty and state autonomy are being revised in the 
face of globalisation-and the role of national parliaments reassessed accordingly. 
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The adverse affect of globalisation on national parliaments is exacerbated by the fact 
that the 'lagging legislators' have been slower at developing international networks 
than have their governments (Slaughter, 2004, Chapter three). However, networks are 
developing with parliamentarians associating themselves directly with organisations 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as well as within geographical regions. Slaughter (2004, p. 121) claims that 
`(i]t is frankly hard to find a region of the globe without some kind of parliamentary 
assembly'. Slaughter further argues (Slaughter, 2004, p. 127-30) that parliamentary 
networks are developing for three main reasons: firstly, in order to counter existing 
networks of officials, secondly, because of a desire to interact for political purposes 
and, thirdly, to strengthen parliamentarianism as a profession. 
In this context parliamentary advocacy groups and 'educational' forums become 
important (see Slaughter, 2004, pp. 115-8,125-7). By addressing problems of a general 
nature (such as how to become better informed about activities at the international 
level), national parliamentarians may simultaneously learn about global networks as 
well. Within the EU the fora fulfilling this role are COSAC and the Speakers' 
Conference. The developments that have taken place within these organisations mirror 
developing parliamentary cooperation taking place on a wider global scale. 
However, accepting that national parliaments are important to the legislative process, 
as well as democracy at the European level, has prompted new questions about 
precisely how national parliaments are to be engaged in activities at the European 
level. This is especially so as the idea of a second (third) chamber at the European level 
has been rejected by most national parliamentarians. 
Nation states remain the building blocks of international organisations, including the 
EU, and consequently important seats of political power. Indeed, states 'remain central 
to the EU policy process, but they are no longer the only significant actors-and are not 
always the predominant actors' (Wallace, 2000, p. 532, emphasis in original). National 
parliaments therefore maintain their importance too, as they remain the ultimate 
legitimisers of national governments and their actions at the international level. The 
EU is an important actor in the international arena, but its mere existence and 
empowerment over time can also be seen as a response to globalisation and the 
repercussions it has had for nation states. Member state parliaments have seen 
limitations on their powers as a result of globalisation, but as members of the EU they 
are in the relatively advantageous position of being able to receive information about 
and influence certain decisions taken in this international forum. 
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Technically it may be possible to democratise the EU (and other international systems 
of cooperation) without the involvement of national parliaments. However, improving 
the democratic underpinnings of the EU by exclusively granting more powers to the 
EP is currently not a politically viable option. National parliamentarians have therefore 
become a necessary component in the European legislative process despite their lack of 
power over this process. National parliaments are unlikely to develop a direct role in 
European legislative procedures. They will only be able to influence decisions at this 
level-although as shown by the case studies, the influence exercised at the national 
level over the executive, extending to its behaviour and activities at the European level, 
can potentially be substantial. 
Reaching into the far corners of what has traditionally been considered domestic 
activities, the nature of European legislation means that traditional methods of 
scrutinising EuroFean-level activities are no longer sufficient. EU specialists cannot 
also be experts on all the areas in which the EU is active, making cooperation within 
parliaments necessary in order to undertake adequate scrutiny. EU subcultures may 
therefore be weakening as Europeanisation generates pressure for European affairs to 
be treated, if not similarly to domestic policy, then at least not with as much 
detachment as has been traditional for foreign affairs. 
National parliaments are likely, however, to remain firmly anchored in the domestic 
level, maintaining their roles as legitimisers of national executives as well as 
expressions of national sovereignty. They can therefore also be expected to remain 
independent and autonomous institutions, determining their own activities and 
procedures. As a consequence, the impetus behind any move by national parliaments 
to further develop their influence over European (or global) decision-making and 
activities must come from within national parliaments themselves. 
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Appendix A: Research Notes 
Primary research for this thesis has been conducted in two ways: through documents 
from the parliaments that were the subjects of the case studies and through interviews 
with politicians, civil servants and parliamentary staff. Further, a number of MEPs 
were also interviewed together with a representative from the Commission and staff 
from the EP. 
Documents were obtained from various sources. Many were available via the internet 
while others were collected during fieldwork. The aim was to obtain an overview of 
how the parliament's treatment of European legislation had developed over time, what 
the considerations behind changes had been as well as the likely direction of future 
changes. Where possible, documented debates and discussions preceding these 
documents were also considered in order to gain further understanding of the process 
that led to their creation. 
Interviews were conducted with politicians as well as parliamentary staff and civil 
servants. Several visits were made to London and Copenhagen, while a lengthy stay in 
Rome made research there possible. 
As the link between parliaments and the administrations was shown to be of 
significance, the view of the administration was obviously important to obtain 
although the main focus was on parliamentarians and their staff. ' 
For information about parliamentary EU committees, members (especially chairs) of 
EU committees were important interviewees, as were the staffs of these committees. 
However, members of other committees were also approached in order to develop a 
more thorough understanding of how EU matters are beginning to permeate the daily 
work of national parliaments (outside of EU committees). Not all were understanding 
of this request, with many referring to the 'experts' in EU committees. This was 
especially the case in Italy and the UK. 
In Denmark an additional group of interviewees was approached: former ministers 
with experience of the mandating process were asked for their opinion of this process. 
' Several appointments were made with members of the British civil service for interviews. However, all 
were cancelled, usually at the very last moment, leaving little time for rearranging such appointments. A 
high rate of turnover in staff at the relevant offices (relations with parliament on EU matters) further 
complicated the situation. Unfortunately, in the end, no interview was obtained with members of the 
British civil service. 
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As the change in government had been very recent (and because the previous 
government had governed 1993 - 2001), ex-ministers were deemed to have 
significantly more experience of working with the European Committee and the 
mandating procedure than the recently appointed ministers. Although the list of 
questions for the ex-ministers was the shortest, these gave rise to the longest interviews 
conducted for this thesis. 
Contact with interviewees was initiated by a physical letter, which included a brief 
introduction of the research and the basis for contacting the particular person. Where 
necessary, introductory letters were followed up by further letters or emails (if use of 
electronic media was initiated by the interviewee). Some interviewees were also 
contacted via telephone or via introductions and personal recommendations from 
previous interviewees. Especially in Italy this approach seemed both successful and 
appropriate. 
Previous interviewing experience convinced me that a formal list of questions to be 
answered by the interviewees was considered to be essential. Interviews were thus 
built upon lists of topics tailored to the separate groups of interviewees (see Appendix 
B for examples). The same topics would thus be covered in interviews with, for 
instance, chairs of EU committees. However, the questions were not necessarily asked 
in the exact same order or in exactly the same way. Furthermore, as interviewees had 
different amounts of time available, it was at times necessary to focus on the most 
important issues. In other situations, when time permitted, it was possible to allow the 
interviewee to expand more on the topics as well as following up on related matters. 
An example of a'related matter is the inter-ministerial'battles'. While these are of obvious importance to 
how an administration handles the coordination of EU affairs and its relations with the national 
parliament, it was an issue that was only brought up when time permitted. 
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Appendix B 
Questions for chairs of EU Committee 
1. Are you satisfied with current powers? 
2. Would you like to have mandating powers? (Question omitted in interview 
with chair of Danish EUC) 
3. What would mandating powers achieve? (Question omitted in interview with 
chair of Danish EUC) 
4. What level of control over decision-making process should national 
parliaments have? 
5. Has this question been discussed within committee or in international fora? 
6. How has co-ordination process influenced work? 
7. How well is Committee fulfilling its task? 
8. What could be done to improve its working conditions? 
9. What logistical/ library support does committee have? 
10. How much contact with MEPs? (what's desirable/how to develop? ) 
11. How do you 'use' your staff in Brussels? (how much staff there? ) 
12. How much contact wifit other parliaments? (what's desirable/how to develop? ) 
13. What do you think of DK Committee? Like to emulate it? (Question omitted in 
interview with chair of Danish EUC) 
14. Do you delegate stuff to select committees? 
15. How has increasing 'blending'/merging of foreign policy. and domestic policy 
affected work of committee? 
16. Would a second chamber in Europe a good idea? 
17. What are your feelings about the Convention? 
18. Is the Convention a good solution for specific situations like the Charter on 
Human Rights or for long-term involvement? 
19. What is the appropriate level of participation by parliaments in IGCs? 
20. What is the long-term role of EP? 
21. The EP is specifically mentioned in treaties, national parliaments are not, do 
you think they should be? What would their role be? 
22. What is the appropriate' division of labour' EP - national parliaments? 
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Questions for chairs of select committees 
1. What involvement does your committee have with EU-issues? 
2. Should national parliaments be more involved in EU-issues? How/ why not? 
3. Are you in contact with the European Scrutiny Committee? Are issues 
delegated? 
4. Do you leave it to EU-Committee to assess consequences of EU-legislation on 
issues within your remit? 
5. Is this satisfactory with blending /merging of domestic/ EU issues? 
6. Danish committee part of 'experiment' (explained to interviewees), would you 
like to emulate this? (Question omitted in interview with chairs of select 
committees in the Danish Folketing) 
7. Would it be appropriate for your committee to have more influence over EU- 
issues within your remit? 
S. What is the appropriate role of national parliaments in the EU? in IGCs? 
9. What is the appropriate'division of labour' EP - national parliaments? 
10. How has the blending of foreign policy/EU and domestic policy affected the 
work of your committee? 
11. How could the EP help you conduct your work better? 
12. Would a specialised COSAC be a good idea? 
13. Do you meet with 'twin Lommittees in other MS parliaments? in EP? 
14. Do you have any contact with your parliamentary representatives in Brussels? 
15. Do you have any contact with MEPs? 
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Questions for Danish ex-ministers 
1. How did you, as a minister, experience the mandating and questioning process 
in the EUC and other committees? ) 
2. What advantages/ disadvantages did you experience as the Folketing, through 
the EUC, followed the Council's work within your remit? ) 
3. When talking to politicians outside Denmark, one is given the clear impression 
that Denmark's system of mandating is seen as both troublesome and slow and 
that it delays decision-making at the European level. Was this your 
experience? ) 
4. To what extent has the fact that Danish governments often are minority 
governments influenced the mandates provided to the EUC? 
5. Do you believe it is possible to improve a) the way in which the Folketing 
handles EU affairs and b) the cooperation between select committees and 
departmental ministries? If yes, how? 
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Appendix C: List of interviews 
Where no name appears, the interviewee was promised anonymity. Instead, a title 
explaining the person's position will be listed. 
Brussels 
1. Jens-Peter Bonde (MEP) 
2. Richard Corbett (MEP) 
3. MEP's assistant 
4. Andrew Duff (MEP) 
5. Jo Leinen (MEP) 
6. Neil McCormick (MEP) 
7. European Parliament employee 
8. Mike Shackleton (EP) 
9. David Martin (MEP) 
10. Commission official 
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Denmark 
1. Margrethe Auken (MP) 
2. Svend Auken ex-minister 
3. Lars Barfoed (MP) 
4. EU-secretariat staff 
5. Pia Gjellerup ex-minister 
6. Ivar Hansen ex-speaker of the Folketing (email) 
7. EU-secretariat staff 
8. Kai Ikast ex-minister 
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs official 
10. Marianne Jelved ex-minister 
11. Jern Jespersen (MP) 
12. Henrik Dam Kristensen ex-minister 
13. EU-secretariat staff 
14. EU-secretariat staff 
15. Erik Larsen (MP) 
16. Claus Larsen Jensen (MP, Chair of the EUC) 
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs official 
18. Mogens Lykketoft ex-minister (email) 
19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs official 
20. Rasmus Nielsen altinget. dk 
21. Poul Nyrup Rasmussen ex Prime Minister (letter) 
22. Erling Olsen ex-speaker of the Folketing 
23. Ove Kai Pedersen Professor, Kebenhavns Universitet 
24. EU-secretariat staff 
25. EU-secretariat staff 
26. Kristen Touborg (MP) 
27. Jens Peter Vernersen (MP) 
28. Eyvind Vesselbo (MP) 
29. Margrethe Vestager ex-minister (email) 
30. Tove Videb ek (MP) 
31. Jacob Buksti ex-minister 
32. Niels Helveg Petersen ex-minister 
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Italy 
1. Senatorial employee 
2. Filadelfio Basile (Senator) 
3. Senatorial employee 
4. Chamber of Deputies staff 
5. Senatorial employee 
6. Alfiero Grandi (MP) 
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff 
8. Giorgio La Malfa (Senator) 
9. Andrea Manzella (Senator) 
10. Department of European Affairs official 
11. Chamber of Deputies staff 
12. Chamber of Deputies staff 
13. Giacomo Stucchi (MP) 
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff 
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United Kingdom 
1. Michael Ancram (MP) 
2. Lord Astor of Hever (Peer) 
3. European official 
4. Lord Brabazon (and House of Lords staff) (Peer) 
5. Cabinet office staff 
6. Michael Connarty (MP) 
7. David Curry (MP) 
8. House of Commons staff 
9. MP 
10. Jimmy Hood NO 
11. Michael Moore (MP) 
12. Lord Norton (Peer) 
13. Lord Oxburgh (Peer) 
14. Lord Peston (Peer) 
15. UK Parliament staff 
16. Lord Watson (Peer) 
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